

NOTE:

On July 1, 1950, Averell Harriman suggested to the President that it would be a good thing for him to have a talk with General ~~Marshall~~^{Marshall}. He said that he and Acheson lunched with the General that day at Leesburg and suggested that it would be useful to have a quiet talk with Marshall, if possible, on the following Sunday evening before he had to deal with various issues which would come before him on Monday.

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~EYES ONLY~~MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS - General MacArthur & W. A. Harriman

General MacArthur met me at Haneda Airport on our arrival at 9:45 A.M., August 6, 1960. He drove me to the guest house at the Embassy. As the window between the driver and his aide, and ourselves, was open, our conversation was general.

He described the satisfactory political development in Japan since my last visit. He spoke of the great quality of the Japanese; his desire to work, the satisfaction of the Japanese in work, his respect for the dignity of work. He compared it unfavourably to the desire in the United States for more luxury and less work.

He considered Communist infiltration into Japanese life was in no sense a threat as Communist ideas did not appeal to the Japanese, but, more importantly, it had the Russian label. The Japanese both feared and hated the Russians.

The reaction among the Japanese to our action in Korea was one of relief, as they interpreted it to mean that we would vigorously defend them against Russian invasion. They were not disturbed by our temporary difficulties, since they understood the military difficulties caused by the surprise attack. Their pride had been aroused by "his" confidence in them, shown by the withdrawal of most of the American troops. He could withdraw them all without any danger of disorder in Japan.

I was struck by the change in Tokyo: The reconstruction that had taken place from an almost ghost city to one of activity; the active spirit of the people on the streets; the great improvement in the way they looked and were clothed. Most of the houses were of course of the most temporary type of construction, but although shanties from our standpoint, perhaps adequate by Japanese standards.

He arranged for me and the officers with me to attend the morning briefing at 10:30 at Headquarters, and that I should call on him at his office at 11:30.

I had a $\frac{1}{2}$ hour talk with MacArthur in the morning; lunch with him and Mrs. MacArthur for the entire party, and then a further two-hour talk from 5:30 to 7:30 in the afternoon.

On Tuesday morning, after my return from Korea, we had a further four-hour talk before my departure.

The first $\frac{1}{2}$ hours included a military discussion at which Generals Ridgeway and Norstad participated. General Almond also was present.

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I will not attempt to divide the conversations chronologically, but largely by subjects.

Our first talk on Sunday morning covered the military situation as he saw it.

I explained to him that the President had asked me to tell him that he wanted to know what MacArthur wanted, and was prepared to support him as fully as possible. I asked MacArthur whether he had any doubts about the wisdom of the Korean decision. He replied, "absolutely none". The President's statement was magnificent. It was an historic decision which would save the world from communist domination, and would be so recorded in history. The commitment of our ground forces was essential, and victory must be attained rapidly.

MacArthur described his firm conviction that the North Korean forces must be destroyed as early as possible and could not wait for a slow build-up. He emphasized the political and military dangers of such a course; the discouragement that would come among the United Nations including the United States; the effect on Oriental peoples as well as on the Chinese Communists and the Russians. He feared that Russia and the Chinese Communists would be able to greatly strengthen the North Korean forces and that time was of the essence, or grave difficulties, if not disaster, were ahead.

(His military appraisal is dealt with in a separate memorandum, including the statement to the Joint Chiefs prepared by Ridgway, and signed by him, Horstad and myself.)

He did not believe that the Russians had any present intention of intervening directly, or becoming involved in a general war. He believed the same was true of the Chinese Communists. The Russians had organized and equipped the North Koreans, and had supplied some of the trained personnel from racial Koreans of the Soviet Union who had fought in the Red Army forces. The Chinese Communists had cooperated in the transfer of soldiers who had fought with the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria. These had not come over as units, but had been released in Manchuria, and reorganized into North Korean forces after they had been transported to North Korea. Their leadership was vigorous. A number of Russian officers were acting as observers but undoubtedly giving direction. Their tactics had been skillful, and they were as capable and tough as any army in his military experience.

He described the difference between the attitude towards death of Westerners and Orientals. We hate to die; only face danger out of a sense of duty and through moral issues; whereas with Orientals, life begins with death. They die quietly, "folding their arms as a dove

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folding his wings, relaxing, and dying". With that, MacArthur folded his arms, and sighed. (This was part of the dramatic speech he made to the three of us on Tuesday morning.)

MacArthur could not see why we could not quickly recruit experienced combat non-commissioned officers, so badly needed, among the many that had served in the last war. He thought we could get the fast ships and airplanes to transport the needed troops rapidly. To think that we might fail in this, he said, "makes me feel sick in my stomach". (Both of these things he said on Tuesday morning).

MacArthur wants maximum UN ground forces possible, as many as 30,000 or 40,000. He will take battalions (1,000 men) just as fast as they can come, with only their small arms. Actually, heavier artillery would be welcome, but the need is so great that he would take them with their small arms only. He feels the British should send a brigade from Hong Kong or Malaya; thinks it could be replaced from the United Kingdom. The French could send some forces from Indochina. A brigade from Pakistan and Turkey would be most welcome. Canada should send some troops. He was going to work on蒙特利尔 when he arrived the following week. He didn't have a good word to say about the Siamese, although he recognized the value of Eastern troops. He wasn't sure the Philippines could spare anything just now.

He has no doubts of the political outcome, once there is victory. Victory is a strong magnet in the East, and the Koreans want their freedom. When Syngman Rhee's Government is reestablished in Seoul, the UN-supervised election can be held within two months, and he has no doubt of an overwhelming victory for the non-communist parties. The North Koreans will also vote for a non-communist government when they are sure of no Russian or communist intervention. He said there was no need to change the Constitution, which now provides for 100 seats for the North. Korea can become a strong influence in stabilizing the non-communist movement in the East.

MacArthur thinks highly of Ambassador Macchio. He said they worked together fully and effectively.

In my first talk with MacArthur, I told him the President wanted me to tell him he must not permit Chiang to be the cause of starting a war with the Chinese communists on the mainland, the effect of which might drag us into a world war. He answered that he would, as a soldier, obey any orders that he received from the President. He said that he had discussed only military matters with the Generalissimo on his trip to Formosa. He had refused to discuss any political subjects whenever the Generalissimo attempted to do so. The Generalissimo had offered him command of the Chinese National troops. MacArthur had replied that that was not appropriate, but that he would be willing

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to give...

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to give military advice if requested by the Generalissimo to do so.

(MacArthur described the way to deal with Orientals. You must never make a direct command; always suggest what you want to be done as an idea worthy of thought; but suggest, however, as he did with the Generalissimo, that he would know best. He could then obtain complete loyalty and confidence. If he wanted a Chinese general to be appointed to a position of command, he would never demand it, but point out the qualities of the individual; and then it would be accepted as the Generalissimo's own idea. One should never talk in large groups, but personally, on matters of importance so that the individual's dignity could be maintained with his associates. One should only ask for important things, and recognize that Orientals have their own ways of doing things and we could not change them completely. He had not vetoed all the laws^{he} prevented them from taking many of the steps the Japanese Government desired, but vetoed only when he felt it most essential, even though on certain matters he thought they were making mistakes. They would learn then in their own way.) He thought that this was the way he had dealt with the Japanese and what had contributed to his success.

MacArthur gave me his memo of June 15 on the importance of Formosa from a strategic standpoint in the defensive system of the United States in the Far East. (A copy is in my file.) For reasons which are rather difficult to explain, I did not feel that we came to a full agreement on the way he believed things should be handled on Formosa and with the Generalissimo. He accepted the President's position and will act accordingly, but without full conviction. He has a strange idea that we should back anybody who will fight communism, even though he could not give an argument why the Generalissimo's fighting communists would be a contribution towards the effective dealing with the communists in China. I pointed out to him the basic conflict of interest between the U.S. and the Generalissimo's position as to the future of Formosa, namely, the preventing of Formosa's falling into hostile hands. Perhaps the best way would be through the medium of the UN to establish an independent government. Chiang, on the other hand, had only the burning ambition to use Formosa as a stepping-stone for his re-entry to the mainland. MacArthur recognized that this ambition could not be fulfilled, and yet thought it might be a good idea to let him land and get rid of him that way. He did not seem to consider the liability that our support of Chiang on such a move would be to us in the East. I explained in great detail why Chiang was a liability, and the great danger of a split in the unity of the United Nations on the Chinese-Communist-Formosa policies; the attitude of the British, Nehru and such countries as Norway, who, although stalwart in their determination to resist Russian invasion, did not want to stir up trouble elsewhere. I pointed out the great importance of maintaining UN unity among the friendly countries, and the complications that might

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result from any mis-steps in dealing with China and Formosa.

MacArthur would never recognize the Chinese Communists, even to the use of the veto in seating the Communists. He believes it would only strengthen the prestige of Mao Tse Tung's Government in China and destroy what he considers should be our objective: the splitting of the present supporters of Mao Tse Tung and the developing of strengthened resistance movements. He does not believe the Chinese want to come under Russian domination. They have historically opposed invasion from the North. We should be more aggressive than we have been so far in creating stronger dissension within China. I told him of the President's appointment of Bedell-Smith as Director of the CIA, which he warmly welcomed and asked me to extend an invitation to Bedell-Smith to come to see him as early as possible. MacArthur has not developed any plan of action in China. He believes there are great potentialities.

I emphasized the importance of getting evidence on the participation of the Chinese Communists in supporting the North Korean attack and present operations. There will be considerable support in seating the Chinese Communists at the next meeting of the Assembly. I explained that if we could obtain real evidence of direct support for the North Koreans, this might be the reason by which we could prevent the seating of the Communists on the moral issue involved.

In all, I cannot say that he recognizes fully the difficulties, both within the world and within the East, of whatever moves we make within China in our position with the Generalissimo in Formosa. He believes that our policies undermine the Generalissimo. He has confidence that he can get the Generalissimo to do whatever he is asked to undertake; is prepared to deal with the political problems, but will conscientiously deal only with the military side, unless he is given further orders from the President.

He had much to say of a derogatory nature about Strong, the Charge at Formosa, but said that he had a good impression of Rankin, the man who is to take his place. He will not inform Rankin of what he does in the military field in Formosa, but will report fully to the Joint Chiefs who can then keep the State Department informed. He believes that the reports which Strong has been sending have been inaccurate and harmful and he does not want to have any of his reports misinterpreted or watered-down, by being transmitted through State Department sources.

He has sent a military mission under General Fox to Formosa to find out the equipment needs of the National troops; it is already clear that they need barbed wire, reinforcing bars for concrete beach defenses, some additional motor transport, so that a defense can be

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worked out...

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worked out in depth with mobility for the reserves. He is quite satisfied that the military appropriations already available will be sufficient to take care of whatever they need. He has no intention of recommending any military equipment for anything other than the defense of the island, which in no sense would increase the ability of the National army to invade the continent. He regrets the Joint Chiefs' recommendation, to permit Chiang's airplanes to attack the concentration of troops, and particularly the airstripes on the mainland, has been overruled, but accepts the decision and will use every means to stop the Generalissimo sending out his planes, barring "shooting them down". He is satisfied the Chinese Communists will not attempt an invasion of Formosa at the present time. His intelligence and photographs show no undue concentration of forces, although they are building airstripes. He is convinced that the 7th Fleet plus the air jets from the Philippines and Okinawa, B-29's and other aircraft at his disposal, can destroy any attempt which may be made. He believes that the Chinese National troops can be organized to fight effectively and destroy any Communist troops which might get through. Should the Chinese Communists be so foolhardy as to make such an attempt, it would be the bloodiest victory in Far Eastern history, and would strengthen favorably morale in the East. He does not believe the reports that have been made to Washington of the bad situation within Formosa. He believes, however, that it can be improved, both politically and economically, and hopes RCA will continue its economic work so that Formosa can become increasingly important in trade relations with Japan and in the improvement of the economic life of the Formosans. He explained that his observations were of course preliminary, and he might amend them when he had more information, but he thought there was reasonable political stability; the Assembly of 22 members now included 18 Formosans and only 4 mainland Chinese. The budget had been balanced. Currency had been stabilized at 10 to 1 for the dollar. There was only a small black market. Wages and prices had been stabilized. Schools and the judicial system were working normally. Governor Wu (formerly Mayor of Shanghai) has perhaps been largely responsible for improved conditions. People are well fed and clothed and housed, perhaps as well now as they were under the Japanese. There was an air of tranquillity on the island. He considered the RRA work had been good and should be continued. We should see that the distribution got to the people, avoiding, as far as possible, graft.

The Japanese psychology is strongly and firmly friendly towards us. He believes the Japanese would be a good influence in the East; we should use the psychology of the present situation to press for an early peace treaty. I showed him the draft which had been given to me by Dean Rusk of the security provisions of the Treaty. He read them and said, "This is the right Idea: I approve." He said he

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believed he could "sell them to the Japanese Government". I explained that these provisions were still in the discussion stage, but I had been asked by the State Department to show them to him to get his reaction.

He spoke warmly of his relations with the State Department in the past five years, and of Sebald, his Political Advisor. He said the State Department had shown greater strength of understanding than the Pentagon, and had supported him in his concepts in the development of Japan.

In talking about arming the Japanese, the Japanese can pay for the maintenance of what forces are developed, MacArthur said, but we will have to supply the equipment which can be given on a lend-lease basis. He had asked for about 40 coast-guard cutters; further coastal patrol vessels could be considered later.

He said that he had already started to organize the Central Police Force, which in fact was a military organization of 75,000 men, which were being organized into four infantry divisions. Officers were being carefully selected from the Reserve officers who had fought in the war. None of the regular officers whose group had been accused of war crimes, were included. The men had combat experience. This force could be expanded if desired for the defense of the island only. At the present time, they were being equipped with small arms, but heavier equipment could be given them at a later time, should it be decided to do so. Such questions as a Japanese air force, stronger coast and navy defense, could be considered at a later date. The Japanese were quite prepared to develop their own defenses. They did not desire, nor should we permit, the development of a force which had offensive capabilities outside of the islands.

He spoke about the problem of the island of Quemoy, close to the mainland. The Generalissimo claims to have 70,000 men there which is important from the standpoint of eventually landing on the mainland, but has no value to the U.S. The Generalissimo considers Formosa part of China. MacArthur didn't see any evidence of a desire for independence so far, even among the Formosans he talked to, but perhaps that was natural at this stage. There were no soldiers on the street and no curfew; no evidence to support the pessimistic reports that had come from the State Department. Strong had been reporting exaggerated gossip.

MacArthur feels that we have not improved our position by kicking Chiang around, and hoped that the President would do something to relieve the strain that existed between the State Department and the Generalissimo. He suggested the President might reiterate his previous statements by threatening the Chinese Communists that he would withdraw ^{The military} in addition to attacking the airfields on the mainland if the Chinese

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continued to do this work, or to build up their positions. I told him that if he wanted to make that recommendation to the President it was up to him, but I assured him that I would strongly recommend to the President against his doing so. I emphasized the over-powering importance of UN unity and that this would only give further trouble and give the Russians a chance to develop an entering wedge.

MacArthur strongly supports the development of strong forces in Europe, and further believes we should be more vigorous in strengthening the military forces to resist Communists in the East. He believes the Chinese Communists will not move their own troops south, but will train Indochinese and Burmese, equip them, and attempt to create by infiltration and supported by well-equipped local Communist troops dissension, with the eventual hope of taking over these areas. Nehru, he believes is concerned over the threat of communism, but is acting wrongly in thinking he will get anywhere by appeasement. "We should fight the communists every place - fight them like hell!" He considers the Truman Doctrine "great". It should be carried out more vigorously. We should organise economic assistance in the East as we have been doing in the Marshall Plan in Europe. Large sums are not required. This assistance should be capably directed. We should see that it gets to the people and corruption is avoided.

When he saw me off at the airport, he said loudly so that all could hear, "The only fault of your trip was that it was too short".

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WAM/nmb.

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RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE COMPLAINT OF AGGRESSION UPON
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ADOPTED AT THE
474TH MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ON 27 JUNE 1950

The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and

Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and

Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and

Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

Saturday, June 24:

10.35 am The President accompanied by Governor William P. Lane, Jr., of Maryland, Mayor Thomas D'Alessandro of Baltimore and others took plane to Baltimore arriving at Friendship International Airport at 11:00 A.M.

11.15 am The President made speech at Dedication Exercises at Friendship International Airport.

12.00 The President left Friendship Airport for Kansas City

2.00 pm CDT Arrived Municipal Airport, Kansas City

June 26th, Monday:

8.00 am War in Korea

11.00 am (Secretary of Treasury John Snyder)

3.00 pm (Admiral Chester Nimitz)
(Admiral Raymond A. Spruance)
(Admiral Henry Hewitt)
(Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid)
(Admiral Dewitt C. Ramsey)
(Admiral Robert L. Dennison)

3.25 pm (Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter)

3.30 pm (Mr. Richard Burdige)

3.50 pm Honorable Dean Acheson - Secretary of State
Dr. John Nyun Chang - The Ambassador of Korea

Tuesday, June 27:

9.50 am Korean War Conference - the following conferred with the President:
Honorable Louis Johnson, The Secretary of Defense
General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force
Honorable Stephen T. Early, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Honorable W. Stuart Symington, Chairman, Nat'l. Security Resources Board
Honorable Dean Acheson, Secretary of State - and group of advisors
from State Department)
Honorable Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives
Senator Scott Lucas, Senate Majority Leader
Senator Tom Connally, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Senator Alexander Wiley, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Senator W. Alexander Smith, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Senator Elbert D. Thomas, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Senator Millard E. Tydings, Chairman, Senate Armed Services
Senator Styles Bridges, Senate Armed Services
Congressman John W. McCormack, House Majority Leader
Congressman John Kee, Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee
Congressman Charles A. Eaton, House Foreign Affairs Committee
Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee
Congressman Dewey Short, House Armed Services Committee
Congressman Mike Mansfield, House Foreign Affairs Committee

10.00 am (Staff Meeting)

12.30 pm Korean War Conference - (Secretaries and Joint Chiefs)
Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense
Honorable Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army
Honorable Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy
Honorable Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force
Honorable Stephen T. Early, Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General J. Lawton Collins
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman

1.00 pm (LUNCH)

3.00 pm The President spoke at laying of cornerstones of new U. S. Courthouse
for District of Columbia.

Tuesday, June 27th: (Continued)

4.10 pm (Mr. William Hillman) OFF THE RECORD

4.15 pm Honorable Frederick Lawton
Director, Bureau of the Budget

4.30 pm (Honorable Samuel I. Rosenman)
OFF THE RECORD

4.45 pm Honorable Carl H. Gray, Jr., Administrator of Veterans Affairs
(The President wrote General Gray that he would like to
discuss hospital matters with him, as well as several
bills for relief of people of Philippines)

5.00 pm Honorable John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury

Wednesday, June 26th:

9.30 am (Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense)
(Honorable Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army)
(Honorable Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy)
(Honorable Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force)
(Colonel Harry Shultz) - OFF THE RECORD

9.52 am (The President left for the Mayflower Hotel, where he "dropped in" and spoke to Convention of the Reserve Officers' Association)

10.30 am (STAFF MEETING)

11.30 am Commander David M. Brown, Disabled American Veterans
Mr. Francis Sullivan, Legislative Director, DAV
Mr. A. L. Koolish, General Manager of Iden-tag operations
(Commander Brown asked if he might present the President with the 200th millionth "Iden-tag" which this organization makes and distributes. Disabled veterans throughout the country make these tags and the proceeds are used to maintain claim service offices for disabled veterans. This tag was specially made for the President. The tags give name and address of car owners and license number of their cars.)

11.45 am (Senator Virgil Chapman, Kentucky)
(Senator Garrett L. Nethers, Kentucky)
(Senator Nethers called Mr. Connally and asked if they might come in OFF THIS RECORD, and discuss private matter with the President. LOWER WEST DOOR)

12.00 H. E. Henri Bonnett, the Ambassador of France
Pastor Marc Boegner, President of the Federation of Protestant Churches of France
(The French Ambassador made this request through the State Department. Boegner is leader of Protestantism in France.)

12.15 pm Honorable James Roosevelt
(Wired Mr. Connally June 18th, stating he would be in East at this time and would like to pay his respects to the President)

12.30 pm (Honorable W. Averell Harriman)
OFF THE RECORD

12.35 pm Honorable W. Stuart Symington, Chairman, N. S. R. B.
(Usual Wednesday appointment) One-half hour

1.00 pm (LUNCH)

Wednesday, June 28th: (Continued)

2.30 pm (The President dropped in on meeting of National Security Council in Cabinet Room)

3.15 pm Honorable William M. Boyle
(Usual Wednesday appointment - one-half hour)

3.45 pm The President received members of Washington Student Citizenship Seminar. About 110 members present.
(The President has received this Seminar in past years. List attached.)

3.50 pm (Honorable John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury)
(Honorable J. Howard McGrath, Attorney General of the U. S.)
(Honorable Thomas McCabe, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve)
(Arranged late Tuesday afternoon at suggestion of Secretary Snyder.
OFF THE RECORD. LOWER WEST DOOR)

4.20 pm (The President left for the Statler Hotel, where he addressed the Convention of the American Newspaper Guild)

Thursday, June 29th:

9.55 am (Mr. Walter Gates)
(Came to see Mr. Connally and saw the President OFF THE RECORD)

10.00 am (Staff Meeting)

11.00 am Honorable Frederick Lawton, Director, Bureau of the Budget
(One-half hour)

11.30 am Honorable Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture
(Called Mr. Connally to ask for this)

11.45 am (Vice Admiral E. B. Cochrane, Head of N. I. T.)
(Arranged by Admiral Dennison, who brought Admiral Cochrane
in OFF THE RECORD)

12.00 Honorable Edward R. Dudley, American Ambassador to Liberia
(In State Department on consultation and asked if he might
call before returning to his post at Monrovia)

12.10 pm (George Siddle)
(Mr. Donald Dawson) - OFF THE RECORD

12.15 pm The President received group of Overseas Employees of the State
Department, engaged in work on The International Information
and Educational Exchange Program.
(This group represents thirty-two overseas posts; are nationals
of other countries who are now in U. S. for two months orientation
and training. These foreign employees of the United States
Government were chosen from overseas posts for ability and
devotion to the United States International Information and
Educational Exchange Program. The State Department asked
that the President receive them.) - LIST ATTACHED.

12.30 pm The Secretary of State - Honorable Dean Acheson
(Usual Thursday appointment)

1.00 pm (LUNCH)

4.00 pm Press and Radio Conference

Thursday, June 29th: (Continued)

5.00 pm The following conferred with the President:
Honorable Dean Acheson - Secretary of State (and advisors)
Honorable Louis Johnson - Secretary of Defense
Honorable Thomas E. Finletter - Secretary of Air Force
Honorable Frank Pace, Jr. - Secretary of Army
Honorable Francis P. Matthews - Secretary of Navy
Honorable Stephen T. Early - Under Secretary of Defense
General Omar N. Bradley - Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
General J. Lawton Collins
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman
Honorable James Lay
Honorable George E. Meany
Honorable John Foster Dulles

7.00 pm (The President left for Statler Hotel, where he attended dinner
of Finance Committee of Democratic National Committee)

Friday, June 30th:

9.00 am (Secretary Snyder) - OFF THE RECORD

9.15 am (Secretary Acheson)
(Honorable W. Averell Harriman)
(Secretary Louis Johnson)
(Honorable Stephen T. Early) - OFF THE RECORD
(General Omar N. Bradley)
(General J. Lawton Collins)
(General Hoyt S. Vandenberg)
(Admiral Forrest Sherman)

10.00 am (Honorable Oswald Ryan, Acting Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board)
(Honorable Frederick Lawton, Chairman, Bureau of the Budget)

10.15 am (Staff Meeting)

11.00 am Honorable Alben Barkley, Vice President
Honorable Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State
Honorable John W. Snyder, Secretary of Treasury
Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense
Honorable J. Howard McGrath, Attorney General
Honorable Jesse M. Donaldson, Postmaster General
Honorable Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of Interior
Honorable Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture
Honorable Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce
Honorable Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor
Honorable Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives
Senator Scott Lucas, Senate Majority Leader
Congressman John W. McCormack, House Majority Leader
Senator Elbert T. Thomas
Senator Millard E. Tydings
Senator Tom Connally
Senator Alexander Wiley
Senator H. Alexander Smith
Congressman John Kee
Congressman Dewey Short
Congressman Mike Mansfield
Congressman Charles A. Eaton
Senator Chan Gurney
Congressman Overton Brooks
Congressman John M. Vorys
Senator Kenneth S. Wherry
Honorable W. Stuart Symington, Chairman, Nat'l. Security Resources Board
Honorable W. Averell Harriman, Special Ass't. to the President
Mr. George Elsey
Mr. James Ley

12.00 Honorable Joseph Kennedy

12.15 pm Honorable James M. Mead, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission.

12.25 pm (Honorable W. Averell Harriman) OFF THE RECORD

Friday, June 30th: (Continued)

12.30 pm Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas
12.45 pm Honorable Robert Butler, American Ambassador to Cuba
12.55 pm (Mr. Lewis Barringer) OFF THE RECORD
1.00 pm (LUNCH)
4.52 pm (The President left for Union Station, where he boarded train for Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, and Boy Scouts' Jamboree)
9.00 pm The President addressed Boy Scout Jamboree
9.45 pm The President boarded train. Detrained at Municipal Station, Philadelphia, and motored to Philadelphia Navy Yard, where he went aboard USS Williamsburg for leisurely cruise to Washington, D. C. Was accompanied by:
Mr. Steelman
Mr. Ross
Mr. Hassett
Mr. Murphy
Admiral Dennison
General Landry
Mr. Stowe
Mr. Elsey
Mr. Springarn
Mr. Ayers

Sunday, July 2nd:

4.00 pm Arrived Washington, D. C.

Monday, July 3rd:

10.00 am (Staff Meeting)

11.30 am Honorable Louis Johnson
Honorable Stephen T. Early
General Omar N. Bradley

12.00 Honorable Frederick Lawton, Director, Bureau of the Budget
(Half-hour)

12.30 pm Honorable Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State

1.00 pm (LUNCH)

4.00 pm At the Blair House - OFF THE RECORD
(Honorable Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State)
(Honorable John W. Snyder, Secretary of Treasury)
(Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense)
(Honorable Jesse M. Donaldson, Postmaster General)
(Honorable Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture)
(Senator Scott Lucas, Senate Majority Leader)
(Honorable E. Averell Harriman, Special Ass't. to the President)
(General Omar N. Bradley)
(Honorable Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of Navy)
(Honorable Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of Army)
(Honorable Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force)

Tuesday, July 4th:

HOLIDAY

The President remained at Blair House.

Wednesday, July 5th:

10.00 am (Staff Meeting)

11.10 am (Mr. Walter Gates) - OFF THE RECORD

11.15 am Senator Harry Darby, Kansas

(Called Mr. Connally Sunday to say he was leaving for Kansas on Thursday, and would like to see the President before leaving)

11.30 am H.E. Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne, the Ambassador of Norway
(Asked for this through Division of Protocol, stating he had just returned from Norway and had been instructed by his Government to deliver a message to the President)

11.45 am Honorable Daniel Bell

(Asked for this through Under Secretary Webb's office)

12.00 Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense

(Usual weekly appointment, one-half hour)

Honorable Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of Navy

12.30 pm Honorable E. Stuart Symington, Chairman, Nat'l. Security Resources Board
(Usual Wednesday appointment, one-half hour)

1.00 pm Lunch at the Blair House - OFF THE RECORD

(General Omar N. Bradley)

(General Dwight D. Eisenhower)

(General George C. Marshall)

(Admiral Forrest Sherman)

3.15 pm Honorable Gordon Gray

3.30 pm Honorable William E. Boyle

(Usual Wednesday appointment)

Thursday, July 6th:

10.30 am Press and Radio Conference

11.00 am (Staff Conference)

11.45 am (Honorable Byron C. Taylor) - OFF THE RECORD
(Dr. Friedrich Otto Dibelius, Bishop of Berlin)
(Bishop Dibelius presides over union of Lutheran and Reformed
churches; is a friend of the higher clergy of the Lutheran
Church in America; took very strong stand against Nazism
during the war. Arranged at suggestion of Byron Taylor -
OFF THE RECORD - waited in Cabinet Room)

12.00 Honorable Winthrop Aldrich

12.15 pm Honorable Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior

12.30 pm Honorable Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State

1.00 pm (LUNCH)

2.30 pm (The President sat in on meeting of National Security Council
in Cabinet Room).

3.15 pm Honorable William H. Boyle, Jr.

4.50 pm Honorable Carl R. Gray, Jr., Veterans Administrator
(Asked for forty-five minute appointment)

Friday, July 7th:

10.00 am CABINET MEETING - The following were present:
Honorable Alben Barkley, Vice President
Honorable Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State
Honorable John W. Snyder, Secretary of Treasury
Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense
Honorable J. Howard McGrath, Attorney General
Honorable Jesse M. Donaldson, Postmaster General
Honorable Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior
Honorable Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture
Honorable Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce
Honorable Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor
Honorable W. Averell Harriman, Special Asst't to the President
Honorable W. Stuart Symington, Chairman, N.S.R.B.

11.45 am (Mr. and Mrs. Walter Gates and son)
(Came to see Mr. Connally and then saw the President OFF THE RECORD)

11.55 am (Honorable George Allen) - OFF THE RECORD

12.00 Honorable E. L. Bartlett, Delegate from Alaska

12.15 pm Congressman John F. Shelley of California
(Called Mr. Connally on Wednesday to ask for this)

12.30 pm Congressman Foster Furcolo, Massachusetts
Dr. Charles L. Furcolo
(Dr. Furcolo is father of Congressman, who asked if he might just bring him in and introduce him to the President)

12.35 pm Honorable Myron Taylor
(Called Mr. Connally yesterday to ask for this)

12.45 pm Honorable Thomas H. McCabe, Chairman, Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System

1.00 pm (LUNCH)

3.00 pm Senator Willard E. Tydings, Maryland
Senator Styles Bridges, New Hampshire
Congressman Lelandale C. Sasser, Maryland
Congressman Leslie C. Arends, Illinois

3.15 pm Honorable John W. Snyder, Secretary of Treasury

3.30 pm (Honorable James S. Lay) and
Admiral Robert L. Dennison) OFF THE RECORD

Friday, July 7th: (Continued)

3.45 pm (Honorable Charles F. Brannan) - OFF THE RECORD
(Mr. Clarence J. McCormick)

4.45 pm Honorable W. Averell Harriman

Saturday, July 8th:

10.00 am (Honorable Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army) OFF THE RECORD

10.15 am (Honorable Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State) OFF THE RECORD

1.00 pm (Luncheon at the Blair House - OFF THE RECORD)
(Honorable Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy)
(Honorable Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force)
(General Omar N. Bradley)
(Admiral Forrest Sherman)
(General Hoyt S. Vandenberg)
(Major General Harry R. Vaughan)
(Honorable Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army)
(Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison)
(Brig. General Robert Landry)

Monday, July 10th:

10.00 am Big Four met with the President - the following were present:
Honorable Alben Barkley, Vice President
Senator Scott Lucas, Senate Majority Leader
Honorable Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives
Congressman John W. McCormack, House Majority Leader
(General Oscar N. Bradley - OFF THE RECORD)

11.00 am (Staff Meeting)

12.00 Honorable Edward J. Flynn
(Called Mr. Connally last week, from Poolesville, Maryland,
to ask for this)

12.15 pm Senator Robert S. Kerr, Oklahoma
Dr. Henry C. Bennett, President, Oklahoma A. and M. College
(Senator Kerr called Mr. Connally last Friday to ask if he
might bring Dr. Bennett in to call on the President)

12.30 pm Honorable Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State
(Usual Monday appointment)

1.00 pm (Cabinet Luncheon) OFF THE RECORD
The Following were present:
(Honorable Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State)
(Honorable John W. Snyder, Secretary of Treasury)
(Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense)
(Honorable J. Howard McGrath, Attorney General)
(Honorable Jesse W. Donaldson, Postmaster General)
(Honorable Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior)
(Honorable Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture)
(Honorable Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor)
(Honorable W. Averell Harriman, Special Asst. to the President)
(General Oscar N. Bradley)
The Vice President and Secretary Sawyer absent

3.15 pm (Mr. Ed. Harris, of St. Louis Post Dispatch) OFF THE RECORD
(Arranged by Mr. Ross. Mr. Ross brought him in from his office)

3.30 pm Honorable Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior
(Asked Mr. Connally last week to arrange this)

3.45 pm Honorable Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor

4.00 pm Honorable Frederick Lawton, Director Bureau of the Budget

4.15 pm Honorable John Steelman

4.30 pm (Dentist)

Tuesday, July 11th:

9.45 am (Honorable W. Averell Harriman) OFF THE RECORD

10.00 am (Staff Meeting)

11.00 am Senator Kenneth McKellar, Tennessee
Senator Carl Hayden, Arizona
Senator Styles Bridges, New Hampshire
Senator Chan Durney, South Dakota
Senator Tom Connally, Texas
Senator Walter F. George, Georgia
Senator H. Alexander Smith, New Jersey
Senator Alexander Wiley, Wisconsin
(At the President's direction, Mr. Connally invited the above members of Senate Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees, to come in for conference. They were not told subject of the conference, which is Point IV Program, with particular emphasis on recent action of Appropriations Committee in reducing the amount of money necessary for operation of the program) ONE-HALF HOUR

11.30 am Mr. John E. Buxton of Little Rock, Arkansas
(Wrote to the President in June, asking if he might come here and talk to him about Mississippi River Commission)

11.45 am Mrs. India Edwards
(Asked Mr. Connally to arrange this)

12.00 (General Frank Lowe) - OFF THE RECORD

12.30 pm Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense (Usual Tuesday appointment)
Honorable Thomas E. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force
Honorable Gordon Deane
(LUNCH)

1.00 pm (General Omar N. Bradley) OFF THE RECORD

3.15 pm Honorable John W. Snyder

3.25 pm (Mr. Joseph Quilfoyle) OFF THE RECORD

3.30 pm The President saw Members of the Communications Policy Board, as follows:
Dr. Irvin L. Stewart, President, University of W. Va.
Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, President, California Institute of Technology
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mr. David M. O'Brian, Hackettstown, N. J.
Professor William L. Everitt, Head, Dept. of Electrical Engineering,
University of Illinois
(Dr. Steelman) OFF THE RECORD

4.00 pm (Dentist)
(One hour)

Wednesday, July 12th:

10.00 am (Staff Meeting)

10.45 am (Honorable William D. Hassett)
(Captain Walter Karig, USN, Chief Editor)
(Commander Eric S. Purton, co-author)
(Lt. Commander Frank A. Manaugh, co-author)
(Captain R. John Long, chief illustrator)
(To present to the President Volumes I-V, of BATTLE REPORT.
Mr. Hassett brought them in OFF THE RECORD.)

11.00 am (Mr. Duke Shoop, Kansas City Star)
(Mr. Charles Ross)
(Mr. Ross brought Mr. Shoop in OFF THE RECORD from his office)

11.15 am Congressman Jacob K. Javits, New York
(Wrote to the President on subject bearing on European Recovery Program - the President in replying, stated he would be glad to talk to him about it.)

11.30 am Honorable Thomas D. McCabe, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System
(Mr. Oliver Powell)
(When Mr. McCabe saw the President on July 7th, he arranged to bring in OFF THE RECORD, Mr. Powell, and introduce him to the President)

12.00 Dr. L. E. Smith, President, Elon College, N. C.
(Wrote to the President in June, reminding him of the President's inability in 1945 to keep engagement at Elon College to receive honorary degree, which was received for him by Congressman Durham; also mentioned that he has never had opportunity of meeting the President and wanted to meet him very much)

12.15 pm Honorable James Clement Dunn, American Ambassador to Italy
(In Department for consultation and asked, through Division of Protocol, if he might pay respects)

12.25 pm (Honorable Paul Fitzpatrick)
(George McFadden)
(Mrs. Mary Easterling)

12.30 pm Honorable W. Stuart Symington, Chairman, N. S. R. B.
(Usual weekly appointment - One-half hour)

1.00 pm (LUNCH)

3.00 pm (General Omar N. Bradley) - OFF THE RECORD

3.15 pm Honorable Joseph K. Carson
(Formerly Commissioner on Maritime Commission. Arranged by Dr. Steelman)

Wednesday, July 12th: (Continued)

3.25 pm (General Arthur Wilson)
(General Thomas Wilson) - OFF THE RECORD

3.30 pm Honorable Henry F. Schricker, Governor Of Indiana
(Congressman Madden, of Indiana, called Mr. Connally
yesterday to ask for this)

3.45 pm Honorable William M. Boyle
(Usual weekly appointment - one-half hour)

4.15 pm Honorable John L. Sullivan
(Called Mr. Connally this week to ask for this)

Thursday, July 13th:

9.30 am (General Omar Bradley) - OFF THE RECORD

9.45 am (Honorable W. Averell Harriman) - OFF THE RECORD

10.00 am (Staff Meeting)

10.35 am (Miss Harvey)
(Mr. Fitzgerald) - OFF THE RECORD

10.45 am (Mrs. Henry C. Chiles, of Lexington, Missouri)
(and grandchild, Mary Lee Mayfield, aged 8)
(Mrs. Chiles wrote Mr. Connally she would be in town at this time visiting her son Frank, and asked if she might bring her granddaughter in to meet the President. Will come to see Mr. Connally and see the President OFF THE RECORD)

11.15 am Honorable Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture

11.45 am Mrs. Nellie Tayloe Ross, Director, Bureau of the Mint
Mr. Carter Barron
Mr. Joseph McGarragh
Mr. Paul Keesman
(Mr. Barron asked Mr. Connally if they might present to the President the gold medal struck by the Mint to be given to the President by the Sesquicentennial Committee)

12.00 General Edwin Schwien
(Old friend of the President's; arranged at request of Joe Healey, who phoned Mr. Connally ten days ago that Schwien would be in Washington at this time)

12.10 pm Mr. Earl Grant, Democratic candidate for Governor of Maine

12.15 pm H. E. Athanase G. Politis, the Ambassador of Greece
(Newly appointed - to present papers)

12.30 pm Honorable Dean G. Acheson, the Secretary of State
(Usual Thursday appointment)

1.00 pm (LUNCH)

2.30 pm (The President will drop in on Security Council Meeting in Cabinet Room)

4.00 pm Press and Radio Conference

Friday, July 14th:

10.00 am Cabinet
(All regulars present except Secretary Brannan; Harrison and Symington will also attend)

11.00 am (Staff Meeting)

12.00 Dr. Billy Graham
Mr. G. F. Beavan
Mr. Cliff Burrows
(This request came originally to Congressman John McCormack from Congressman Joseph R. Bryson, of South Carolina. Congressman McCormack took it up with Mr. Connally)

12.15 pm Commander Donald J. McQuade, National Catholic War Veterans
(Asked Mr. Connally if he might pay respects. Is believed to be youngest Commander ever selected to any veterans organization)

12.30 pm (Mr. Bernard Bellin.)
(Mr. John Perry, Jr.)
(Came in OFF THE RECORD. Mr. Connally arranged this with Mr. Bellin yesterday)

12.45 pm Congressman Raymond L. Karst, Missouri
(Asked for this as early as possible, stating he wished to talk over political situation with the President)

1.00 pm (LUNCH)

3.15 pm (Honorable Gordon Gray) - OFF THE RECORD

3.30 pm (Dentist)
(1½ hour)

Saturday, July 15th:

9.30 am (General Omar N. Bradley) - OFF THE RECORD
9.45 am (Honorable W. Stuart Symington) - OFF THE RECORD
10.00 am (Admiral Robert L. Dennison)
(Honorable James Lay) - OFF THE RECORD
11.00 am (Dentist)
1.00 pm (LUNCH)
3.30 pm Blair House
Honorable Louis Johnson
Honorable Stephen T. Early
Honorable Frank Pace, Jr.
Honorable Francis P. Matthews
Honorable Thomas K. Finletter
General J. Lawton Collins
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Admiral Forrest Sherman
General Omar N. Bradley
Honorable W. Averell Harriman

Monday, July 17th:

9.30 am (General Omar N. Bradley) OFF THE RECORD

10.00 am The Vice President, Honorable Alben Barkley
The Speaker, Honorable Sam Rayburn
Senator Scott Lucas, Illinois
Congressman John W. McCormack, Massachusetts

10.45 am Congressman John W. McCormack, Massachusetts
Mr. Ernest E. Swartzwelder, of Youngstown, Ohio
(Congressman McCormack talked to the President and to Mr. Connally about this last Monday. Mr. Swartzwelder is one of leading steel men in country and is one of the country's outstanding industrialists, according to Congressman McCormack. He is President of Aetna Standard Engineering Company)

11.00 am (Staff Meeting)

12.00 Mr. George E. Leighty, Chairman, Railroad Labor Executive Association
(Ed Keating of A. F. of L., asked Mr. Connally to arrange this)

12.15 pm Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
(Mrs. Roosevelt asked Mr. Bassett to arrange this)

12.30 pm Honorable Dean G. Acheson, the Secretary of State
(Usual Monday appointment)

1.00 pm (LUNCH)

3.00 pm (Mr. W. V. Woodward)
(Mr. A. E. Weston of Neosho, Missouri) OFF THE RECORD

3.15 pm (Congressman Clarence Cannon, of Missouri) OFF THE RECORD

3.30 pm Honorable Thomas E. Murray, Member, Atomic Energy Commission
(To thank the President for appointment, and also to tell him about his recent trip. ONE HALF HOUR)

4.00 pm Senator Clinton Anderson, New Mexico
(Called Mr. Connally last week to ask for this)

4.15 pm (Dentist)

Tuesday, July 16th:

9.30 am (General Omar N. Bradley) OFF THE RECORD

10.00 am (Staff Meeting)

11.00 am Mr. R. W. Kehler, President, U. S. Junior Chamber of Commerce
Mr. J. R. Gorman, Vice President, " " " "
Captain James D. Bligh, Jr., President, D. C. Jr. Chamber of Commerce
Mr. Paul M. Hawkins, Nat'l. Director, U. S. Junior Chamber of Commerce
Lou Brott, Public Relations, U. S. Junior Chamber of Commerce

11.15 am Honorable James G. Patton, President, National Farmers Union
(Phoned Mr. Connally last week to say he would be here at this time
and wanted very much to have talk with the President.)

11.30 am Congressman Edward J. Hart, New Jersey
Congressman Charles R. Howell, New Jersey
Congressman Peter Wallace Rodino, Jr., New Jersey
Congressman Hugh J. Addonizio, New Jersey
(Congressman Hart called Mr. Connally last week to ask if he and the
above three Democratic Congressman from New Jersey might see the President)

11.45 am (Mr. William Randolph Hearst, Jr.)
(Mr. Bernard Bellin)
(Arranged by Mr. Connally, OFF THE RECORD. LOWER WEST DOOR,
One-half hour)

12.15 pm Honorable Waldemar J. Galimberti, American Ambassador to Poland
(Asked for this through Division of Protocol; has recently returned
to United States and would like to pay respects)

12.30 pm The Secretary of Defense (Usual weekly appointment)
The Secretary of Army

1.00 pm (LUNCH!)

2.00 pm (Dentist)

3.15 pm Honorable Alex Campbell
(Democratic candidate for Senate from Indiana; in town and asked to pay
respects)

3.30 pm (Admiral William D. Leahy) OFF THE RECORD

4.00 pm Cabinet
(All regulars present except Agriculture; Symington and Harriman attended)

6.00 pm (Mr. Tom Evans) OFF THE RECORD

7.30 pm At Blair House
(Speech Conference)

Wednesday, July 19th:

9.30 am (General Omar N. Bradley) OFF THE RECORD

10.00 am (Staff Meeting)

10.45 am (Honorable Bryce Smith)

11.00 am Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Minnesota
Mr. York Langton, Congressional Candidate, 5th Dist., Minnesota
Honorable Karl Polvaag, State Chairman, Minnesota
Judge Harry Peterson, Democratic Candidate for Governor, Minnesota
Mr. William C. Sims, Administrative Assistant to Senator Humphrey
Mr. Max Kampelman, Legislative Counsel to Senator Humphrey
Mr. Frederick Gates, Campaign Manager for Langton
Mr. Harvey Dashi, Campaign Manager for Peterson
(Mr. Boyle asked Mr. Connally to arrange for this Minnesota group
to call on the President)

11.15 am (Mr. Elmer F. Harber)
(Honorable Donald Dawson)
(Arranged by Mr. Dawson, who brought Mr. Harber in OFF THE RECORD)

1.00 pm (LUNCH)

1.15 pm (Dentist)

10.30 pm The President broadcast from the Projection Room of the White House.
The following guests were invited:

The Vice President	Stephen Spingarn
Secretary of State	David Stowe
Secretary of Treasury	Donald Dawson
Secretary of Defense	William D. Pascett
Attorney General	Charles Ross
The Postmaster General	John Steelman
Secretary of Interior	Charles Murphy
Secretary of Commerce	Admiral Sauers
Secretary of Agriculture	James Lay
Secretary of Labor	William Hopkins
Honorable W. Averell Harriman	Herbert Miller
Honorable W. Stuart Symington	Mark Leva
Admiral Dennison	Joseph Feeney
David Niles	Colonel Charles Maylon
General Vaughan	Eben Ayers
George Elsey	Colonel Mara

Sunday, July 2nd:

4.00 pm Arrived Washington, D. C.

Thursday, July 20th:

9.30 am (General Omar N. Bradley) OFF THE RECORD

10.00 am (Staff Meeting)

11.30 am (Colonel Pinckney)
(Honorable Donald Dawson) OFF THE RECORD

12.00 (Mr. Walker Stone, Editor, Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance)
(Mr. Bernard Bellin)
(Mr. Bellin arranged this with Mr. Connally; will bring Stone
in OFF THE RECORD. LOWER WEST DOOR)

12.30 pm Honorable Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State
(Usual Thursday appointment)
Honorable Charles Sppford, Deputy U.S. Representative to Atlantic Council

12.50 pm (Honorable Richard Patterson) OFF THE RECORD

1.00 pm (LUNCH)

3.15 pm (Honorable Gordon Gray) OFF THE RECORD

3.30 pm Honorable Stuart Symington, Chairman, Nat'l. Security Resources Board
Honorable John F. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury
Honorable Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce
Honorable Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior
Honorable Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor
(Mr. Connally asked them to come in for talk with the President)

4.15 pm (Dentist)

Friday, July 21st:

9.30 am (General Omar N. Bradley) OFF THE RECORD

10.00 am Cabinet
(All present, including Mr. Symington & Mr. Harriman; also General Bradley)

11.00 am (Staff)

12.00 (Mr. and Mrs. Lee Dickson and daughter) OFF THE RECORD
Mr. Dickson is Postmaster at Carrollton, Missouri. He wrote Mr. Bassett that he would be here at this time, and as he was old personal friend would like to call on the President. Came to see Mr. Connally and saw the President OFF THE RECORD.

12.15 pm Honorable Raymond W. Foley, Administrator, Housing & Home Finance Agency
(Called Mr. Connally earlier in the week to ask for this)

12.30 pm Honorable Ward M. Canaday, United States Co-chairman, Caribbean Commission
(Called Mr. Connally last week to ask for this)

1.00 pm (LUNCH)
(Mr. Edward P. Neild) OFF THE RECORD
Mr. Neild had lunch with the President at Blair House

3.00 pm The President received members of Aviation Development Advisory Committee, as follows:

Mr. C. J. Reese, President Continental Motors, Inc. Muskegon, Michigan	Mr. Leighton Collins, Editor Air Facts New York, N. Y.
Mr. Harold F. Wood, President Wood Chevrolet Company, Inc. Birmingham, Alabama	Mr. James D. Ramsey, Director Nebraska State Aero Commission Lincoln, Nebraska
Mr. George E. Haddaway Publisher & Editor Southern Flight Dallas, Texas	Mr. J. B. Martranft, Jr. General Manager Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association Washington, D. C.
Mr. W. O. Marsh, President Marsh Aviation Company, Inc. Phoenix, Arizona	Mr. Maxwell W. Balfour Vice President & Director Spartan School of Aeronautics Tulsa, Oklahoma

Friday
July 21st:

(Continued)

Mr. E. B. Williamson, President Bearing Sales & Service, Inc. Seattle, Washington	Mr. Arthur Godfrey Aviation Enthusiast and Proponent Extra-ordinary, Radio & Television New York, N. Y.
Dr. H. L. Casebeer, President Butte Chamber of Commerce Rancher, Manufacturer, Surgeon Butte, Montana	Mr. Delos W. Rentzel Administrator Civil Aeronautics Administration Washington, D. C.
Dr. Lynn L. Bollinger Graduate School of Business Administration Harvard University Boston, Massachusetts	Mr. Wiley R. Wright, Director Aviation Development Civil Aeronautics Administration and Executive Secretary of the Aviation Development Advisory Committee
Mr. William Berry Asst. to Regional Administrator Civil Aeronautics Administration Region Four Fort Worth, Texas	Mr. Robert Wear (representing Amon G. Carter Publications) Fort Worth Star-Telegram Fort Worth, Texas

3.15 pm (Honorable Clark Clifford) OFF THE RECORD

3.30 pm Honorable Frederick Lawton, Director, Bureau of the Budget
(One-half Hour)

4.00 pm Congressman Adolph J. Sabath, Illinois
(Postponed from yesterday)

4.15 pm (Honorable Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State)
(Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense)
(Honorable W. Averell Harriman) OFF THE RECORD

4.30 pm (Honorable Mon Wallgren) OFF THE RECORD

5.00 pm (Dentist)

CONFIDENTIAL

July 1, 1950

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT



Dear Mr. President:

Believing that it would be a good thing to have a talk with General Marshall, Dean and I motored down to Leesburg and lunched with him today.

As always, he has a vigorous and confident understanding of the basic problems involved in the Korean situation. I am sure you would find it useful to you to have a quiet talk with him, if possible, Sunday evening, before you have to deal with the various issues that will be before you on Monday.

Respectfully,

/s/ Averell (Harriman)

The President
The White House

C
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Y

RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE COMPLAINT OF AGGRESSION UPON THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA ADOPTED AT THE 476TH MEETING OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ON 7 JULY 1950



The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its Resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

E.O. 13526. See (P) and (D), or (E)

Dep't. of State Distr. 7-14-75

D, M.R. ✓✓, MARS Date 4-23-75

June 25, 1950 - Sunday

Subject: Muccio telegram.

Eben Ayers was asked Saturday evening by the White House reporters who were staying at the Muehlebach Hotel in Kansas City, what the President's reaction to Korea was. Ayers said he did not know, nor did he propose to call the President because, he said, he did not wish to disturb him. Ayers did not know that the President had discussed the matter with Acheson, as he had no contact with the President Saturday evening.

When the (Muccio) telegram was delivered to Ayers about 1:30 A.M., C.S.T., he still did not call the President, as the matter did not seem to him important enough to waken the President in the middle of the night. He still did not realize that the President already knew the contents of the telegram from Acheson's phone call.

On Sunday morning, June 25, Ayers drove from Kansas City to Independence. He found the President had driven to Grandview, and he decided to await his return rather than follow him. He handed the President the telegram when the latter returned to Independence from Grandview about noon.

Actually, no harm was done by this tardy delivery of the telegram because the contents were known to the President. Ayers, however, had made no effort to ascertain that fact and was unaware of it.

SOURCE: G.M.E. discussions with Ayers, June and July 1951.

June 24, 1950 - Saturday

Subject: Acheson's phone call to the President.

*
X

"At eight o'clock, Central Standard Time in Independence, Missouri, Saturday night, I received a telephone call from the Secretary of State informing me that the North Korean forces had invaded South Korea in an all-out effort to overturn the South Korean Government. We then discussed the situation and a decision was made to call a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. That meeting convened about two o'clock, Sunday afternoon."

Source: H.S.T. to G.M.E.,
June 27, 1950.

Sometime after 10:30 P.M., E.D.T., Acheson telephoned the President and advised him of the hostilities in Korea. Acheson told the President that he had already sent him a telegram from Washington giving him all the available information known to the State Department. Acheson later said he received this report from Korea between 10 and 10:30 P.M., E.D.T.

Source: Eben Ayers' Chronology.

* Ps: undoubtedly is too early time.

Mr. Dulles
Mr. Allison

Mr. John Foster Dulles and Mr. John Allison to the
Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary Rusk
[Extract from Telegram]



Tokyo, June 25, 1950

[Received June 25, 1950,
10:35 a.m.]

It is possible that the South Koreans may themselves contain and repulse the attack and, if so, this is the best way. If, however, it appears that they cannot do so, then we believe that United States force should be used.... To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war. We suggest that the Security Council might call for action on behalf of the organization under Article 106 by the five powers or such of them as are willing to respond.

John

(Not recorded
under 106)

Mr. Dulles
also - we wish to draw it
to your attention,

June 25, 1950 - Sunday

Subject: Blair House Meeting.

The President apparently had the following papers before him at the Blair House meeting. They were handed by the President as one group to Miss Conway for file:

1. "White 3", the copy of Muccio's telegram to State
~~had been~~ which was forwarded through the White House Signal Center for the
~~in advance~~ President at the request of Acheson.

2. Notes, probably by the usher, of a telephone report from Matt Connelly: ~~to the effect that~~ "Bill Foster says Hoffman is sick," and "all women and children have been evacuated from Korea, ship has destroyer escort."

3. The text of the resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council Sunday afternoon.

4. The "action copy" of telegram 1726, from the Charge at Moscow to the State Department (action was marked for "RE", and this copy was probably handed to the President by Dean Rusk or Acheson).

5. A six-page memorandum entitled "Points Requiring Presidential Decision," (apparently the notes from which Acheson spoke) [they parallel what he actually did, as noted by [unclear.]]

Paul's interpretation of

SOURCE: ✓ President's personal files in Rose Conway's office.

POINTS REQUIRING PRESIDENTIAL DECISION

1. Should General MacArthur be authorized to supply South Korea with arms and other equipment over and above the supplies of ammunition presently authorized under the MDAP Program?

Discussion: Present authorization under the MDAP Program permits General MacArthur to supply South Korea with additional ammunition which he has available. He is now arranging to deliver such supplies. He is not currently authorized to furnish arms and other equipment such as anti-tank guns, artillery, etc.

Recommendation: That General MacArthur be authorized to supply South Korea with such arms and other equipment as is available to him and which in his judgment is important to support the Southern Korean defense effort.

2. What orders should be given to General MacArthur regarding the extent to which he should use available forces to provide protection for the evacuation of Americans from South Korea and for the delivery of arms, etc., to South Korea?

Discussion: Under the standing approved evacuation plans, Ambassador Muccio is authorized to call upon General MacArthur to provide air, sea or other transportation facilities for

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the evacuation of Americans from South Korea. General MacArthur is authorized in providing such transportation to furnish at the same time any necessary air or sea cover to protect the operation.

Further orders are desired to guide General MacArthur in the exercise of his discretion.

While certain air cover based on Japan could be utilized, it may be desirable or necessary to base fighter aircraft on Kimpo Airport at Seoul in order to make the necessary protection fully available.

An important element in the situation is the presence of the North Korean tank forces, estimated at some 70 tanks, at a point reported to be only 15 or 20 miles north of Seoul. If the North Korean forces capture Kimpo Airport, evacuation might be made impossible. Use of our air cover might therefore extend to bombing or strafing operations against North Korean tank or other ground forces or operations against North Korean air forces. It is considered desirable that Kimpo Airfield be held for the present, not only to aid in evacuation plans but also for its effect on the morale of the army, government and people of South Korea. Retention

of

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- 3 -

of the airport is also important to facilitate the delivery of ammunition or other arms. While American dependents are already being evacuated, other American personnel need not be immediately brought out. So long as any remain in Korea, the suggested operation would have justification in this fact.

Recommendation: That General MacArthur be ordered in his discretion so to use air cover for evacuation operations as to prevent their interruption by North Korean forces;

That General MacArthur be further ordered in his discretion to use the Naval forces at his disposal to hold such Korean ports as he believes may be useful in completing evacuation plans.

3. If requested by the Security Council to assist in executing a resolution for the termination of the invasion of South Korea, what assistance would the United States be prepared to render?

Discussion: The Security Council has adopted a resolution calling on the North Korean forces to cease fire and withdraw beyond the 38th parallel. The resolution called upon all member states to assist in the execution of the resolution.

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- 4 -

In the absence of the Soviet representative, it might be possible to have the Security Council adopt a further resolution calling upon all or certain states to respond in so far as they are able to any request from the Korean Government for aid in its defensive effort.

In pursuance of such a resolution the United States would be justified in using land, sea and air power to render material assistance to the South Korean military effort.

If such action is considered desirable, steps toward its implementation would have to be taken immediately.

Recommendation: That the Joint Chiefs of Staff be requested to inform the President immediately what action of the type indicated would be within the capabilities of the United States and what their estimate of the probable local military value in Korea of such effort would be.

If the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that such action would be within the capabilities of the United States and would be useful, that steps be immediately taken to secure such Security Council action.

b. In the light of the Korean developments, what action should the United States take in regard to Formosa?

Discussions:

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- 5 -

Discussion: The invasion of Southern Korea cannot be regarded as any isolated incident. It alters the strategic realities of the area and is a clear indication of the pattern of aggression under a general international Communist plan. Quick affirmative action by the United States in other Far Eastern trouble spots will contribute to the disposal of the Korean situation and also to forestalling a deterioration of the entire Far Eastern situation.

It is unnecessary to review the history of the Formosa problem but it seems clear that Formosa now offers an opportunity for United States action of general utility in maintaining the peace of the Pacific area.

Recommendation: That as soon as North Korean non-compliance with the Security Council resolution is known, the 7th Fleet be ordered to proceed to Formosan waters. The task assigned the Fleet will be to prevent any landing upon Formosa by Chinese Communist forces from the mainland. The Fleet will also be charged with terminating the Nationalist blockade of the China coast or other Nationalist operations against the mainland;

That the United States announce its purpose is to prevent the extension of aggression to Formosa and

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- 6 -

to protect the interests of the Formosans without prejudice to the future disposition of the island. The United States is prepared to submit to the United Nations the decision concerning the island's future.

5. In the light of the Korean developments, what action should the United States take in regard to Southeast Asia?

Discussion: The reasons for prompt action in Southeast Asia are the same as those stated under question 4.

Recommendation: That the programs for military aid to Indo-China, Burma and Thailand be executed immediately with at least some token deliveries made at once through the use of such extraordinary clearances and procedures as can be devised.

~~S E C R E T~~

Sunday
June 25,
1950

Dinner

Baked Fruit Cup

Fried Breast of Chicken
Current Jelly
Cream Gravy
Shoestring Potatoes
Buttered Asparagus
Scalloped Tomatoes
Hot Biscuits



Hearts of Lettuce
Russian Dressing

Vanilla Ice Cream
Chocolate Sauce
Cup Cakes

*Volunteers were called before dinner
to take on duty.
Dinner was served at 7:30 P.M.*

June 26, 1950 - Monday

Subject: President Truman's conversations with George M. Elsey.

Immediately after the first statement was finished and while Charlie Ross was taking it off for mimeographing, I stayed behind to chat with the President about the significance of Korea. I expressed my very grave concern about Formosa. I said it seemed to me this was the perfect ~~conceal~~ ^{comple} for the Chinese communists to take.

The President walked over to the globe standing in front of the fireplace and said he was more worried about other parts of the world. He said he had ordered MacArthur to give ammunition to the Koreans, that the Air Force and the Navy were to protect the evacuation of Americans. That much was easy and clear. But what he was worried about, the President said, was the Middle East. He put his finger on Iran and said: "Here is where they will start trouble if we aren't careful."

"Korea," he said, "is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough enough now, if we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won't take any next steps. But if we just stand by, they'll move into Iran and they'll take over the whole Middle East. There's no telling what they'll do, if we don't put up a fight now."

The President appeared sincerely determined to go very much further than the initial orders that he had approved for General MacArthur the evening before.

(SOURCE: G.M.E. notes of June 26, 1950)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

24 JUNE 1950

FROM: THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON D.C.
TO : THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ME : WHITE 3
DTG : 250515Z

THE SECRETARY OF STATE REQUESTED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE TRANSMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT:

TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM SEOUL
TO SECRETARY OF STATE
NO NINE TWO FIVE CMA JUNE TWO FIVE CMA ONE ZERO ABLE MIKE
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SENT DEPARTMENT NINE TWO FIVE CMA REPEATED INFORMATION CINCPAC.

ACCORDING KOREAN ARMY REPORTS WHICH PARTLY CONFIRMED BY KHAG FIELD ABCIQR REPORTS CMA NORTH KOREAN FORCES INVADED ROK TERRITORY AT SEVERAL POINTS THIS MORNING. ACTION WAS INITIATED ABOUT FOUR ABLE MIKE ONGJIN BLASTED BY NORTH KOREAN ARTILLERY FIRE. ABOUT SIX ABLE MIKE NORTH KOREAN INFANTRY CONDENSE CROSSING PARALLEL IN ONGJIN AREA CMA KAPSONG AREA CMA CHUNCHON AREA AND AMPHIBIOUS LANDING WAS REPORTEDLY MADE SOUTH OF KANGNUMO ON EAST COAST. KAESONG WAS REPORTEDLY MADE CAPTURED AT NINE ABLE MIKE WITH SOME ONE ZERO NORTH KOREAN TANKS PARTICIPATING IN OPERATION. NORTH KOREAN FORCES CMA SPEARHEADED BY TANKS, REPORTEDLY CLOSING IN ON CHUNCHON. DETAILS OF FIGHTING IN KANGNUMO AREA UNCLEAR, ALTHOUGH IT SEEMS NORTH KOREAN FORCES HAVE CUT HIGHWAY. AN CONFERRING WITH KHAG ADVISORS AND KOREAN OFFICIALS THIS MORNING RE SITUATION. IT WOULD APPEAR FROM NATURE OF ATTACK AND MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS LAUNCHED IT CONSTITUTES ALL OUT OFFENSIVE AGAINST ROK.

HUGGIO
ESP LQB

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NOTE:- MR. CONNERS TO CMA MR WHITE SA NOTIFIED ONE ZERO; ONE FIVE PETER
NINE SIX/24/50. Relayed to Army Dept. 10:30 PM 6/24/50 CWO/FED.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

NR: DA TT 3415

25 JUN 50

Subject: Korean Situation

References: C-55777; C-55775; Dept. 931; 250555Z.

Conferrees:

Washington (G2)

Tokyo

Gen J Lawton Collins	C/S	Maj Gen G A Willoughby G2
Lt Gen M B Ridgway	Dep C/S	Col L J Fortier G2
Maj Gen Charles L Bolte	G3	Lt Col P B Davidson G2
Maj Gen A R Bolling	G2	Capt C E Howard G2
Maj Gen S Le Roy Irwin	G2	
R/Adm Carl Spaatz	ONI	
Brig Gen Thomas S Timberman	G3	
Col Charles V Bromley	G2	
Col B D Talley	G2	
Col Frank T Folk	G3	
Col Schow	CIA	
Lt Col Jung	G2	
Lt Col Richard H Lawson	G3	
Lt Col John R Belashine	Sec Gen Staff	
Maj Evans	APCIN	
Capt Brown	G2	
Dr Wade	ONI	
Dr Robert S Spencer	G2	
Mr Roy S McNeir	G2	
Mr K R Bendetsen	Asst Sec	
Mr Bond	State	000157070
Mr Evan T Sage	G2	E.D. 177, 25 JUN 50 Copy Draft

Washington: DA-1

What NK units were committed?

A. Ground - especially armor.

B. Air - and in what areas.

(End DA-1)

(Jun 50)

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Tokyo: FEC Item 1

Re item 1 ur agenda

1. A. Reports at 252100I indicate 3rd Border Constabulary Brigade on Ongjin Peninsula; two divisions, possible 1st and 2nd, attacking S on axis Pochon (1021-1682) Uljengbu (1005-1655) located at Pochon; 40 tanks, reported 5 kilometers north of Uljengbu, 1st Border Constabulary Brigade, minus 2 bns, reportedly landed on east coast and committed in Kangnung (-(1183-169))--Makho (1104-1644) area; two bns 1st Border Constabulary Brigade attacking south along East Coastal road (1205-1545); 7th Border Constabulary Brigade located vicinity Pochon; 5th Division reported formerly in Sarivon (880-1750) moving south toward Kaesong (950-1692); independent mixed brigade, possibly 4th Division in general reserve, location unknown.

B. Map reference in ANS 551-1 to 250,000. No air identifications. Three or four planes bombed and strafed Kimpo Airfield at 251735Z.
(End Item 1)

Washington: DA-2.

Resistance of SK

A. Rate and orderliness of Army withdrawal.

B. Are SK people fleeing or remaining in towns.
(End DA-2)

Tokyo: FEC Item 3

Re item 2 ur agenda

Resistance of South Korea:

A. Reports indicate orderliness of withdrawing South Korean units.

B. Late reports state morale of people good. No disorder or disturbances reported.
(End Item 3)

DA TT 3415

(Jun 50)

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NR: DA TT 3415

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Washington: DA-3.

Is SK Government standing firm and maintaining internal order?
(End DA-3)

Tokyo: FEC Item 4

Re item 3 ur agenda

South Korean Government reported to be standing firm and maintaining internal order. Martial law declared in most towns. Curfew in Seoul.
(End Item 4)

Washington: DA-4

What is your estimate of objective of current NK effort?
(End DA-4)

Tokyo: FEC Item 5.

Re item 4 ur agenda.

There is no evidence to substantiate a belief that the north Koreans are engaged in a limited objective offensive or in a raid. On the contrary, the size of the North Korean Forces employed, the depth of penetration, the intensity of the attack, and the landings made miles south of the parallel on the east coast indicate that the north Koreans are engaged in an all-out offensive to subjugate South Korea.
(End Item 5)

Washington DA-5

Has there been a formal, confirmed Declaration of War?

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Washington: FEC Item 6

Re Item 5 or agenda

There has been no firm confirmation that a formal Declaration of War has been made by either contender. Radio Pyongyang (North Korea) is reported to have issued a Declaration of War. But our investigations have failed to substantiate this report. See also radio from AM Embassy, Seoul, (State Dept 931) 250655Z for additional information.
(End Item 6)

Washington DA-6

Do you have any information regarding numbers of north Korean Naval Forces involved in amphibious landings on Korean East Coast.

(End DA-6)

Tokyo FEC Item 9

Reur DA-6; G2, GHQ, FBC to DA

We have no information as to number of ships involved. However, landing of 3200-3800 troops reported at four points on East Coast:

400-600 at Chumunjin (1170-1580); 2,000 at Hossan (1220-1590); 400-600 at Ulchin (1230-1570); 400-600 at Kuryong-Po (1250-1450);
(End Item 9)

Washington DA-7

Have South Korean Naval Forces engaged North Korean Naval units in any location other than Samchok.
(End DA-7)

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Tokyo FEC Item 7

Rear DA-7

KMAG reports one Russian type destroyer engaged by SK Naval element at Kangnung (1100-1550). KMAG reports SK Coast Guard are engaging enemy in Mokpo (930-1300) Area.
(End Item 7)

Washington: DA-8

General Roberts is available to you.
(End DA-8)

Washington DA-9

We assume reference FECOM responsibility to assist U.S. Amb to Korea in providing for safety U.S. natls in emergency you are communicating directly with Korea and info copies will be received here. Are we right in assuming CINCPF is meeting KMAG request for emergency supply of ammunition?
(End DA-9)

Tokyo FEC Item 8

Rear DA-9

Partial answer is subpar (2) two our C-55772. We are meeting emergency request for ammunition. Safety and/or evacuation nationals under study and will advise.
(End Item 8)

Tokyo FEC Item 12:

In view of proximity enemy tanks AMEMBASSY plans to evacuate American personnel women and children beginning tomorrow thru Inchon on available transportation. CINCFE provide Naval and Air protection. General situation points to tank break through via Uijongbu. Other Infantry units generally in previously reported positions.

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Tokyo FEC Item 2: G-2, GHQ, FEC to DA

Official

Have you received our C 95777 which was received
for by your Communications Center at 1204 2?
(End Item 2)

Washington DA-10

Your C 56775 answers question last sentence in
our number 9.
(End DA-10)

Washington DA-11

Are there any indications of USSR military participation, if so give details. Where is main effort? What appears to be its weight, direction and objective.
(End DA-11

Toky FEC Item 10

Reur DA-11

There is as yet no evidence of Soviet military participation in invasion. Main effort is believed to be along axis Pochang-Seoul. Weight appears to be two Infantry divisions supported by 40-70 tanks. Objective is Seoul.
(End Item 10)

Washington PA-12

What casualties are reported. What is source
of report?
(End DA-12

Tokyo: PEC Item 13

Reur DA-12 G-2, OHQ, FEC to DA
KMAC has been queried and has no information ref
esults. (End Item 13)

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HRC DA TT 3415

From 1

Washington DA-13

Is there anything you require from US at this time.
(End Item DA-13)

Washington DA-14.

In addition to your regular reports request complete summary by Telecon 250000 Washington daylight time (251200Z). Additional questions will be asked at that time. Suggest your G3 members be present as in case here. Navy and Air will also be represented here.

Have you anything further.
(End DA-14)

Tokyo FBC Item 11

Last minute information from KMAG Seoul:

70 tanks concentrated in night bivouac five miles north of Uijongbu. As of midnight tonight morale of South Korean troops reported good. Civil population disturbed but fairly stable.

Chun Chon reported surrounded.

Leading elements of South Korea 2nd Division reported now entering Seoul.
(End Item 11)

ORIGIN: G2

DISTR: AF, JCS, CSA, G2(STATE-CIA), NAVY, G3, OASCOM,
DA TT 3415 (JUN 50) DTG: 251244Z

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RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY SECURITY COUNCIL

[Jun 15, 1950]

The Security Council

Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its Resolution of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government "having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult, and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; and that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea, and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea";

Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its Resolutions of 12 December 1948 and 21 October 1949 of the consequences which might follow unless member states refrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of

Korea and might lead to open military conflict there;

Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,

I. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and

Calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel.

II. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea

- (a) to communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;
- (b) to observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and
- (c) to keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution.

III. Calls upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

LIMITED DISTRIBUTIONCOPY NO. 1OF 2 COPIES

DATE: June 25, 1950

SUBJECT: Korean Situation

PARTICIPANTS: The President

Secretary Acheson	Secretary Pace
Secretary Johnson	Secretary Finletter
Secretary Matthews	General Bradley
CONFIDENTIAL	Admiral Sherman
Mr. Webb }	General Vandenberg
Mr. Rusk }	General Collins
Mr. Hickerson } State	
Mr. Jessup } Dept.	

The persons listed above met with the President for dinner at Blair House at 7:45 PM. Before dinner General Bradley read a memorandum prepared by General MacArthur in which he emphasized his views about the importance of denying Formosa to the Communists.

After dinner the discussion began around the table. The President called on the Secretary of State to open the discussion.

MR. ACHESON summarized the various problems which he thought the President should consider. The first point was the question of authorizing General MacArthur to supply Korea with arms and other equipment over and above the supplies of ammunition presently authorized under the MDAP program. He recommended that this be done. He suggested that our air cover should be used to aid in the evacuation of the women and children from Seoul and that our air force should be authorized to knock out northern Korean tanks or airforce interfering with the evacuation. He then mentioned the resolution adopted by the Security Council and suggested that consideration should be given to what

further

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further assistance we might render to Korea in pursuance of this or a supplementary Security Council resolution. He next suggested that the President should order the Seventh Fleet to proceed to Formosa and prevent an attack on Formosa from the mainland. At the same time operations from Formosa against the mainland should be prevented. He said that he did not recommend that General MacArthur should go to Formosa until further steps had been decided upon. He said that the United States should not tie up with the Generalissimo. He thought that the future status of Formosa might be determined by the UN.

THE PRESIDENT interposed "or by the Japanese Peace Treaty".

MR. ACHESON finally suggested that our aid to Indochina should be stepped up.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that we must draw the line somewhere.

THE PRESIDENT stated he agreed on that.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that Russia is not yet ready for war. The Korean situation offered as good an occasion for action in drawing the line as anywhere else and he agreed with the actions suggested by Mr. Acheson. He said that jets flying over her would have a great morale effect on the South Koreans even if they were unable to spot the North Korean tanks. He said that naval action could help on the East Coast. He questioned the value of sending materiel which the Koreans were not trained to use. He mentioned the F-51's in this connection. He said that we should act under the guise of aid to the United Nations. He proposed that we should move fleet units now in Sasebo Bay. He thought it would probably not be necessary for them to shoot but that they might frighten off the North Korean amphibious forces. He questioned the advisability of putting in ground units particularly if large numbers were involved.

GENERAL COLLINS reported on a telecon with Tokyo. General MacArthur is shipping the mortars, artillery, and so on with ammunition. These supplies will reach the Koreans within the ten-day period for which they already have supplies. The F-51's are available in Japan for Korean pilots to fly back. The Korean pilots will be flown from Kimpo. General Collins urged that authority be given MacArthur to send a survey group to Korea.

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DRAFT (See 101 and 103 or 10)

P-12 12-17-57

DRAFT (See 101 and 103 or 10)

DRAFT (See 101 and 103 or 10)

ADMIRAL SHERMAN

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- 3 -

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said that the Russians do not want war now but if they do they will have it. The present situation in Korea offers a valuable opportunity for us to act. Korea is a strategic threat to Japan; this was the conclusion which he reached in his studies during the war when we were planning our attacks on Japan. He favored sending a survey group from Tokyo and increasing the strength of KMAG. He thought we should stop the use of the sea as a means of attack on South Korea. This was the logical corollary of the views stated by the Secretary of State. On Formosa he thought we must adjust our position to our general occupation position in Japan. He thought that MacArthur fitted into that situation as SCAP. He agreed, as had General Bradley, that in the Formosa operation we must apply our guarantees against military action both ways, that is to prevent attacks from Formosa as well as on Formosa. We could not otherwise justify our action. He said it would take two days to bring the fleet up from the Philippines. It need not be used if we decided against such action but the movement should be ordered now. He wished also to move some ships from the mainland as far as Pearl Harbor, for example, at least one carrier.

THE PRESIDENT asked about Russian fleet strength in the Far East and Admiral Sherman gave him the details.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed that we must stop the North Koreans but he would not base our action on the assumption that the Russians would not fight. He said that we could knock out the North Korean tanks with our air if only the North Korean air force is involved. However, Russian jets might come into action and they would be operating from much closer bases. In regard to Formosa he pointed out that all places were interrelated. Formosa was therefore important only in relation to other places.

THE PRESIDENT asked about Russian air strength in the Far East.

GENERAL VANDENBERG gave him the information including the fact that a considerable number of Russian jets are based on Shanghai.

THE PRESIDENT asked whether we could knock out their bases in the Far East.

GENERAL

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D.S.C. of State Dept. *(initials)*
Re M.R. *(initials)* MAR 13 1962 00 76

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GENERAL VANDENBERG replied that this might take some time. He said it could be done if we used A-Bombs.

MR. PACE expressed doubts about the advisability of putting ground forces into Korea. He stressed the need for speed and for encouraging General MacArthur to take action.

MR. MATTHEWS also stressed the need for prompt action and said that we would get popular approval.

MR. FINLETTER said we should go as far as necessary in protecting our evacuation. He expressed some doubt on the additional items which had been suggested by the Secretary of State. He said our forces in the Far East were sufficient if the Russians do not come in. He advised that only the necessary decisions be made that night. He thought that General MacArthur should be authorized to go beyond mere evacuation. He stressed the analogy to the situation between the two world wars. He thought we should take calculated risks hoping that our action will keep the peace.

MR. JOHNSON agreed with Mr. Acheson's first recommendation concerning instructions to General MacArthur but thought the instructions should be detailed so as not to give him too much discretion. He thought there should not be a real delegation of Presidential authority to General MacArthur. He mentioned the three islands south of Okinawa in the Ryukyu's which could be made ready in a few days as air bases. He pointed to the fact that they are already under our jurisdiction and said that the Formosan situation could be handled from them. He agreed with the views that had been expressed by Mr. Finletter. He was opposed to committing ground troops in Korea.

MR. WEBB, MR. JESSUP, MR. RUSK and MR. HICKERSON made brief comments in amplification of Mr. Acheson's statements.

THE PRESIDENT confirmed his decision that the following orders should be sent:

1. General MacArthur was to send the suggested supplies to the Koreans.
2. General MacArthur was to send a survey group to Korea.

3. The

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By M.R. HC, MAR 20 1951

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3. The indicated elements of the fleet were to be sent to Japan.
4. The Air Force should prepare plans to wipe out all Soviet air bases in the Far East. This was not an order for action but an order to make the plans.
5. Careful calculation should be made of the next probable place in which Soviet action might take place. A complete survey should be made by State and Defense Departments.

He stressed that we are working entirely for the United Nations. We would wait for further action until the UN order is flouted.

He wished the State Department to prepare a statement for a message for him to deliver in person to Congress on Tuesday indicating exactly what steps had been taken. He wished the Department to put its best brains on it and said that there were plenty of them there.

He said he was not yet ready to put MacArthur in as Commander-in-Chief in Korea.

He said our action at this moment would be confined to the United Nations and to Korea.

He said that our air was to continue to give cover for evacuation destroying tanks if necessary.

He asked whether more bazookas and possibly recoilless rifles could be sent.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that on the recoilless rifles we had few available and that there was also a shortage of ammunition.

THE PRESIDENT again emphasized the importance of making the survey of possible next moves by the Soviet Union. He also emphasized that no statement whatever was to be made by any one to the press until he speaks on Tuesday. It was absolutely vital that there should be no leak in regard to this matter and he wished everyone to be careful. They should not even make any background comment to the press.

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12-10-1950 1000 AM
O.P. 1000
MR. ACHESON
6-10-50

MR. ACHESON

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MR. ACHESON pointed out that he and Secretary Johnson were scheduled to appear before the Congressional Appropriations Committee tomorrow and wondered whether any statements should be made on the Korean situation. The President said that he thought no comment on this question should be made by either of the Secretaries at that time.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN inquired whether he had been authorized to move fleet units from California to Pearl Harbor.

THE PRESIDENT said that he was.

In response to further questions THE PRESIDENT said that our air cover should take action against North Korean tanks if this were necessary.

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L. O. 1612, Sec. 3(1) and 3(2) w/ (2)

Dgt. of Secy Exec. *PL-2P-74*

Re PLT. *AC*, NAME Date *6-11-76*

S/APP:assup:mtb

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

NR: DA TT-3418

25 Jun 50

Subject: Korean Situation

Conferrees:

Washington (OSA)

Tokyo (CINCPF)

Mr Frank Pace Jr. OSA
Mr Thomas K Finletter S. AF
Mr MC Cone US/AF
Gen J Lawton Collins (mo)
Gen Hoyt S Vandenberg AF
Adm Forrest P Sherman CNO
Lt Gen M B Ridgway DEP C/S
Lt Gen Thomas B Larkin G4
Maj Gen Charles L Bolte G3
Maj Gen S LeRoy Irvin G2
Brig Gen James E Moore SOS

G/A Douglas MacArthur
Vice Adm C T Joy COMNAVFE
Maj Gen E M Almond C/S
Maj Gen E E Partridge Actg CG
FEAF
Maj Gen C A Willoughby G2
Maj Gen G L Eberle G4
Brig Gen E X Wright G3
Brig Gen C I Beck Sig 0

Washington DA-1:

At conference this evening following was decided:

A. CINCPF authorized to dispatch survey party to Korea for purposes outlined in DA-2 earlier telecon this date.

2. CINCPF authorized to send any ammunition and equipment to Korea he deems necessary to prevent loss of Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area with appropriate air and naval cover to insure safe arrival.

3. FECOM authorized to take such action by air and Navy as necessary to prevent overrunning of Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area in order to insure safe evacuation US dependents and such other US non-combatants as determined by US Emb Korea.

4. 7th Fleet ordered to proceed immediately to Sasebo and report COMNAVFE for operational control.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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NR: DA TT 3418

Page 2

5. Efforts being made to return Gen Roberts to Korea as soon as he can be picked up.

Do you need any further instructions at this time?

(End DA-1)

Tokyo FEC Item 1, Reur DA-1;

No.

(End item 1)

Washington DA-2:

While foregoing decisions are geared to protection of dependents and non-combatants further high level decisions may be expected as military and political situations develop. State has advised US Amb Korea that KMAG personnel should remain with Korean Forces to insure continued and effective South Korean resistance.

(End DA-2)

Washington DA-3:

What is latest information on tank column North of Seoul?

(End DA-3)

Tokyo FEC item 2: Reur DA-3;

No new definite information since last report but Ambassador and Col Wright acting Chief KMAG report increased steadiness of SK troops in that area.

Chunchon retaken.

(End item 2)

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(JUN 50)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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NR: DA TT 3418

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Washington DA-5:

What if any information is available on present location and direction of movement of forces landed in vicinity of Pohang?

(End DA-4)

Tokyo FEC Item 3: Reur DA-4;

Initial report on Pohang now discounted. Landing vicinity Kangnung now locally contained.

SK force on Ongjin peninsula assumed offensive attacking in direction of Haeju.

(End item 3)

Washington DA-5:

We suggest cancellation of scheduled 1200Z telecon unless you deem one advisable.

(End DA-5)

Tokyo FEC Item 4, Reur DA-5;

Concur.

(End item 4)

Washington DA-6:

Nothing further here. Do you have anything further? If not good night and many thanks.

(End DA-6)

Tokyo FEC Item 5, Reur DA-6:

DA TT 3418

(JUN 50)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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MR: DA TT 3418

Page 4

Nothing further here. Good nite and many thanks to you.

(End Item 5).

ORIGIN: CSA

DISTR: AF, JCS, OSA, G2, G4, NAVY, G3(STATE), SECDEF,
SDLO

DA TT 3418

(JUN 50) DTG: 260355Z

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~~5-10 1951 Sec. 103 and 104 of 53
G-2, et. al. State Dept. 5-10-1951
PROJECT 445 76-16
S-103-A-C, NARS Date 2-2-51~~

Conf

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 26, 1950

The Secretary telephoned Senator Connally this morning to give him a report on the Korean situation. The Secretary reported that General MacArthur had the situation well in hand, that we were watching developments closely, and that it appeared from reports received that the approaches to Seoul were well guarded by the forces of South Korea.

Senator Connally said that the Committee was most eager to get a report on the situation. The Secretary stated that it was the President's desire that nothing be said until all the information and reports had been gone over. For that reason, the Secretary said when he made his appearance this morning before the Senate Committee on Appropriations he would refrain from getting into the Korean question.

The Secretary said he would get in touch with Senator Connally just as soon as he could regarding his appearing before the Committee to give a report on the situation.

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~~5-10 1951 Sec. 103
D-2, et. al. State Dept. 5-10-1951
S-103-A-C, NARS Date 2-2-51~~

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6-24 19502 Sec. 101 and 102 - 1952
S-11-72
TOP SECRET AND 7-24-52
S-11-72, RNS 20-2012

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CONF

June 26, 1950

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

The Secretary called Senator Wiley and said that he wanted to give him a report on the Korean situation and that he had just talked with Chairman Connally. The Secretary said that when he got word of the attack about 10 or 11 o'clock Saturday night he immediately had a meeting of the Security Council called for Sunday. At the meeting a strong resolution was gotten through calling upon North Korea to stop the attack. The Secretary said the Security Council would meet tomorrow at 3 p.m. to get a report from the Commission on North Korea.

The Secretary said that the President had met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Johnson and himself and top advisers.

The Secretary said that when he went before the Senate Appropriations Committee this morning to discuss MDAP, he would be acting under orders of the President not to discuss Far Eastern matters since the President in the opening phase of the matter thought it important to keep control of the situation in his own hands. The Secretary said he thought the position in Korea was in pretty good shape this morning. He pointed out that the attack coming from prepared positions a short distance away made the first impact difficult to take, but now the South Koreans were in good fighting shape. The Secretary said that he hoped that within a very short time he would be able to come before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, or have the President consult with them, on the basis of a careful analysis of the whole situation.

Senator Wiley made no comment. He asked first what MacArthur was doing. The Secretary told him that MacArthur was in charge of sending them assistance and that it was MacArthur's judgment that the President was relying on.

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- 2 -

Senator Willey asked whether there was any evidence that the Russians were actually participating. The Secretary said that there was no evidence as far as he knew that anyone except North Korean forces were being used, although, of course, there was a strong suspicion that it had been stimulated by the Russians. Senator Willey asked if there was any evidence of air attack. The Secretary said that there have been Koreans flying Russian planes and there have been some attacks on the capitol. Senator Willey then asked whether the policy of the State Department would be to continue to send aid of some kind and asked if he were correct that we would not send in any forces at present. The Secretary said all of that is now before the President, but that no forces had been sent in yet.

L. D. B.

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DATE: JULY 1981 BY SP-10

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June 28, 1950

MR
CONF

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

The Secretary telephoned Judge Kee after having talked with Senator Connally. The Secretary said that he had to go up this morning to testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee on MDAP. He had been instructed by the President that he should not talk about any Far Eastern matters during the hearing since the President wanted the matter kept as secure and quiet as possible while the matter is before the UN Security Council. The Secretary said that the United Nations was taking effective action and that we are backing them up. The Secretary agreed with the President that we should not appear to be urging a course of action on the UN.

The Secretary outlined to Judge Kee the steps that had been taken since they first heard about the attack, which information came to him about 10 or 11 Saturday night. The Secretary said that Department officials had gotten in touch with the UN to ask that a Security Council meeting be called for 2 p.m. Sunday. The Security Council without objection had passed a very fine resolution calling for end of the fighting and withdrawal of the North Korean troops. The next step was to have the President come back last night and to meet with himself, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and top advisers, during which meeting a program was worked out for backing up UN and giving effective help to the South Koreans. The Secretary said the situation in South Korea was being followed very closely and that as of this morning things seemed to be in pretty good shape.

Judge Kee asked whether he had been right in making the statement that it could be assumed that South Korea was in good condition to take care of itself so long as the North Koreans were not supported by outside forces. The Secretary said he thought that was right. He said that the resistance had stiffened last night.

Judge Kee asked if his understanding was correct that we are aiding by furnishing such additional things as ammunition. The Secretary confirmed that understanding. Judge Kee said that his feeling is that the matter had been handled expeditiously and that everything had been done that ought to be done. Judge

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Kee said that his Committee was meeting this morning, would be in session probably every day of this week and that he would arrange for the Secretary to meet with them at any time he thought advisable. The Secretary said he would keep in close touch with Judge Kee and as soon as there was any information that would be useful, he would meet with the Committee but it was a delicate situation at the present and at this opening moment it really had to be in the hands of the President.

L. D. B.

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June 28, 1950

Judge Kee telephoned the Secretary this afternoon that it would be helpful if they could have someone come up who could brief them a little with reference to what supplies, etc., were being sent into Korea (either a military man or someone from the State Department).

The Secretary said it would be pretty difficult for anyone to do that now since we had had reports since he spoke with Judge Kee earlier that things were not going so well. The supplies which they had thought were going in might not be able to get in.

Judge Kee said it would be helpful if someone, perhaps Mr. McFall, could come up because it seemed advisable to get some report back to the people.

The Secretary said he would look into the matter and call him back later.

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PROJECT NET 74-1P
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June 26, 1950.

**MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
AT THE WHITE HOUSE**

The President received the Korean Ambassador at the latter's request this afternoon, the Secretary of State being present.

The Korean Ambassador presented to the President the attached resolution of the Korean Parliament, asking for expeditious and substantial help. He said that he had received three telephone calls from President Rhee, stating that the great deficiencies of the Korean forces were in artillery, tanks, and aircraft, and asking for all possible aid in furnishing these. He said that nothing had as yet arrived.

The President said that he had already issued orders to General MacArthur to supply all items of ammunition and equipment which, in General MacArthur's opinion, the Korean army was trained to use, and that the Koreans must now continue to fight effectively so that help from the United States could strengthen them. He pointed out that the battle had been going on for only forty-eight hours, and that other men and other countries had defended their liberties under much more discouraging situations through to ultimate victory. The Korean Ambassador insisted that the soldiers were brave but that they did not have adequate equipment. The President again said that help was on the way and that the Koreans must develop the steadfast leadership which would carry them through this crisis.

It was agreed that the Ambassador should say to the press that he had presented a petition asking for help and that the President had assured him that he had issued the necessary orders to give necessary supplies at the earliest possible moment in order to support the resolution of the UN and the efforts of the Koreans to defend themselves.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COPY NO. /
OF 1 COPIES

~~TOP SECRET~~ Memorandum of Conversation

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

DATE: June 26, 1950

SUBJECT: Korean Situation

PARTICIPANTS: The President

Secretary Acheson

Secretary Pace

Secretary Johnson

Secretary Finletter

Mr. Matthews)

General Bradley

Mr. Rusk)

Admiral Sherman

Mr. Hickerson) State

General Vandenberg

Mr. Jessup) Dept

General Collins

(Secretary Matthews arrived
just after meeting adjourned)

The above group met with the President at Blair House
at 9:00 PM.

GENERAL VANDENBERG reported that the First Yak plane had
been shot down.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that he hoped that it was not the
last.

GENERAL VANDENBERG read the text of the orders which had
been issued to our Air Forces calling on them to take
"aggressive action" against any planes interfering with their
mission or operating in a manner unfriendly to the South
Korean forces. He indicated, however, that they had been
avoiding combat where the direct carrying-out of their mission
was not involved.

MR. ACHESON suggested that an all-out order be issued
to the Navy and Air Force to waive all restrictions on their

operations

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operations in Korea and to offer the fullest possible support to the South Korean forces, attacking tanks, guns, columns, etc., of the North Korean forces in order to give a chance to the South Koreans to reform.

THE PRESIDENT said he approved this.

MR. PACE inquired whether this meant action only south of the 38th parallel.

MR. ACHESON said this was correct. He was making no suggestion for any action across the line.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked whether this meant also that they should not fly over the line.

MR. ACHESON said they should not.

THE PRESIDENT said this was correct; that no action should be taken north of the 38th parallel. He added "not yet".

MR. PACE said that care should be used to avoid hitting friendly forces.

GENERAL COLLINS agreed but suggested that the orders themselves should not put restrictions on the operation.

MR. ACHESON said that if it was considered useful the orders could add that the purpose which the orders would implement is to support South Korean forces in conformity with the resolution of the Security Council.

MR. ACHESON said that the second point he wished to bring up was that orders should be issued to the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed.

MR. ACHESON continued that at the same time the National Government of China should be told to desist from operations against the mainland and that the Seventh Fleet should be ordered to see that those operations would cease.

MR. ACHESON said his third point was an increase in the United States military forces in the Philippines and an

CONFIDENTIAL

20 NOV 1950 10:00 AM GPO

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- 3 -

acceleration of aid to the Philippines in order that we might have a firm base there.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed.

MR. ACHESON said his fourth point was that aid to Indo-china should be stepped up and that a strong military mission should be sent.

He suggested that on all these matters if orders were issued tonight it would be desirable for the President to make a statement tomorrow. He handed the President a rough draft of the type of statement which might be issued.

THE PRESIDENT said he would work on the statement tonight. The President continued that he wished consideration given to taking Formosa back as part of Japan and putting it under MacArthur's Command.

MR. ACHESON said that he had considered this move but had felt that it should be reserved for later and should not be announced at this time. It required further study.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had a letter from the Generalissimo about one month (?) ago to the effect that the Generalissimo might step out of the situation if that would help. He said this was a private letter and he had kept it secret. He said that we might want to proceed along those lines in order to get Chinese forces helping us. He thought that the Generalissimo might step out if MacArthur were put in.

MR. ACHESON said that the Generalissimo was unpredictable and that it was possible that he might resist and "throw the ball game". He said that it might be well to do this later.

THE PRESIDENT said that was alright. He himself thought that it was the next step.

MR. JOHNSON said that the proposals made by the Secretary of State pleased him very much. He thought that if we hold the line as indicated that that was alright.

MR. ACHESON added in regard to the Formosan situation that he thought it undesirable that we should get mixed up in the question of the Chinese administration of the Island.

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2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

D.P. 4 June 1974 A-13-74

2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

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20 MAY 1965 SEC. 3001 AND 3003 - 15
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~~MR. RUSK, NAME ON~~

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THE PRESIDENT said that we were not going to give the Chinese "a nickel" for any purpose whatever. He said that all the money we had given them is now invested in United States real estate.

MR. JOHNSON added or in banks in the Philippine Islands.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said that the Command of the Seventh Fleet could be either under Admiral Radford at Pearl Harbor or under General MacArthur. He said that under the orders issued yesterday the Seventh Fleet had been ordered to proceed to Japan and placed under General MacArthur's Command. He said that the orders in regard to Formosa would be issued from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur so to employ the forces allocated by Admiral Radford to General MacArthur.

No objection was raised to this statement.

MR. ACHESON said that the Security Council would meet tomorrow afternoon and that the Department had prepared a further resolution for adoption. Our reports were that we would get full support. He noted that even the Swedes were now supporting us.

MR. HICKERSON read the draft of the Security Council resolution recommending that UN members render such assistance as was needed to Korea to repel the attack.

THE PRESIDENT said that was right. He said we wanted everyone in on this, including Hong Kong.

GENERAL BRADLEY reported that British Air Marshall Tedder had come in to see him, was generally in accord with our taking the firm position, and gave General Bradley a full report of the forces which the British have in that area.

MR. RUSK pointed out that it was possible the Russians would come to the Security Council meeting and cast a veto. In that case we would still take the position that we could act in support of the Charter.

THE PRESIDENT said that was right. He rather wished they would veto. He said we needed to lay a base for our action in Formosa. He said that he would work on the draft of his statement tonight and would talk to the Defense and State Departments in the morning regarding the final text.

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MR. RUSK

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- 5 -

MR. RUSK pointed out that it was Mr. Kennan's estimate that Formosa would be the next likely spot for a Communist move.

SECRETARY JOHNSON reported that SCAP's guess was that the next move would be on Iran. He thought there should be a check on this.

GENERAL COLLINS said that SCAP did not have as much global information as they have in Washington. He and Mr. Pace stated that they have asked for full reports all over the world in regard to any developments, particularly of Soviet preparations.

SECRETARY JOHNSON suggested to Mr. Acheson that it would be advisable to have some talks with the UK regarding possible action in Iran.

MR. ACHESON said he would talk with both the British and French.

MR. ACHESON asked Admiral Sherman whether he desired that any action should be taken regarding the utilization of the Sakishimas, south of Okinawa.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said he would leave this to General MacArthur.

MR. ACHESON said it would be better to put any necessary supporting air forces on these Islands than to try to put them on Formosa itself.

MR. PAGE inquired whether the State Department would inform Ambassador Muccio concerning the orders which were being given.

MR. ACHESON said from latest reports it would probably be impossible for us to contact Ambassador Muccio.

GENERAL COLLINS reported that they were in contact with Seoul through a ham radio operator there.

MR. PAGE said that they could pass a message to Ambassador Muccio through General MacArthur.

MR. ACHESON suggested that the President might wish to get in Senator Connally and other members of the Senate and House and tell them what had been decided.

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THE PRESIDENT said that he had a meeting scheduled for 10:00 tomorrow morning with the Big Four and that he would get in any others that the Secretary thought should be added. He suggested that Secretaries Acheson and Johnson should also be there.

MR. JOHNSON suggested that the majority and minority members of the two Armed Services Committees be included.

After the discussion it was agreed to set the meeting for 11:30.

THE PRESIDENT then read the following list of persons to be included in the meeting:

The Big Four (Lucas, Rayburn, McCormack - the Vice President will be out of town, Senators Connally, Wiley, George, Alexander Smith, Thomas of Utah, Tydings and Bridges; Congressmen Kee, Eaton, Vinson and Short.

MR. JOHNSON referred again to the draft statement for the President, said that it was very forthright, that he liked it very much and that the Joint Chiefs would consider it during the evening and make any suggestions in the morning.

GENERAL COLLINS stated that the military situation in Korea was bad. It was impossible to say how much our air can do. The Korean Chief of Staff has no fight left in him.

MR. ACHESON stated that it was important for us to do something even if the effort were not successful.

MR. JOHNSON said that even if we lose Korea this action would save the situation. He said this action "suited me". He then asked whether any of the military representatives had any objection to the course of action which had been outlined. There was no objection.

GENERAL VANDENBERG, in response to a question from Mr. Pinletter, said that he bet a tank would be knocked out before dark.

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THE PRESIDENT said he had done everything he could for five years to prevent this kind of situation. Now the situation is here and we must do what we can to meet it. He had been wondering about the mobilization of the National Guard and asked General Bradley if that was necessary now. If it was he must go to Congress and ask for funds. He was merely putting the subject on the table for discussion. He repeated we must do everything we can for the Korean situation - "for the United Nations".

GENERAL BRADLEY said that if we commit our ground forces in Korea we cannot at the same time carry out our other commitments without mobilization. He wondered if it was better to wait now on the question of mobilization of the National Guard. He thought it would be preferable to wait a few days.

THE PRESIDENT said he wished the Joint Chiefs to think about this and to let him know in a few days time. He said "I don't want to go to war".

GENERAL COLLINS stated that if we were going to commit ground forces in Korea we must mobilize.

MR. ACHESON suggested that we should hold mobilization in reserve.

MR. JOHNSON said he hoped these steps already authorized will settle the Korean question.

THE PRESIDENT said the next question would be the mobilization of the Fleet Reserve.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said there must be a degree of balance.

THE PRESIDENT noted that there is some pretty good air in the National Guard. He had never been in favor of this and thought it should be like the Naval Reserve.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said he was very glad to hear the President say this.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN asked whether MacArthur could anchor the fleet in Formosan ports if necessary.

THE PRESIDENT asked Mr. Acheson what he thought about this.

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MR. ACHESON

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- 8 -

MR. ACHESON said that they should go ahead and do it.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said this would be the best procedure.

GENERAL COLLINS remarked that if we had had standing orders we could have stopped this. We must consider this problem for the future.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed.

MR. JOHNSON said that if there was danger of a Russian veto in the Security Council the President's statement should be put out before the Security Council meets tomorrow.

MR. ACHESON agreed.

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E.O. 11052 - 4PM and 4PM on 10/

Dept. of State Library *(A-2)-75*

Re M.L. *✓* NAME Date 4-11-76

S/A:PCJS:ap:mtb

W.H. HANSON

June 26, 1950 - Monday

Subject: ~~SECRET~~ Teleconference with MacArthur, 270217Z

Re. 26th/10:17 fm. 2/2

The teleconference opened with the following message from Washington:

"President has directed that instructions be issued as follows:

7th Fleet Command

"All restrictions on employment of FECOM Navy and Air Forces are removed. They will offer fullest possible support to South Korean forces so as to permit these forces to reform.

"Purpose of above action is to support SK forces in accordance with resolution of United Nations approved 25 June.

"In addition 7th Fleet will take station so as to prevent invasion of Formosa and to insure that Formosa not be used as base of operations against Chinese mainland.

"Detailed instructions reference Navy and Air Forces follow:

"All restrictions which have previously prevented the full utilization of the U.S. Far East Air Forces to support and assist the defense of the South Korean territory are lifted for operations below the 38th Parallel. All North Korean tanks, guns, military columns and other military targets south of the 38th Parallel are cleared for attack by U. S. Air Forces. The purpose is to clear South Korea of North Korean military forces. Similarly Naval forces may be used without restriction in coastal waters and sea approaches of Korea south of 38th Parallel against forces engaged in aggression against South Korea."

There was then an exchange of combat intelligence including the statement by MacArthur "Our estimate is that a complete collapse is possible."

Washington also transmitted the orders concerning the assignment of the Seventh Fleet to MacArthur, and the orders from JCS to CINCPAC & CINCFL that South Fleet was to prevent any attack on Formosa, or any offensive from Formosa against the mainland.

Washington asked MacArthur if he had succeeded in getting any ammunition or supplies to South Korean forces and he replied that the first ship containing ammunition and artillery would be ready to sail from Yokahoma "late this afternoon" (i.e. Tuesday afternoon Tokyo time). Ten fighter planes had been turned over to Korean pilots in Japan. Ammunition would be flown to Korea when a suitable landing site could be determined.

MacArthur asked when there would be an announcement of the instructions he had been given and when Washington replied that there would be no publicity for the present, MacArthur said immediate publicity was desirable to keep up the morale of the South Korean Army. Washington then said it was likely that the release would be made in Washington within the next 12 hours.

Source: White House files.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

NR: DA TT 3426

Subject: Korean Situation

REFERENCES: CX-56812; CX-56802

Conferences:

Washington (CSA)

Tokyo (CINCPAC)

Sec Pace, SA	G/A Douglas MacArthur, CINCPAC
Sec Pinletter, SAP	Vice Adm C T Joy, COMNAVFE
Sec McCone, USAF	Maj Gen E M Almond, C/S FEC
Gen Bradley, CJCS	Maj Gen G A Willoughby, G2 FEC
Gen Collins, CSA (me)	Maj Gen G L Eberle, G4 FEC
Gen Vandenberg, CGUSAF	Maj Gen W A Beiderlinden, G1 FEC
Adm Sherman, CNO	Maj Gen D O Hickey, DEP(C/S) FEC
Gen Haaslip, VICE CSA	Maj Gen A P Fox, DEP C/S SCAP
Gen Ridgway, DEP CSA	Maj Gen E E Partridge, ACTG CG FEAF
Gen Bolte, G3	Brig Gen E K Wright, G3 FEC
GEN Irvin, G2	Brig Gen G I Beck, SIG O FEC
Mr Bond, STATE	Col L J Fortier, G2 FEC
	Lt Col J H Chiles, SGS FEC

Washington: DA-1

President has directed that instructions be issued as follows:

All restrictions on employment of FECOM Navy and Air Forces are removed. They will offer fullest possible support to South Korean Forces so as to permit these forces to reform.

Purpose of above action is to support SK forces in accordance with resolution of United Nations approved 25 June.

In addition 7th Fleet will take station so as to prevent invasion of Formosa and to insure that Formosa not be used as base of operations against Chinese mainland.

DA TT 3426

(Jun 50)

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E.O. 11752, Sec. 3(2)

000 Director CINCPAC, June 13, 1959

By WLT-H

MASS, Date 11-6-60

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26-2217

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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NR: DA TT 3425

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Detailed instructions reference Navy and Air Forces follow:

All restrictions which have previously prevented the full utilization of the U.S. Far East Air Forces to support and assist the defense of the South Korean territory are lifted for operations below the 38th Parallel. All North Korean tanks, guns, military columns and other military targets south of the 38th Parallel are cleared for attack by U.S. Air Forces. The purpose is to clear South Korea of North Korean military forces. Similarly Naval forces may be used without restriction in coastal waters and sea approaches of Korea south of 38th Parallel against forces engaged in aggression against South Korea. (End DA-1)

Washington: DA-2

Imperative that you use every method available to you to advise Amb. Muccio, Korean military leaders and Korean civilian officials of these decisions as they relate to Korea. (End DA-2)

Washington: DA-3

What is your latest information summary of military situation in Korea? (End DA-3)

Tokyo: FEC Item 1

Summary situation since 270145I last report CX 56812 Chief KMAG quotation N-Koreans have capability to take Seoul within 24 hr i.e. Tuesday/Wednesday. S-K C/S takes attitude that the fall of Seoul is fall of South Korea. Latest info to 10 A.M. Tokyo time: Piecemeal entry into action North of Seoul by South Korean Third and Fifth Divisions has not succeeded in stopping the penetration recognized as the enemy main effort for the past 2 days with intent to seize the capital city of Seoul. Tanks entering suburbs of Seoul. Government transferred to south and communications with part of KMAG opened at Taegu.

DA TT 3426

(JUN 50)

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MR: DA TT 3426

Page 3

South Korean units unable to resist determined northern offensive. South Korean casualties as an index to fighting have not shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will to fight and our estimate is that a complete collapse is possible. (End Item 1)

Washington: DA-4

What means of communication do you have now with Korea? (End DA-4)

Tokyo: FEC Item 2, reur DA-4:

Communications now available as follows:

A. Manual telegraph circuit GHQ-KMAG. KMAG located Taegu.

B. Voice telephone via submarine cable GHQ-Washington commercial exchange Seoul. No local communication beyond Washington exchange in Seoul.

C. Voice telephone via submarine cable GHQ to Kimpo Airfield.

D. Voice telephone via submarine cable GHQ to Pusan.

E. KMAG has destroyed all cipher material.

F. In addition to above official circuits, amateur manual CW radio circuit Tokyo-Pusan. (End Item 2)

Tokyo: FEC Item 12, re FEC Item 2 Para A:

KMAG reports its location as Seoul rather than Taegu as previously reported. (End of Item 12)

DA TT 3426

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NR: DA TT 3426

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Washington: DA-5

From JCS

To: CINCFE
CINCPAC

Info: CINCEUR
CINCNELM
COMNAVPE
COMSEVENTH FLT

1. Chinese nationalist government on Formosa is being called on to cease all sea and air offensives against mainland.

2. Seventh Fleet is hereby assigned to operational control CINCFE for employment in following task hereby assigned CINCFE: By Naval and Air action prevent any attack on Formosa, or any sea or air offensive from Formosa against mainland of China. Anchorages in Formosa authorized to be used connection this task.

3. CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT support and reinforce CINCFE as necessary and practicable in performing tasks herein and those previously assigned. (End DA-5)

Tokyo: FEC Item 11

Request Seventh Fleet be diverted to Buckner Bay.
(End Item 11)

Washington: DA-15

Ref FEC 11.

JCS directive contained DA-5 assigned 7th Fleet to your operational control. You should therefore issue necessary orders. (End DA-15)

DA TT 3426

(Jun 50)

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Washington: DA-5

Has your survey party arrived in Korea and, if so,
where are they? (End DA-5)

Tokyo: FEC Item 3, Answer to DA-5

Survey group now designated advance command group will
arrive Suwon -30 miles south of Kimpo approximately 1800
today. (End Item 3)

Washington: DA-7

What is status of evacuation of dependents? (End DA-7)

Tokyo: FEC Item 7

Status of dependents and other noncombatant personnel.

582 dependents departed Inchon 1715I hours 26 June -
ETA Fukuoka 28 June.

203 civilian employee's air evacuated from Kimpo to
Itazuke morning 27 June.

104 Dependents scheduled depart Pusan morning 27 June -
departure not yet confirmed.

250 dependents to be air evacuated from Kimpo 1330I.

313 non-combatant to be air lifted from Suwon begin-
ning after 1500I 27 June.

275 males-moving to Pusan by motor for evacuation.

125 additional personnel not dependents to be evacuated
from Pusan later.

DA TT 3426

(Jun 50)

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Re our rad CX 56802 we are utilizing commercial transportation at govt expense to clear backlog here.
(End Item 7)

Washington: DA-8

Have you succeeded in getting any ammunition or supplies to Korean Forces? (End DA-8)

Tokyo: FEC Item 5: reur Item DA-8

First ship loading ammunition and additional artillery pieces will be ready to sail from Yokohama late this afternoon. Can arrive Pusan in 3 days. Ten aircraft F-51 have been turned over to Korean pilots at Itazuke Air Base Japan.

Airlift of ammo and supplies critically needed will be provided in view of the existing fluid situation when suitable landing location can be determined. (End Item 5)

Tokyo: FEC Item 4

Desire to interview Vice Adm Struble before he joins 7th Fleet. (End Item 4)

Washington: DA-9

Re FEC 4.

Struble left today for Tokyo and intends report GHQ.
(End DA-9)

Tokyo: FEC Item 5

What publicity is being released in Washington regarding missions and directives enunciated above by the President?
(End Item 5)

DA TT 3426

(Jun 50)

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Washington: DA-10

Reur FEC 5.

No publicity from Washington for the present. It is recognized that your action under DA-2 may result in leaks from Korea but no official release to press should be made by you until further instructions. (End DA-10)

Tokyo : FEC Item 8

Revival of fighting spirit of So. Korean Army and people essential in this situation.. This can only be accomplished thru general publicity. Consequently we suggest immediate publicity of main features from Washington. Information is certain to leak in next 24 hours and exaggerated speculation theron can do untold damage. Request reply.
(End Item 8)

Washington: DA-13

Re FEC 8.

Our understanding release will be made in Washington within next 12 hours. Will keep you advised. Meanwhile proceed with action as indicated in this telecon. (End DA-13)

Washington: DA-15

Ref FEC 8.

We are checking further with State references publicity. There will be some delay pending consultation. (End DA-15)

Washington: DA-11

Sec Def Requests your G2 estimate as to next most likely threat from Soviet. (End DA-11)

DA TT 3425

(Jun 50)

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NR: DA TT 3426

Page 8

Tokyo: FEC Item 9, reur DA-11

Information completely lacking as to any Soviet Intent. In view of military action directed by you, it is believed most probable that retaliatory Soviet action may be taken against Japan or S Korea.

It is speculative that N Korean assault is linked with overall SE Asia Communist operations. (End of Item 9)

Washington: DA-12

Have you seen text or press summary of United Nations resolution adopted Sunday afternoon? (End DA-12)

Tokyo: FEC Item 13

In view of latest reports suggest cancellation telecon with Irwin proposed for 10 P.M. local time (271200Z). (End of Item 13)

Washington: DA-14

Re FEC 13.

Concur. (End DA-14)

Washington: DA-17

Nothing further. Will keep you informed on developments here. Many thanks. (End DA-17)

ORIGIN: CSA

DISTR: AF, JCS, CJCS, G2, USA, NAVY, G3

DA TT 3426

(Jun 50) DTG: 270217Z

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

COPY NO. /
OF 8 COPIESSUBJECT: Notes on Meeting in Cabinet Room
at the White House

DATE: June 27, 1950

PARTICIPANTS: The President

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense,

Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Congressional leaders

Mr. Rusk, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Jessup and Mr. McFall
accompanied the Secretary of State

1-162

THE PRESIDENT asked the Secretary of State to summarize the developments in the Korean case which the Secretary did.

THE PRESIDENT stressed the prompt action of the UN Security Council. He then read the statement which was subsequently released to the press. He said that he intended to release this at the end of the meeting and asked for any expression of views. He added that we could not let this matter go by default. He referred to the fact that the Secretary of State had directed the Ambassador at Moscow to get in touch with the Soviet Government. He still hoped there would be no Soviet involvement in the attack but their possible next moves were being studied.

SENATOR WILEY asked what forces General MacArthur had sent in.

GENERAL VANDENBERG supplied details beginning to outline the forces we had available.

SECRETARY JOHNSON broke in to say this information was secret and he did not wish details regarding our forces in the Far East to be known.

DECLASSIFIED

6-20-1947 Sec. (E) and (D) or (C)
3-16-74
Dep. of State Libr. 10-1-74
2-20-74
REF ID: A658 D-16/C-26

SENATOR

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- 2 -

SENATOR WILEY said it was sufficient for him to know that we were in there with force and that the President considered this force adequate.

SECRETARY PAGE mentioned that no ground troops had been sent in.

SENATOR TYDINGS reported on the action of the Armed Services Committee that morning extending the draft act and giving the President authority to call out the National Guard.

SENATOR CONNALLY asked what further UN action was to be anticipated.

SENATOR SMITH commented that our aid is in support of the UN and not the United States.

THE PRESIDENT said this was true.

SENATOR SMITH continued that in regard to Formosa and other areas the action was US action and not UN action.

THE PRESIDENT again agreed.

CONGRESSMAN MCCORMACK asked Admiral Sherman whether he thought the Navy should not now be strengthened.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said the Joint Chiefs are studying this. He said there was to be balanced program for the three services.

SECRETARY ACHESON reported that the UK had sent a message of support and were discussing the kind of action they could take.

CONGRESSMAN SHORT said he hoped that other countries would join in support of the UN.

CONGRESSMAN KEE, SENATOR CONNALLY, and SECRETARY ACHESON discussed the Security Council resolution and a possible Soviet veto.

CONGRESSMAN MANSFIELD said that we should stiffen Western Europe as well.

SENATOR LUCAS asked what our attitude would be if other nations hung back in giving support.

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D/P: 100 1000, 3-14-60

6-11-100 - 200 1000 and 1000 or 100

SECRETARY

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- 3 -

SECRETARY ACHESON said that we could not expect military help from the French whose hands are already full.

SENATOR CONNALLY said this was a clear-cut case for the UN. This was an opportunity to test its methods.

CONGRESSMAN EATON inquired whether the United States was now committed to defend South Korea from invasion.

THE PRESIDENT replied that his statement made this clear.

SECRETARY ACHESON added that we were doing this in support of the UN.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said that Senators and Congressmen would be kept posted by the Defense Department on developments with regular briefings.

SECRETARY ACHESON pointed out that the USSR has carefully not committed itself as yet. He referred to the approach made by Ambassador Kirk and pointed out this information was not yet public. He added that we are avoiding publicly engaging Soviet prestige at this time.

CONGRESSMAN KEE asked whether any other governments doubted that we were acting in support of the UN.

THE PRESIDENT and SECRETARY ACHESON said that this was perfectly clear.

In answer to questions from Senator Connally, SECRETARY ACHESON said that he doubted whether the Russians would attend the next Security Council meeting. He said Senator Austin would be there to represent the United States.

SENATOR WILEY asked whether the action in regard to Formosa, the Philippines and Indochina was taken under the UN.

THE PRESIDENT said no that was United States action.

SENATOR WILEY inquired whether we had adequate forces.

THE PRESIDENT said yes.

SENATOR RAYBURN stated that on leaving the room he would say nothing to the press beyond the statement which the President was issuing.

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 1954
DEPT. OF STATE BUREAU
~~11-20-54~~

SENATOR

~~HIP SECRET~~

By M.L.T. [Signature], REC'D. ON 6/1/74.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4 -

SENATOR CONNALLY said that we must be careful in handling the Formosan question not to divert attention from Korea.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

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20 AUG 1961 BY 401 AND 1001 ON 101

D.P. of Secy. State, A3-4-74

By M.L.T. 10/10/61 MARSH Date 6/11/76

S/A: POU: assvp:mtb

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Eddy

At 10:00 P.M. Monday, June 26, the President called Mr. Murphy (who was in his office at the White House) and asked him to telephone a group of Senators and Congressmen and invite them to attend a "very important meeting on Korea" in the President's office at 11:30 A.M. Tuesday, June 27.

*list the President's report
those invited by Mr. Murphy were:*

The Speaker.
Senators Bruce, Coughlin, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey,
Thomas of Utah, Tydings, and Bridges.
Congressmen Mc Cormick, Kee, Eaton, Vinton, All
Shattuck, and Mansfield.

The Vice President, Senator George and Chairman
Seymour of the National Security Resources Board were
invited, but were out of the city.

On Tuesday morning, at 11:30, the individuals invited the night before, plus a number of others, assembled in the Cabinet Room to meet with the President. A complete list of those attending is attached as Annex A.

The President entered the room at 11:30, and made a circuit of the room, shaking hands with those present and exchanging a few words of personal greeting with each Member of Congress.

The President opened the meeting by stating that he had invited a group of Senators and Congresmen to the White House so that he could describe the situation in the Far East to them, and inform them of a number of important decisions which he had made during the previous 24 hours, and to read to them a statement which he intended to release in a matter of minutes to the press. The President said that he would ask the Secretary of State to give a brief account of events in the Far East.

Mr. Acheson ran over briefly the events in Korea, beginning with first word that arrived in Washington on Saturday afternoon that the Republic of Korea had been invaded by communist forces from the north of the 38th parallel. He stated that as soon as word of this invasion reached Tokyo, Gen. MacArthur had (in accordance with a pre-arranged plan) begun to evacuate American personnel and had moved

naval and air units into the area to protect evacuees. Mr. Acheson continued that, when the situation began to clarify and was recognized as a major threat to the peace, the President returned to Washington from Independence, Missouri, and met with a number of State and Defense ~~officials~~ ^{officials} at Blair House on Sunday evening. At that meeting, it was agreed that instructions should be sent Gen. MacArthur to the effect that he should provide immediate military assistance to the South Korean forces.

On Monday, Mr. Acheson continued, it became apparent in Washington that the United States adopt a very firm stand in the Far East, for two reasons: (a) the Korean forces appeared to be weakening fast and their leadership was weak and indecisive; (b) the governments of many Western European nations appeared to be in a state of near-panic, as they watched to see whether the United States would act or not. Therefore, Mr. Acheson concluded, the President had called another meeting at Blair House on Monday evening at which he decided, after consultation with his State and Defense advisers, to take additional steps which the President would now describe.

The President thanked Mr. Acheson for his summary but pointed out that the Secretary had overlooked a most important element in the situation; namely, that the United States had called for a special

meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations in New York on Sunday, June 25, and that our military assistance to Korea was being given pursuant to the Security Council resolution passed at that meeting. [the Secretary of State was quite obviously embarrassed at his failure ~~in mentioning~~ ^{to} the United Nations].

The President then read his statement very rapidly, which is attached(Annex B) Upon finishing his statement, the President gave a brief summary of what lay behind this Government's decisions. The communist invasion of South Korea could not be let pass unnoticed, he said, this act was very obviously inspired by the Soviet Union. If we let Korea down, the Soviet ^s will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another. We had to make a stand some time, or else let all of Asia go by the board. If we were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe. Therefore, the President concluded, he had ordered our forces to support Korea as long as we could -- or as long as the Koreans put up a fight and gave us something we could support -- and it was equally necessary for us to draw the line at Indo-China, the Philippines, and Formosa.

There were a few moments of silence after the President had finished his statement.

Sen. Wiley asked the first question. He wanted to know if orders to MacArthur were pursuant to the Security Council's resolution. The President assured him that they certainly were.

Sen. Wiley then wanted to know if MacArthur had enough military strength to give effective aid to Korea -- what kind of planes, for example, could MacArthur give the Koreans? Gen. Vandenberg arose and summarized briefly the numbers and types of planes in Japan and adjacent United States areas. Secretary Johnson broke in and quite brusquely stated that this was secret information and that, unless he got pledges of secrecy from those attending the meeting, he would have to ask Gen. Vandenberg not to continue. There was general agreement around the table that the meeting would be regarded as an "executive session."

Sen. Tydings said that he thought the President would be pleased to know that the Senate and House conferees on Selective Service had agreed earlier in the morning to extend Selective Service for one year and that a number of crippling resolutions had been taken out of the bill and additional powers for the President inserted. That action was taken, Tydings said, in the light of Far Eastern events. The President thanked Sen. Tydings and said that Selective Service extension was vitally essential.

Sen. Connally asked if we would continue to *push our* *case* in the United Nations. The President and the Secretary of State assured him that all of our actions would be carried out through the United Nations.

Sen. Alexander Smith wanted to be sure that the military assistance we were giving to Korea was actually pursuant to the Security Council resolution. He was assured by the President that it was -- that everything we were doing for Korea was in support of the Security Council resolution.

Rep. Short said that he was glad we were working through the United Nations.

The President asked Mr. Acheson to discuss the forthcoming Security Council meeting which was to be held at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Mr. Acheson said he did not know whether the Russians would attend the meeting or not; if they did, they would probably try to veto whatever action the Security Council tried to take. If the Russians vetoed any further actions of the Security Council, we would go right ahead -- without interruption -- and supply assistance to Korea under the terms of the Security Council resolution of Sunday. The Russians could not in any way veto that resolution, which was already on the record. Mr. Acheson said, however, that he doubted very much that the Russians would attend.

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Sen. Lucas expressed the hope that the nations of Western Europe would back us up, and would help us out in United Nations procedures. Mr. Acheson said that he was confident, on the basis of the cablegrams he had received from Europe, and on the basis of discussions which various State Department officials had been having during the past 24 hours with the European Ambassadors, that we would have the fullest possible support from Western Europe and that we would also get what little assistance they might be able to give us.

Sen. Connally said that it was quite apparent that this was the clearest test case that the United Nations has ever faced. If the United Nations is ever going to do anything, this is the time, and if the United Nations cannot bring the crisis in Korea to an end, then we might just as well wash up the United Nations and forget it. There was general agreement around the table that this was the case and the President once again stated that he was going to make absolutely certain that everything we did in Korea would be in support of, and in conformity with, the decision by the Security Council of the United Nations.

Secretary Acheson began to discuss the position of the Soviet Union in regard to Korea. The President called for attention

and said that he wanted everyone to be attentive to what Mr. Acheson was saying. The Secretary called attention to the fact that the President's statement did not refer in any way to the Soviet government nor to the Soviet Union. It simply referred to "communism." Mr. Acheson said this Government is doing its best to leave a door wide open for the Soviet Union to back down without losing too much face. The helpful Secretary said it would be very ~~dangerous~~ if the Members of Congress would avoid any reference to Soviet participation or involvement in the Korean crisis. If we publicly say that the Soviets are responsible for the actions of the communists in North Korea then, as a matter of prestige, the Soviet government will be forced to continue supporting the North Korean forces and we will find ourselves with a really tough scrap on our hands. If, however, we leave the door open the Soviet Union may well back down and call off the North Koreans.

By this time, mimeographed copies of the statement which the President had read earlier in the meeting were available and were distributed to all present in the room. A number of questions were asked about the precise meaning of certain phrases. The meeting closed after Judge Kee re-stated the point that had been made earlier in the meeting, namely, that we were acting -- and would continue to act -- under the United Nations. The President said that was correct and that if the

Soviet Union attended future Security Council meetings and attempted to veto Security Council actions, we would go right ahead on our own and justify our actions on the grounds of the Council resolution of Sunday, June 25. The President further remarked that our defense of the Philippines, Formosa, and Indo China was on behalf of our own security and general stability in the Far East. Only our actions in Korea, he concluded, are in conformity with the Security Council resolution.

ANNEX A

Persons Present at the President's
Meeting at 11:30 A.M. Tuesday,
June 27, in the Cabinet Room

The President

Sen. Scott W. Lucas (D., Ill.), Majority Leader

From the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

Sen. Tom Connally (D., Texas), Chairman

Sen. Elbert D. Thomas (D., Utah)

Sen. Alexander Wiley (R., Wisconsin)

Sen. H. Alexander Smith (R., N.J.)

From the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

Sen. Millard E. Tydings (D., Maryland), Chairman

Sen. Styles Bridges (R., New Hampshire)

The Speaker

Rep. John W. McCormack (D., Mass.), Majority Leader

From the House Committee on Foreign Relations:

Judge John Kee (D., West Va.), Chairman

Rep. Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)

Rep. Charles A. Eaton (R., New Jersey)

Boyd Crawford, Administrative Officer

From the House Committee on Armed Services:

Rep. Carl Vinson (D., Georgia), Chairman

Rep. Dewey Short (R., Missouri)

From the Department of State:

Dean Acheson, Secretary

Philip Jessup, Special Adviser to the Secretary

H. Freeman Mathews, Deputy Under Secretary

Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations

ANNEX A

-2-

From the Department of Defense:

Louis Johnson, Secretary

Stephen T. Early, Deputy Secretary

Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army

Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy

Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force

Gen. Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army

Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations

Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

George M. Elsey, Administrative Assistant to the President

Korlde
2443
JUNE 27, 1950STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

I have also directed that United States Forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indo China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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PRIORITY

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

271547

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Capt M M Stephens USN

TOP
SECRET

TO: CINCAL, CINCARIB, CINCEUR, COMGENUSPA (REAR),
CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCNELM, COMDENSAC

INFO: CINCFE

NR: JCS 84499

27 JUN 50

From JCS, for COMGENUSPA (Forward).

1. Following the invasion of South Korea by North Korean Forces, CINCFE was instructed on 25 June to take such action by Air and Navy under his control as necessary to prevent overrunning of Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon Area in order to insure safe evacuation of United States dependents and other United States non-combatants, and to dispatch such ammunition and supplies to Korea deemed necessary to prevent loss of area, regardless of current programs.

2. The President on 26 June directed that instructions be issued removing all restrictions on employment of FECOM Naval and Air Forces. They will offer fullest possible support to South Korean Forces so as to permit these forces to reform. Purpose of above action is to support South Korea Forces in accordance with resolution of the United Nations approved 25 June.

3. In addition the President has directed that the Seventh Fleet be employed to prevent the invasion of Formosa by the Chinese Communists and to insure that Formosa not be used as a base of operations against Chinese mainland by the Chinese Nationalists.

4. In accordance with para 2 above, CINCFE has been notified of the President's directives and given the following instructions:

CM OUT 84499

(Jun 50)

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TOP SECRET

E.O. 12035, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979

NRVRIDE
43

By NLT 1000 HRS. Date 15-6-50

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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NR: JCS 84499

Page 2

"All restrictions which have previously prevented the full utilization of the United States Far East Air Forces to support and assist the defense of the South Korean territory are lifted for operations below the 38th parallel. All North Korean tanks, guns, military columns and other military targets south of the 38th parallel are cleared for attack by United States Air Forces. The purpose is to clear South Korea of North Korean Military Forces. Similarly Naval Forces may be used without restriction in coastal waters and sea approaches of Korea south of 38th parallel against forces engaged in aggression against South Korea."

5. CINCPF and CINCPAC have been issued full instructions:

"A. Chinese Nationalist Government of Formosa is being called on to cease all sea and air offensives against mainland.

"B. Seventh Fleet is hereby assigned to operational control CINCPF for employment in full task hereby assigned CINCPF: By Naval and Air action prevent any attack on Formosa, or any sea or air offensives from Formosa against mainland of China. Anchorages in Formosa authorized to be used connection this task.

"C. CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT support and reinforce CINCPF as necessary and practicable in performing tasks herein and those previously assigned."

(Info note: Instructions in para 5 above contained in DA-5 of Telecon DATT 3426, 270217Z between Nash and Tokyo.)

Note: Dispatches Washington EDT-271142

ORIGIN: JCS

DISTR: AF, CSA, NAVAIDS, NAVY

ON OUT 84499

(Jun 50) DTG: 271542Z mlf

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO.

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-4874-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 27, 1950

Mr. Ross Telephoned the Secretary to give him the following information:

- 1) The message from Dewey had not arrived, but when it did, they would have a suitable reply.
- 2) The President approves putting out the information that this Government has communicated with the Soviet Government, as the Secretary stated to Mr. Ross.
- 3) The President feels that the Secretary should have a press conference in the regular way. He plans to hold one himself. As to a press conference by Mr. Kennan, he doubts the wisdom of that, and thinks it should be postponed at least a couple of days.

The Secretary agreed fully with Mr. Ross on the latter point and explained he was under pressure by the press here.

L. D. B.

DECLASSIFIED

2. Q. 116-1. No. 103-1 and 103-2 or 103-3
T. C. - 103-

Date of Decr 1954. *Aug 22, 1954*

3. REF ID: A6125, REF ID: A6126 /1-26

S:DHM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Korea

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 27, 1950

The President today sent the following telegram to the Honorable Thomas E. Dewey, Governor of New York:

"I am grateful for your message and hasten to assure you that I shall find strength and courage in your brave words. The wholehearted pledge of support which you give will be a source of inspiration and fortitude as we gird ourselves for the difficult tasks ahead. We have taken our stand on the side of Korea and our pledge of faith to that nation is a witness to all the world that we champion liberty wherever the tyranny of communism is the aggressor."

The text of Governor Dewey's telegram to the President is as follows:

"I whole-heartedly agree with and support the difficult decision you have made today to extend American assistance to the Republic of Korea in combatting armed communist aggression. Your action there, in Formosa, the Philippines and in Indo China was necessary to the security of our country and the free world. It should be supported by a united America."

- - - - -

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

E.O. 11053, Sec. 3(D) and 1(D) or (B)

Dept. of State letter, ~~AMERICAN EDITION~~

By M.L. ~~AC~~, MARS Date ~~5/24/51~~

June 28, 1950

FAR EAST

INVASION OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA

At 4 a.m. on the morning of June 25th (Korean time), the Army of North Korea launched a completely unprovoked general invasion into the Republic of Korea. At 6 a.m., North Korean infantry began to cross the 38th parallel in the Ongjin Peninsula area, near the cities of Kaesong and Chunchon while amphibious landings were made on the eastern coast, south of Kangnung. Later in the morning, the Communist Radio at Pyongyang, setting the tone for the world's Communist radio and press, charged that the Republic of Korea had initiated a surprise attack across the border into North Korea and that North Korean armed forces had been ordered to repulse the attackers. The broadcast also noted that North Korean tanks, planes and guns had scored successes south of the border. The invaders committed four divisions plus an estimated 90 tanks to the fight and, when the skies over Seoul cleared made full use of their complete superiority in the air. The North Korean military forces consist of between 90,000 and 100,000 men organized into a picked Border Constabulary of more than 20,000 men and four to six divisions. The Republic of Korea's armed forces number about 90,000 men in eight divisions. In terms of manpower, combat effectiveness, training and leadership the two forces are considered to be about equal. However, the North Koreans, besides possessing the tactical initiative in this operation, enjoyed the advantages of more and heavier artillery, a practically unopposed air force of more than 75 planes, including 35 Yak-9s or IL-10s and an armored force of more than 65 Soviet T-34 and larger tanks. The Republic of Korea had, at the time of the invasion, some 10 Harvard AT-6 trainer aircraft and 27 M-8 armored cars.

US-sponsored Resolution Adopted by UNSC - We immediately asked our United Nations representative in New York to contact the Secretary-General, informing him that we view the North Korean aggression as a threat to the peace and asking him to call the Security Council into special session to consider the Korean situation. We asked that our representatives in countries which are in turn represented on the Security Council to urge that prompt action be taken on this matter. The Security Council, meeting on the afternoon of the 25th Washington time, approved 9-0--Yugoslavia abstaining--a resolution determining that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace and calling for immediate cessation of hostilities. The UN Korean Commission advised

the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the North Korean attack came as a complete surprise to both the Korean Army and the Korean Military Advisory Group and that the Pyongyang radio claim that the South Koreans had violated the border was entirely false. UNCOOK drew the Secretary-General's attention to the fact the situation was assuming the character of a full-scale war which might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. In view of its past experiences, UNCOOK stated it was convinced that North Korea would not heed the Security Council's resolution nor accept the good offices of UNCOOK. There was a real danger, UNCOOK observed, that the operations now in progress might end in a matter of days and that the question of a cease fire and the withdrawal of North Korean forces might well prove academic. Kim Il Sung, North Korean head, broadcasting on the Pyongyang radio, called on his forces to crush South Korea's military power, since that area of the country was being turned into an American colony. The forces of the North Korean Communists, aided by air support, armor and heavy artillery, continued their drive southward. After the South Koreans were able to temporarily stabilize the front on the evening of the 25th (Korean time) the northerners, bringing their overwhelming fire power to bear, broke through the defenses of the southerners in the Oijongbu sector and headed for Seoul against little opposition. South Korean President Rhee and his cabinet fled the city; dependents and non-essential personnel of US missions in Korea were taken to Japan by sea and air. An aura of defeatism and demoralization reportedly set in among the South Korean civil and military officials remaining in Seoul. They were making no plans to continue resistance further to the south if Seoul should fall. Army authorities estimated that Seoul would fall shortly and that, with the fall of Seoul, organized resistance by the Republic of Korea would collapse.

Tension in Foreign Capitals - Meanwhile, the events in Korea, especially following the cease fire resolution of the Security Council, were being watched with concern throughout the world. The future of the UN was believed in many parts of the world to be at stake, and intense interest was evidenced regarding the course the US would take in dealing with this blatant and irrefutable Communist aggression. Most government officials in the non-Communist world viewed the North Korean attack as a direct Soviet challenge to the US. The attack was fairly widely interpreted as an obvious probe by world communism at a soft spot in the non-Communist world which, if successful, would undoubtedly be followed by further action against other soft spots. The assault and the strategy

underlying it were likened to the Hitler tactics of 1938-1939. The Communist powers, in launching the attack, apparently judged that we would not send troops into Korea to throw back the invasion or that the world would be faced with an accomplished fact before the cumbersome machinery of the UN could swing into effective action. Countries under immediate threat by Soviet aggression such as Turkey, Greece and Iran were waiting with intense interest for our reaction, and Germans were acutely aware of the implications the developments in Korea held for their own future.

President Truman's Statement - About noon on

June 27th President Truman communicated a statement of the US policy in Korea and elsewhere in the Far East to the public. The statement, which reflected a policy which had been decided upon the previous night, stressed that the Security Council had called upon all members of the UN to render every assistance to the UN in the execution of the SC resolution, and ordered "US air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support." Mentioning that communism had by its action "passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations ~~to~~ the use of / armed invasion and war," the President said that "under these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the UN." The President also directed that US forces in the Philippines be strengthened, that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated, and that accelerated military assistance be furnished to the forces of France and the Associated States of Indochina. He concluded by saying: "I know that all members of the UN will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the UN. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far reaching effects. The US will continue to uphold the rule of law."

Second UN Resolution - In accordance with the President's statement we offered a second resolution on Korea to the Security Council. In it we noted that North Korea had neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn its armed forces to the 38th parallel and that the Republic of Korea had appealed to the UN for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security in the area. We therefore recommended that the members of the UN furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel this armed attack. The Council voted seven to one in favor of the resolution, with India and Egypt failing to vote in the absence of instructions.

World Reaction to US Policy - Initial reports on the general reaction to our newly enunciated policy in the Far East has been overwhelmingly favorable. French Foreign Minister Schuman said that our action was the only proper course of action, stating that he did not believe the USSR was prepared to embark on a general war at this time. The Belgian Foreign Minister expressed satisfaction that the US proceeded within the framework of the UN and felt that the Belgian public would welcome our decision. British Prime Minister Attlee welcomed and supported the statement which was interrupted during its reading in the House of Commons by bursts of applause; it was very well received. The Dutch Foreign Minister said that he was "mighty glad" that we had taken this position and promised all possible support in the United Nations. Luxembourg Foreign Minister Bech described the firmness of the President's statement as comforting and an incentive to the non-Communist world. Bech thought Soviets would be surprised at the vigor of our reaction. The Norwegian Foreign Minister said that we had made a breathtaking decision, which would prove correct if backed up with adequate force. Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, Chile, Peru, and Colombia all approved the Presidential action. UN Secretary-General Lie also expressed approval of the President's stand on Korea.

NLT 792

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

COPY NO. 1
OF 1 COPIES

SUBJECT: Meeting of the NSC in the Cabinet Room at the White House

DATE: June 28, 1950

PARTICIPANTS: In addition to the usual members of the NSC, The Vice President, Secretary Snyder, Mr. Symington, and Mr. Harriman were present.
Mr. Rusk, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Jessup accompanied the Secretary of State.

XOENSCIXX

THE PRESIDENT read the latest bulletins concerning developments in Korea. He said that we needed to resurvey our policy papers so far as the Soviet Union is concerned.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said that work on this was well along. (It was not clear to what Mr. Johnson referred and I later gathered from either General Burns or Mr. Pace that they did not know to what Mr. Johnson referred.)

SECRETARY ACHESON said that the State Department was working with the Department of Defense on the survey of next possible Soviet moves. They were also giving consideration to what should be done in case the Soviet would take further action. He referred to a paper which he had given to the Defense Department relative to the care which would be taken to avoid action in Korea involving Soviet forces.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said he had no quarrel with the State Department's paper although they might wish to change the phraseology. He had asked the Joint Chiefs to include this point in a comprehensive document so that when it became a historical document the whole picture would be presented. They would send it to the President and Secretary Acheson when it was complete.

THE PRESIDENT expressed approval.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRETARY

(S-1) (REF. Ser. 103 and 401 & 10)

NLT
PROJECT NLT 764-P
P-1 NLT 764-P, MAR 1951 JUN 24 1950

TOP SECRET
NOT SECRET

SECRETARY ACHESON suggested that they would not trouble the President until the staff work had been completed.

THE PRESIDENT said he was doing his best to avoid any feeling of panic and to keep people from being scared.

MR. PAGE suggested that the Top Secret character of the paper in question should be carefully guarded.
THE PRESIDENT agreed.

SECRETARY ACHESON pointed to the serious nature of the situation if the difficulties in Korea increased instead of our meeting with quick success.

THE PRESIDENT said he didn't intend to back out unless there should develop a military situation which we had to meet elsewhere.

SECRETARY ACHESON suggested that the President might wish the Military Establishment to review United States forces available in the Far East in case the President should later decide that he wished to act.

THE PRESIDENT said that was right.

MR. HARRIMAN reported on the favorable European reaction to the moves which had been taken.

THE PRESIDENT said that in the meeting with the Congressional leaders yesterday many questions had been asked whether other countries would aid. Congress should be informed concerning the UK offer of ten vessels.

SECRETARY SNYDER said there was a ticker report that Attlee had offered the whole Far Eastern fleet.

THE VICE PRESIDENT said there was a Senate rumor that the UK had offered its fleet only for relief purposes.

THE PRESIDENT said that as soon as the offer was received it should be accepted and that British forces should be placed under MacArthur.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said he would like to ask the Navy whether they would like to have British forces. He said they did not want them during the last war due to a difference in signals and other difficulties.

THE PRESIDENT said that was a different situation. We do want them now.

SECRETARY SNYDER said the Treasury Department had been keeping up to date a re-appraisal of the Treasury position and it would be prepared to sharpen it whenever it was needed.

SECRETARY FINLETTER showed the President a map of air bases in North Korea. He said we could not get the full value of our air support unless we could attack especially the North Korean bases and fuel supplies.

THE PRESIDENT asked General Vandenberg to survey this point and said we may have to do it but he didn't want to decide that now.

GENERAL VANDENBERG further explained the situation by reference to the map.

THE PRESIDENT said this matter needed further consideration.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said the North Korean bases were thirty or forty miles of the 38th parallel. He said that at present our planes were not likely to cross the frontier even by mistake.

SECRETARY ACHESON said he hoped we would not cross the 38th parallel.

THE PRESIDENT said we were not to do it.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said to General Vandenberg that those were his orders.

THE PRESIDENT said that is correct.

SECRETARY FINLETTER asked whether it would be desirable to send General Vandenberg to Tokyo.

SECRETARY JOHNSON commented on the high quality of the officers in Japan.

THE PRESIDENT said it was not a good idea for any member of the Joint Chiefs to leave Washington at this time.

SECRETARY ACHESON asked what are the possibilities of our air against North Korean armor.

GENERAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4 -

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that we could knock them out if they did not hide in towns. He mentioned also that there are many narrow defiles in which it is hard to reach them. He said if there were a steady stream it was hard to keep them knocked out. He said our planes were flying so far from their bases that they had very little time over the battlefield to search for targets. He suggested the possibility of retaking the Kimpo airport.

GENERAL COLLINS mentioned bad weather as a limitation on our air effectiveness and also noted that the tanks could move at night.

THE PRESIDENT commented that it was apparent that field artillery is still necessary.

SECRETARY PACE said that Intelligence had been ordered to report immediately on any Soviet participation in Korea.

THE PRESIDENT said special attention should also be paid to Bulgaria and Iran. (Admiral Sowers later told me that from what the President had said earlier he had in mind the whole Yugoslav frontier area.)

There was discussion between Secretary Pace, the Vice President and the President concerning limitations to be placed on the military briefing of Senators. THE PRESIDENT suggested that the Vice President and Mr. Pace work this out with Senator Lucas.

S/A:PCJ:essup:mtb

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 29, 1950

To: Ed Barrett
From: Marshall Shulman
Subject: Secretary's Speech to Newspaper Guild.

I. In view of the all-consuming interest in Korea, I would recommend that the Secretary's speech be devoted to a calm and factual treatment of the Korean issue.

1. Comment: a) the speech would give the background of the problem, and report what has taken place, but it would not seek to project policy ahead of what has already been announced.
b) this would have the advantage of keeping public discussion informed and in perspective, and would help to guide tone of response domestically and abroad.
c) this would also support the Secretary's position in the country, and would make the most of favorable reactions to US policy on Korea toward a generalized support for the Department.
d) this speech could be adapted easily to last-minute developments.
2. Outline: a) Factual review of events since Saturday night. In passing, would make clear effective operation of Department; coordination with UN; role of President.
b) Brief background of problem.
Origin of wartime agreements;
Efforts to unify Korea and carry out our commitments;
UN history of problem.
c) Present US position.
Based on President's statement, with emphasis on UN relationship. Make clear that developing situation makes inadvisable any projection into the future.
d) Problem to be seen as aspect of our total program for strengthening free world.
e) Support of all, especially working newspapermen, essential.

II. If the speech were to deal with the information program, and have only a brief reference to Korea in it, I believe that the result would be a serious underplay of the story of the new information program. Making the announcement now, even if it did get little newsplay, would take the edge off a statement at a more propitious time.

III, If the Secretary is not able to make any reference to the Korean situation in his speech, I believe it would be better for him not to make a speech at this time. There would be an adverse reaction to a speech by the Secretary of State which did not deal with the problem uppermost in everyone's mind. On the other hand, it would be understood if the pressure of events prevented the Secretary from fulfilling a speaking engagement at the moment,

Korva

Outline of Proposed Speech by Secretary Acheson
to American Newspaper Guild, June 29, 1950

1. Factual review of events since Saturday night.

In passing, would make clear effective
operation of Department; coordination
with UN; role of President.

*Suffrage world tour S. & M. Defense
Dept's.*

2. Brief background of problem.

Origin of wartime agreements;
Efforts to unify Korea and carry out
our commitments;
UN history of problem.

3. Present US position.

Based on President's statement, with
emphasis on UN relationship. Makes
clear that developing situation makes
inadvisable any projection into the
future.

4. Problem to be seen as aspect of our total
program for strengthening free world.

5. Support of all, especially working newspapermen,
essential.

[Scribbled. Should be 145]. noon 28th June;
his talk was planned to Marshall Shulman
in State.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ June 29, 1950

SUBJECT:

Visit of Korean Ambassador.

PARTICIPANTS:

The Korean Ambassador, Dr. John Kyung Chang.

The Secretary of State.

COPIES TO: Mr. Miles W. Bond, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

FE

S/S

1-142

The Korean Ambassador called this afternoon at his request to express his gratitude, and that of President Rhee and the Korean people, for the prompt and vigorous action of this Government in dealing with the Korean crisis. He left with the Secretary a letter addressed to the President expressing similar sentiments.

The Ambassador said that he hoped that knowledge of this action had become widely known in Korea because of the effect which it would have on morale. The Secretary responded that he was sure that such was the case, as every feasible means was being used, including the air drop of leaflets, to get word of the President's action to the Korean people.

Upon taking his leave the Ambassador reiterated his gratitude for the strong stand which this Government had taken in defense of his nation.

DECLASSIFIED

Category E.O. 10601

FE: RA: MWB: jh

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

MINUTES OF THE 56th MEETING

of the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

held on Wednesday, June 28, 1950
in the Conference Room at The White House~~TOP SECRET~~

- - - - -

MEMBERS PRESENT

1:30 PM.
 Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, Presiding
 Alben W. Barkley, Vice President of the United States
 Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
 Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense
 E. Stuart Symington, Chairman, National Security Resources Board

OTHERS PRESENT

John T. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury

W. Everell Harrison, Special Assistant to the President
 Sidney F. Souers, Special Consultant to the President
 Rear Admiral R. H. Willenhoetter, Director of Central Intelligence
 Philip G. Jessup, Ambassador-at-Large
 H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State
 Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State
 George F. Kennan, Counselor, Department of State
 Max Bishop, Department of State
 Stephen T. Early, Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army
 Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy
 Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force
 General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
 Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Navy
 General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force
 Maj. General James H. Burns, USA (Ret.), Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
 Maj. General Sidney P. Spalding, USA (Ret.), Office of the Secretary of Defense
 Maj. General P. W. Timberlake, Director of the Staff, Munitions Board
 Captain Albert C. Murdaugh, Office of the Secretary of Defense
 Colonel G. R. S. Shell, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Thos. C. Lamphier, Jr., Special Assistant to the Chairman, National Security
 Resources Board

SECRETARIAT

James S. Ley, Jr., Executive Secretary
 S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary
 Hugh D. Farley, Assistant Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

L. O. 1951, Sec. 1(B) and (D) w/ (E)

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~By ~~TOP SECRET~~ MAR 2 1952



DISCUSSIONS

1. THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

(The President participated in the following actions of the Council.)

- ✓ a. Reviewed the situation in Korea.
- ✓ b. Noted the President's directive that the Council resurvey all policies affecting the entire perimeter of the USSR.
- c. Agreed that the Council should prepare for consideration by the President recommendations as to the courses of action to be followed in the event that Soviet forces enter Korean hostilities.
- d. Noted the President's agreement with a suggestion by the Secretary of State that the Department of Defense should prepare for the information of the Council a review of our military capabilities in order to indicate the extent of our freedom of choice.
- ✓ e. Noted Mr. Harriman's remarks that the Europeans, though they had grave concern prior to the President's announcement that the United States would not meet the challenge, felt great relief afterwards although they were fully aware of the implications of the statement.
- f. Noted the President's desire that the British offer of naval assistance, when officially received, be accepted; and that the Vice President, when informed by the Secretary of State of the exact nature of the offer, should inform the appropriate Senators of this assistance.
- g. Noted the remarks by the Secretary of the Treasury that a re-appraisal of the Treasury situation had been underway since January and was ready, subject to sharpening up, for specific application; and that the Treasury Department had been working closely with the National Security Resources Board in this connection.
- h. Noted the President's view that the sources of supply in North Korea should be kept under consideration, but that no U. S. attacks should be made across the 38th parallel under current orders.

DECLASSIFIED

2. C. 11651. Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) w/ (B)

10/10/01
SPK

SPK 10/10/01
SPK 10/10/01

~~SECRET~~

1. Noted that special attention will be devoted to obtaining intelligence concerning clear evidence of Soviet participation in Yom Kippur hostilities, and concerning Soviet activities in the vicinity of Yugoslavia and Northern Iran.

where; The NSC Staff has undertaken the projects referred to in b, The actions in c, and d, above have been transmitted to the Secretary of Defense; and that in f, to the Secretary of State.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 29, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Participants: Secretary of Defense Johnson
Mr. Acheson

Secretary Johnson telephoned Secretary Acheson this morning to request that Mr. Rusk and our State Department people work with General Burns on all matters, except intelligence. On intelligence matters, they should work directly under Army and Pace. Park Armstrong will work with Mr. Pace on intelligence.

Secretary Acheson said that if that is the way it should be done, then we here in State would do it.

Secretary Johnson said there was no friction at the moment, but this is being done to try to avoid any friction arising.

DECLASSIFIED

■ Q. 1960. Rev. 10/10/60 10/10/60
Dep. of State 10/10/60 10/10/60
■ RAY [initials] RADS Date 10/10/60

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S:BEvans/mjm

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 29, 1950.

SUBJECT: Military Support for Southern Korea.

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Melkin, Australian Embassy
Mr. Moody, Australian Embassy
Secretary Johnson
Mr. Satterthwaite, DRA

Conf

COPIES TO: Embassy, Canberra
Embassy, Wellington

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11651, Sec. 3(e) and 4(d)
Distr. to State Dept., 1:1:1
P-4932 CT ALP N.Y.C.
Re M.T. A.P.C. - MARSH 20 1950

The Australian Ambassador called at his request to say that the Australian Government had decided to send to Korea the destroyer Bataan and the frigate Shearwater. These vessels were now in a base in Southern Japan. In addition, the Australians had a squadron of P-51's (Mustangs) in Japan which they would be glad to make available if required. He had been instructed to notify the Department that these Mustangs were not suitable for operations on Korea based in Japan and that they could not be used until suitable airstrips were available in Korea.

The Secretary expressed the Department's pleasure for the prompt assistance Australia is furnishing in support of the UN resolution and promised to let him know as soon as we found out from the military whether they could use the P-51's.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 1(b) and 1(d), 1.4

WTC
PROTACT NO. 77-78
KRS Date 02-5-78

MINUTES OF THE 59th MEETING

of the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

held on Thursday, June 28, 1950 [J-4 27}

in the Conference Room at The White House

- - - - -

MEMBERS PRESENT

Harry S. Truman, President of the United States. Presiding

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State

Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense

J. Stuart Symington, Chairman, National Security Resources Board

OTHERS PRESENT

W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President

George M. Elsey, Administrative Assistant to the President

Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador-at-Large

John Foster Dulles, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State

Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State

Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army

Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy

Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force

General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Navy

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force

Maj. General J. H. Burns, USA (Ret.), Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

SECRETARIAT

James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary

DECISIONS

1. THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

(The President participated in the following actions of the Council.)

- a. Discussed and amended a proposed directive to General MacArthur, and agreed that the final wording should be worked out between the Departments of State and Defense in the light of the discussion at the meeting.
- b. Noted the Soviet reply to the U. S. note on the Korean situation and the Chinese Communist statement on this situation, both of which were read by the Secretary of State.

- c. Noted the President's agreement to the public release, by the Department of State, of the U. S. note to the USSR regarding Korea and the Soviet reply.
- d. Noted the President's desire that all offers by other members of the United Nations to place contingents of their armed forces under the command of General MacArthur for use in the Korean situation, should be accepted, in order that the forces assisting South Korea may be truly representative of the United Nations.
- e. Noted that the President desired a directive issued in his name to General MacArthur to make a full and complete report on the situation in the Far East each day.

NOTE: The wording of the directive referred to in a above subsequently agreed upon by the Departments of State and Defense.

The diplomatic notes referred to in c above subsequently were released to the public by the Department of State

The directive referred to in e above subsequently to be issued by the Department of Defense.

471-B

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MR. BOSS
JUN 23 1951

June 29, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BOSS:

Since the Korean situation developed, approximately 690 telegrams and 275 letters have been received. 225 of the telegrams were prior to the President's statement on Tuesday - 200 favoring intervention, 25 in opposition.

Of the 675 remaining, approximately 325 approved the President's action, 225 opposed, and approximately 125 are of a miscellaneous nature.

As to the letters, they are running so far ten to one in favor of the President's action.

Attached are copies of the more important telegrams.

W. J. H.

X50-71

Original did not come to file.

1-1-5

Dr. Samuel H. Anderson
DENTIST
21 KEW GARDENS RD.
KEW GARDENS, N. Y.
VIRGINIA 7-7718

71-B
Statement of
Com

Harry S Truman
President U.S.A.



June 29, 1950.

Dear Mr. Truman:

I urge "Hands off Korea."

The Korean people have a right to their material independence and in sending arms and men to Korea we are guilty of the same "naked aggression" which characterized the Hitler regime.

Yours truly

Samuel H. Anderson D.D.S.

June 29, 1950 - Thursday

At 1 o'clock in the afternoon the Department of State received a report from Ambassador Kirk of his interview with Gromyko, which the Department interpreted as making it appear unlikely that the Soviet Union intended to commit its forces to Korea.

Source: Secretary Acheson's Briefing Book,
borrowed by C.M.E. from Averell Harriman.

[L.W.
did not
get
B. Smith]

[Redacted Signature]

Ambassador Kirk to the Secretary of State
[Transcription of Telegram]

Moscow, June 29, 1950

[Received June 29, 1950,
1:02 p.m.]

I saw Gromyko at 5 p.m., taking Freers along, and Gromyko had Postoev and Lavrov [?] present. In an atmosphere of calm, and without constraint, Gromyko said that he had a statement to make in reply to mine of 27 June which he read in Russian, translation as follows:

"In connection with the statement of the Government of the United States of America transmitted by you on June 27, the Soviet Government has instructed me to state the following:

"1. In accordance with facts verified by the Soviet Government, the events taking place in Korea were provoked by an attack by forces of the South Korean authorities on border regions of North Korea. Therefore the responsibility for these events rests upon the South Korean authorities and upon those who stand behind their back.

"2. As is known, the Soviet Government withdrew its troops from Korea earlier than the Government of the United States and thereby confirmed its traditional principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states.

(X) And now as well the Soviet Government adheres to the principle of the impermissibility of interference by foreign

J - 16-5... / ... -

powers

powers in the internal affairs of Korea.

"3. It is not true that the Soviet Government refused to participate in meetings of the Security Council. In spite of its full willingness, the Soviet Government has not been able to take part in the meetings of the Security Council inasmuch as, because of the position of the Government of the United States, China, a permanent member of the Security Council, has not been admitted to the Council, which has made it impossible for the Security Council to take decisions having legal force."

Postoev then translated into English.

I then asked if this statement was really a reply to the last part of mine of 27 June (which I said I was sorry not to have been able to make to him in person on Tuesday--and got nothing from Gromyko) wherein the United States Government asks the Government of the U.S.S.R. to "use its influence with the North Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces immediately", adding that we hoped in this way to stop the fighting. Gromyko replied that the statement was complete in itself and should be taken as a whole. He added that I could always return if need be to discuss it further.

I assume that the Soviets will shortly release the text of their statement.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

JUNE 29, 1950
No. 699

**CAUTION
FUTURE RELEASE
NOTE DATE**

FOR RELEASE AT 4:30 P.M., E.D.T., THURSDAY, JUNE 29, 1950.
NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR
USED IN ANY WAY.

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DEAN ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE,
BEFORE THE 17TH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER
GUILD, STATLER HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C., THURSDAY, JUNE 29,
1950, AT 4:30 P.M., E.D.T.

I welcome the opportunity to appear today before this organization of working newspaper men and women, and to discuss some of the problems we face in our foreign policy.

We share a grave responsibility for putting before the American people full and accurate information on what is happening in the world, so that they are enabled to make informed judgments. This is vital to the successful formulation and execution of foreign policy in a democratic society.

This occasion also enables me to acknowledge a debt to the members of the American Newspaper Guild, for having twice loaned to the Government its distinguished President, Mr. Harry Martin.

On both of these assignments, Mr. Martin has served his country with great distinction. Your organization can be proud of his accomplishments.

In his present work, as chief of the Office of Labor Information for the ECA overseas, Mr. Martin is doing an energetic and extremely useful job of working together with trade-unionists in Europe to ensure that the Marshall Plan fulfills the constructive purpose to which it is dedicated.

On a previous occasion, Mr. Martin not only carried out a difficult diplomatic assignment, but he made a name for himself in the Government by going into an international propaganda encounter and pitching a no-hit ball game.

This happened two years ago, when Mr. Martin was appointed by President Truman as a member of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information, which was meeting in Geneva.

After spending days at the Conference listening to the representatives of the Soviet Union and its satellites, complaining about what an unfree press we have in this country, and how Wall Street and the advertisers run our newspapers, Mr. Martin decided he had had enough.

So he asked for the floor. When he was recognized, Mr. Martin pulled out of his pocket a copy of the regulations of Glavlit, the Soviet censorship agency, and read the regulations, one after the other. One regulation spoke of the right of the censorship agency to station a deputy in every editorial office and every publishing house, every broadcasting studio and every printing office, to look things over before they were printed, or put on the air.

Another regulation required editors to send five copies to Glavlit headquarters for post-publication censorship. And another spoke of a period of three months at corrective labor work, or a fine of up to three hundred rubles for not following the political-ideological line, and so on.

After he had finished reading these regulations, Mr. Martin just sat down. Quiet peace settled over the room. For at least two days, not much was heard about the evils of the capitalistic press, and the Conference was able, for a while at least, to get on with its work.

* * *

Today, I would like to review with you the facts of the situation which I am sure is uppermost in your minds -- the events which have been taking place and are now going on in Korea.

I think you will agree that this has been what newspaper men call a fast-breaking story.

The immediate events of the story go back less than five days. On Saturday afternoon -- it was just before daybreak of Sunday morning in Korea -- without warning and without provocation, Communist forces of the North launched a coordinated full-scale assault on the Republic of Korea. After heavy artillery fire, Communist infantry began crossing the 38th parallel at three points, while amphibious forces were landing at several points on the East coast, some 20 miles to the South.

First reports to reach the capital at Seoul, 30 miles below the 38th parallel, were fragmentary and confused. There had been small border forays on many previous occasions, and the magnitude of this attack was not immediately clear.

Our Ambassador at Seoul, John Muccio, immediately got in touch with Korean Army Headquarters, through our Military Advisory Group, and as soon as it became evident that this was more than another border incident, he cabled the State Department.

Ambassador Muccio's cable reached the State Department code room at nine twenty-six Saturday night, having crossed an inquiry the Department had sent to him a few minutes before, based on the first press flash on the action.

Within a matter of minutes, the message was decoded and the Department was alerted for action.

By ten-thirty, our Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, and the Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, were conferring at the Department.

By eleven Secretary Pace had alerted the Department of Defense, a full operating staff was on duty at our Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, and I had discussed the situation by phone with the President.

Action developed along two fronts in the State Department during the night.

One group of Department officers worked through the night preparing for a meeting of the Security Council which we had immediately requested. The United Nations had established the Republic of Korea, and had since early 1948 maintained a Commission in Korea. We therefore felt a primary responsibility to bring this matter to the immediate attention of the United Nations.

By Sunday afternoon, within twenty hours of the time the first official word of this invasion was received here, the Security Council had taken its first action. Representatives of ten member nations of the Security Council had been assembled from their Sunday places of rest -- the eleventh was the representative of the Soviet Union, who stayed away. After hearing the report of the United Nations Commission concerning the unprovoked act of aggression, the Security Council passed a resolution which called for an immediate end to the fighting, and for the assistance of all members in restoring the peace. All actions taken by the United States to restore the peace in Korea have been under the aegis of the United Nations.

Another group of Department officers, meanwhile, were working with their colleagues in the Defense Department, consulting on measures to be taken within the framework of existing policy and plans, and the emergency orders of the President.

The President flew to Washington. By the time he had arrived at seven-twenty Sunday evening, completed staff work and recommendations had been prepared and were laid before him. The Departments of State and Defense had worked as one department, with complete agreement and coordination of effort.

During Sunday night and early Monday morning, actions flowing from the conference with the President were set in motion. General MacArthur was authorized to respond at once to urgent appeals from the Government of Korea for additional supplies of ammunition, and in a matter of hours was flying into Korea loaded transport planes with fighter protection to assure their safe arrival. At about the same time, the Seventh Fleet with all men aboard was steaming north out of Subic Bay, to be on hand in case of need.

It became possible on Monday to get a clearer picture of the military situation, by sifting the fragmentary and sometimes conflicting reports we had been receiving from many different sources.

From the size and speed of the Communist attack, it was evident that it was a premeditated action; that it had been carefully plotted for many weeks before. The initial thrust, supported by planes and tanks, had clearly caught the Korean Government troops by surprise. Although the defending forces rallied and launched several small counter-actions, it did not appear that they were in a position to bar the tank-and-plane-supported Communist thrust down the corridor to the capital city.

By Monday night, in the light of this situation, recommendations were prepared by the President's civil and military advisers on the course of action to be taken. In preparing these recommendations, it was clear to all concerned that this act of aggression had brought in issue the authority and indeed the continued existence of the United Nations, and the security of the nations of the free world, including the United States and its forces in the Pacific. These recommendations were prepared with the sober realization of the issues involved, and with the full agreement of all the President's advisers.

As in many other situations which have arisen in the years in which I have served as Under Secretary and Secretary, the President was faced with difficult decisions which had to be made quickly. And as in the previous cases, the President assumed the responsibility, made the decisions, and has given leadership and direction to the entire action of the Government of the United States.

Consultations with Congressional leaders on Tuesday morning demonstrated a complete unity in understanding the problem and the course of action which needed to be taken.

At Tuesday noon, the President announced the actions which this Government would take to support the United Nations and uphold a rule of law in the Pacific area.

In the interval between the meetings of the Security Council on Sunday and again on Tuesday, the United Nations Commission on Korea had confirmed the fact that the Communist authorities in North Korea had ignored the cease fire order and defied the authority of the United Nations. Therefore, the Security Council recommended at its meeting Tuesday night that member nations give aid to the Republic of Korea, and help to restore peace and security to the area.

Yesterday -- four days after the fighting began -- the fall of Seoul was confirmed but American air and sea support for Korean Government troops was beginning to make itself felt, and peace-loving nations the world over were able to hope that this act of brutal, unprovoked and naked aggression would not be allowed to succeed.

* * * *

It may be useful at this point to review briefly the background of recent history against which the present act of aggression against Korea is to be considered.

Since the 19th century, American missionaries, doctors and educators have been especially active in Korea, so that through the years of Japanese occupation, which began in the first decade of this century, the Korean people came to regard the United States as a symbol of the freedom and independence to which they aspired.

In the Cairo Declaration of December 1943, the United States, the United Kingdom and China pledged their determination that Korea would become free and independent. This pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, and was subscribed to by the Soviet Union when it entered the war against Japan 13 days later.

The defeat of Japan made it possible for Korea to look forward to the realization of its desire for independence.

On the day following the first Japanese offer of surrender, which was made on August 10, 1945, the Secretary of War submitted to the Secretary of State a plan for the arrangements to be followed in accepting the surrender of Japanese troops in various places. To meet the immediate problem, it was proposed that the nearby Soviet troops accept the surrender of Japanese armed forces in Korea down to the 38th parallel, and that American troops be brought up from Okinawa and the Philippines to accept the surrender of Japanese troops in the southern part of Korea. This arrangement was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, and the President, and after it had been accepted by Generalissimo Stalin, was incorporated in the first General Order to be issued by General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on September 2, 1945.

Soviet troops had occupied the Northern part of Korea on August 12. The Soviet desire and intention to put troops into Korea had been made evident at the Potsdam discussions, one month before. On September 8, American troops had been landed to accept the surrender of the Japanese in the Southern part of Korea, and we began efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union for the unification and independence of the country.

We soon found that the Soviet Union considered the 38th parallel not as a line drawn on a map for the sake of administrative convenience, but as a wall around their preserve.

At the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers in December 1945 a joint commission for the unity and independence of Korea was agreed to between the Soviet Union and ourselves, but we found that every effort to give effect to this agreement and previous agreements was blocked by Soviet intransigence.

The United States was unwilling to permit this situation to delay further the realization of Korean independence.

This Government therefore laid the question of Korean independence before the United Nations. The General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1947, called for an election in Korea, under the observation of a United Nations Commission, to choose a representative national assembly for the purpose of drafting a democratic constitution and establishing a national government.

The Soviet Union refused to allow the United Nations Commission to enter its zone. Consequently, the right of the Korean people to participate in a free election to establish a free government was confined to Southern Korea. The election was held there and the Government of the Republic of Korea was established on August 15, 1948.

It has been the aim of the United States to provide the people of the Republic of Korea with sufficient assistance and support to enable them to progress through their own efforts toward freedom and independence. The transfer of functions from the United States Army Military Government to Korean agencies was carried out progressively from the

moment

moment of the establishment of the Republic. The United States has continued to give assistance and support to the Republic, both within the framework of the United Nations, and directly. We have trained and equipped Korean defense forces, we have extended economic aid and technical advice, fostered exchange of students and professors, and, in general, done everything possible to help the people of Korea in establishing a democratic political and economic structure responsive to their needs.

The Government of the Republic of Korea was accepted by the United Nations in December 1948, as the validly elected, lawful Government of the area in which elections were permitted -- and the only such Government in Korea. The General Assembly established a reconstituted Commission to continue to work for unification and a representative government for the entire country.

The United States recognized the new government on January 1, 1949. Many other members of the United Nations have since done the same. Membership of the Republic of Korea in the United Nations has been blocked by the Soviet veto.

Meanwhile, the 38th parallel had become a part of "the iron curtain". Behind that curtain, the Soviet Union established a Communist regime. The formal creation of this regime was proclaimed on September 9, 1948, as the so-called "Democratic People's Republic of Korea", claiming jurisdiction over the entire country. This regime has lived, as it was created, in complete defiance of the United Nations.

The great single fact which stands out from this summary history is that a peaceful people ruled by a sovereign independent government of their own choosing, brought into being by the United Nations and recognized by the great majority of the free nations of the world, was attacked in a cynical and brutal act of aggression.

We are confronted with a direct challenge to the United Nations. Whether this organization, which embodies our hopes for an international order based on peace with justice and freedom, can survive this test will depend upon the vigor with which it answers the challenge, and the support which it receives from free nations.

The President has enunciated the policy of this Government to do its utmost to uphold the sanctity of the Charter of the United Nations and the rule of law among nations. We are, therefore, in conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council of June 25 and June 27, giving air and sea support to the troops of the Korean Government. This action, pursuant to the Security Council resolutions, is solely for the purpose of restoring the Republic of Korea to its status prior to the invasion from the North and of reestablishing the peace broken by that aggression.

In order that the Communist movement may not further threaten the security of the Pacific area by force of arms, we shall increase military assistance to the Philippines and to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indo-China.

The President has also ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, and we have called upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. This action is not intended to determine the future status of Formosa, which can be settled only upon the restoration of peace and security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

As a further measure toward the restoration of peace, we have, through our Embassy in Moscow, asked the Soviet Government to exercise its influence with the North Korean authorities for the withdrawal of the invading forces and the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

In conclusion may I say again that the action of this Government in Korea is taken in support of the authority of the United Nations. It is taken to restore peace and security to the Pacific area.

It is taken in the conviction that peace and security cannot be obtained by sacrificing the independence of nations to aggression.

Free men the world over have spoken out with one voice since this dawn attack was launched five days ago. They endorse our resolve, and stand with us in support of the United Nations. Those governments in a position to provide armed forces to assist in the support of the Republic of Korea are already taking steps to provide that support.

It is now clear to all -- if indeed it was not clear before -- that free nations must be united, they must be determined, and they must be strong, if they are to preserve their freedom, and maintain a righteous peace. There is no other way.

* * *

Draft ---

The President called a conference for 5 o'clock in the Cabinet Room on Thursday, June 29, 1950, to discuss further some of the questions raised at the National Security Council meeting on the previous day.

A complete list of those attending the meeting is attached as Annex "A".

The President opened the meeting by stating that he had asked the group to get together to talk further on the subject of Wednesday's meeting.

Secretary Johnson then read a letter which he had received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, setting forth a directive to General MacArthur. Mr. Johnson stated that the letter had been concurred in by the Department of State. A copy of the letter is attached as Annex "B".

(Not attached)

The President interrupted Mr. Johnson as the latter was reading paragraph ___. The President stated flatly "I do not want any implication in the letter that we are going to war with Russia at this time." The President continued that he could be argued into accepting the paragraph as it had been read but that he would not like it. The President said: "We must be damn careful. We must not say that we are

anticipating a war with the Soviet Union. We want to take any steps we have to to push the North Koreans behind the line (i.e., 38th Parallel) but I don't want to get us over-committed to a whole lot of other things that could mean war."

Secretary Johnson said he understood the President's position, and he continued to read the letter.

When he had finished, Mr. Johnson stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed it essential to establish the beachhead in Korea and he asked Frank Pace for his comments.

Mr. Pace agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a beachhead was necessary. He had considerable reservations about putting any limitations in the directive to General MacArthur.

The President said that some reservations were necessary. He said that he just wanted to destroy air bases, gasoline supplies, ammunition dumps and places like that north of the 38th Parallel. He said that he only wanted to restore order to the 38th Parallel; he did not want to do anything north of it except to "keep the North Koreans from killing the people we are trying to save. You can give the Commander-in-Chief (MacArthur) all the authority he needs to do that but he is not to go north of the 38th degree parallel." The President then turned to the Secretary of State and asked if he had heard from Moscow.

The Secretary of State, before answering the question, made some general remarks on the directive to General MacArthur. He said that the Department of State concurs in the Air Force taking whatever steps are necessary north of the 38th parallel to attack Communist bases. He said he had no objection to the Air Force acting against North Korean airfields and Army units. If, for example, an American plane saw Communist tanks coming down the road, they should attack those tanks without much concern as to which side of the 38th degree parallel they happen to be on. Mr. Acheson continued that he was ~~not~~ in complete agreement with what Secretary Finletter had said at the Security Council meeting the day before about the necessity for freedom of action on the part of pilots. But, Mr. Acheson said, he would have to insist that American planes not go outside of North Korea. No one would be able to foresee the consequences if one of our planes got over into Manchuria.

Mr. Acheson then turned to the employment of United States ground troops. He said he was willing for United States ground troops to go into Korea. It would be a great disaster if we were to lose now, and it was essential to give the Commander-on-the-spot (MacArthur) whatever he needs to stop a disaster. As for paragraph _____ about which there has been some question, Mr. Acheson said he thought

that our troops would have to be given the right to fight Soviet forces if they encountered them. If an American unit found Soviet forces, in Soviet uniforms, attacking them, they naturally had to have the right to defend themselves.

Some discussion ensued at this point about the directive to General MacArthur. It appeared that the President was under the impression it was to be made public, and he had objected to paragraph on the grounds that such a statement should not be made public.

He was assured by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense that the document would remain top secret. Everybody agreed that if General MacArthur's men met Soviet troops they should defend themselves even if that meant actual engagement between United States and Soviet forces.

The President again asked Mr. Acheson about Ambassador Kirk's meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrew Gromyko.

Mr. Acheson then read a telegram which he had received a short time before from Ambassador Kirk. A copy of this telegram is attached as Annex "C". Mr. Acheson said that the Department interpreted that as a clear statement that the Russians were not going to put their armed forces in as their own forces. Mr. Acheson said he was convinced that the Russians do not intend to enter

directly into the Korean dispute. Mr. Acheson said he thought the interview with Gromyko ought to be considered in the light of the statements being made by the Chinese Communists. Evidently there was a scheme built up so that the Communists could say that the United States is attacking China (i.e., Manchuria) so that the Chinese Communists can have an excuse to enter the Korean dispute.

The President interposed to say "That means the Russians are going to let the Chinese do the fighting for them."

Mr. Acheson asked for permission to release the telegrams exchanged with our Ambassador in Moscow and the President gave him the permission.

Mr. Acheson reported that India had accepted the second resolution of the United Nations Security Council, after a delay of 48 hours. The President and Secretary Johnson commented that that was excellent news.

The discussion then turned to offers being made by Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the Netherlands for the use of Naval facilities and planes.

The President told State and Defense to "take everything. We may need them." Everything, he continued should be accepted as a contribution to the work which General MacArthur is doing for the United Nations. No offers of armed assistance should be accepted

as contributions to United States efforts, but only as contributions in support of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

Secretary Acheson asked Secretary Johnson if it would be possible to get General MacArthur to report what was going on.

The President instructed Mr. Johnson to order General MacArthur, in the name of the President, to submit complete daily reports. The President remarked that it was just as hard to get information out of MacArthur now as it had been during the war.

Mr. Johnson remarked that Secretary Pace was coordinating all intelligence and information.

The President concluded the meeting by stating that he had no quarrel with anybody and that he did not intend to have any — he just wanted to know what the facts were, and, he concluded, "I don't want any leaks."

The meeting adjourned at 5:35 P.M.

Persons present at the President's meeting at 5 P.M., Thursday,

June 29, 1950, in the Cabinet Room.

From the White House:

The President

W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President

George M. Elsey, Administrative Assistant to the President

From the National Security Council:

James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary

From the National Security Resources Board:

Stuart Symington, Chairman

From the Department of State:

Dean Acheson, Secretary

John Foster Dulles, Special Advisor to the Secretary

Philip C. Jessup, Special Advisor to the Secretary

H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State

Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

From the Department of Defense:

Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of Defense

Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army

Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy,

Thomas E. Pinletter, Secretary of the Air Force

General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations

Royst S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force

Major General James H. Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED
10 Years, 2013-06-25~~TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY~~

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO: CINCPAC(COMMAND) TOKYO JAPAN

INFO: CINCAL FT RICHARDSON ALASKA, CINCARIB QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ, CINCEUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY, COMGENUSA(REAIR)
SALZBURG AUSTRIA, CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCNEIM
LONDON ENGLAND, COMGENSAO OFFUTT AFB OMAHA NEBR

NR: JCS 84681

29 JUN 50

From JCS.

29/2259 Z I.C. 6:59 pm idt.

1. This directive consolidates, broadens and supplements existing instructions governing your actions with regard to situation in South Korea and Formosa.

2. In support of resolutions of United Nations, approved on 25 June (transmitted as WCL 29851, 28 June 50) and 27 June (transmitted as WCL 30453):

A. You will employ naval and air forces available to the Far East Command to provide fullest possible support to South Korean forces by attack on military targets so as to permit these forces to clear South Korea of North Korean forces.

B. Employment of army forces will be limited to essential communications and other essential service units, except that you are authorized to employ such army combat and service forces as to insure the retention of a port and air base in the general area Pusan-Chinhse.

C. By naval and air action you will defend Formosa against invasion or attack by Chinese Communists and will insure that Formosa will not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese mainland by Chinese Nationalists.

3. Seventh Fleet is assigned to your operational control. CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT will support and reinforce you as necessary and practicable.

CM OUT 84681

(JUN 50)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR: JCS 84681

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. You are authorized to extend your operations into Northern Korea against air bases, depots, tank farms, troop columns and other such purely military targets, if and when, in your judgment, this becomes essential for the performance of your missions as given in paragraphs 2A and B, or to avoid unnecessary casualties to our forces. Special care will be taken to insure that operations in North Korea stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria or the Soviet Union.

5. You are authorized to send to Korea any munitions and supplies from resources at your disposal which you deem necessary. You will submit your estimates of amounts and types of aid required from sources outside your control.

6. The decision to commit United States air and naval forces and limited army forces to provide cover and support for South Korean troops does not constitute a decision to engage in war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervene in Korea. The decision regarding Korea, however, was taken in full realization of the risks involved. If Soviet forces actively oppose our operations in Korea, your forces should defend themselves, should take no action to aggravate the situation, and you should report the situation to Washington.

ORIGIN: JCS

DISTR: AF, NAVY, OSA, NAVAIDE, G2(STATE), SECDEF, 04,
G1, OMA, G3, PRAD

CM OUT 84681

(JUN 50) DTG: 292259Z med

~~TOP SECRET~~

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JCS Memo. No. 44-74-1
By ANALYST/AC NARS, Date 3-2-2021

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THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

10-4224-1

SI 1484

POLIFIED
L. to: DIAZ, Sec. (FE) and R.D. - (S)
D.P. at State Dept. ~~Aug 3, 1950~~
S. R. M.L.T./C, NARS Date 6-30-50

C O P Y

Incoming Telegram

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Telegraph Branch

A

~~SECRET~~

S-B-I

Action

FE

FROM: Tokyo

Control: 13335

Rec'd: June 30, 1950
1:31 A.M.

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

O

NO: 682, June 30

UNA

OLI

PRIORITY.

DCR

Talked to Muccio by telephone late last night. Gist of conversation indicated that Muccio and President Rhee have just had a conference with General MacArthur. Muccio repeatedly stressed his desire that I convey to Department in strongest terms his urgent recommendation that the plan presumably to be recommended by General MacArthur to the JCS be supported. During the conversation, he said: "It is absolutely essential that we adopt the bold plan without further delay. It is essential that a master stroke be carried out, the sooner the better". He also said that an all-out effort is necessary if the situation is to be saved.

He inferred that communication by telephone was most difficult and obviously is being tapped or jammed. Much of the conversation was, for security reasons, carried out in double-talk, but it is clear that Muccio was bending every effort to make me understand his recommendation that full support be given to General MacArthur's recommendations. He also spoke of having "rough times" today by reason of having been spotted by "our friends", but said that all are well.

SEBALD

TT:RFB

NOTE: Read by Mr. Cochran (FE) 6/30/50, 2:30 a.m. SMB.

~~SECRET~~

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MESSAGE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

PANAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

FROM: CINCPOZ TOKYO JAPAN SCD Mac

DTG:

TO: DEPTAR PASS TO JCS

i.e. 10:50 pm,
29th 6.d.t.

NR: C 56942

30/07/50 2

30 JUL 50

I have today inspected the South Korean battle area from Suwon north to the Han River. My purpose was to reconnoiter at first hand the conditions as they exist and to determine the most effective way to further support our mission.

The Korean army and coastal forces are in confusion, have not seriously fought, and lack leadership through their own means. Organized and equipped as a light force for maintenance of interior order they were unprepared for attack by armor and air. Conversely, they are incapable of gaining the initiative over such a force as that embodied in the North Korean army.

The Korean army had made no preparations for a defense in depth, for echelons of supply or for a supply system. No plans had been made, or if made, not executed, for the destruction of supplies or materiel in event of a retrograde movement. As a result, they have either lost, or abandoned, their supplies and heavier equipment and have absolutely no system of inter-communication. In most cases the individual soldier, in his flight to the south, has retained his rifle or carbine. They are gradually being gathered up in rear areas and given some semblance of organization by an advance group of my officers I have sent over for this purpose. Without artillery, mortars, and anti-tank guns, they can only hope to retard the enemy through the fullest utilization of natural obstacles and under the guidance and example of leadership of high quality.

CK-IN-2776

(30 Jun 50)

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by 2000 11-2003 2705
11-2003 2705

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950-O-00000

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INCOMING
MESSAGE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

~~TOP
SECRET~~

MR: C 56942

PAGE 2

The civilian populace is tranquil, orderly and prosperous according to their scale of living. They have retained a high national spirit and firm belief in the Americans. The roads leading south from Seoul are crowded with refugees refusing to accept the Communist rule.

South Korean military strength is estimated at not more than 25,000 effectives. North Korean military forces are as previously reported, backed by considerable strength in armor and a well trained, well directed and aggressive air force equipped with Russian planes. It is now obvious that this force has been built as an element of Communist military aggression.

I am doing everything possible to establish and maintain a flow of supplies through the air-head at Suwon and the southern port of Pusan. The air-head is most vital but is subject to constant air attack. Since air cover must be maintained over all aircraft transporting supplies, equipment, and personnel, this requirement operates to contain a large portion of my fighter strength. North Korean air, operating from nearby bases, has been savage in its attacks in the Suwon area.

It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its impetus will threaten the overrunning of all Korea. Every effort is being made to establish a Han River line but the result is highly problematical. The defense of this line and the Suwon-Seoul corridor is essential to the retention of the only air-head in Central Korea.

The Korean army is entirely incapable of counter action and there is a grave danger of a further breakthrough. If the enemy advance continues much further it will seriously threaten the fall of the Republic.

The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground, is through the introduction of US ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces of our Air and Navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.

CW-IN-8776

(30 Jun 50)

750
100 Hours, 10/17/1974 / 27-75
By AF/DT/AM, NMIC, Date 2-9-75

COPY NO.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1950-0-14464

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED
INCOMING
MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

~~TOP SECRET~~

NR: C 56942

PAGE 5

If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a US regimental combat team to the reinforcement of the vital area discussed and to provide for a possible build-up to a two division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counter-offensive.

Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy-Air team in this shattered area our mission will at best be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worse, it might even be doomed to failure.

Note: This message has been relayed to State.

Note: Dispatched Tokyo DT 301250
Dispatched Washington EDT 292200

ACTION: JCS

INFO: CSA, AF, NAVY, NAVALDE, SECDEF, SA, CI, CIA, PREAD

CM-1B-8776

(30 Jun 50) UTC: 300250Z 12.1/1

DDP DECLASSIFIED
440 Name. Date 12-10-71
By ASST AGO, MAR. Date 3-4-75

June 30, 1950 - Friday

Subject: ~~SWW~~ Teleconference with MacArthur, 300740Z (3:40 A.M., E.D.T.)

The reference messages were MacArthur's 300250Z and the JCS 292259Z.

Those present in Washington included Collins (The senior one present), Gruenthal, Dean Rusk, and various staff officials. MacArthur was on the Tokyo end with seven staff officers.

Collins began the conference by stating that the authorization proposed in MacArthur's 300250Z would require Presidential decision "which will take several hours for consideration. Meanwhile, you are authorized . . . to move one RCT immediately to Pusan base area." (Collins referred to paragraph 2b of JCS 292259Z).

Collins continued "I was present at White House conference late afternoon June 29 when decision was made by the President to authorize action covered in JCS 84681 (292259Z). Tenor of decision clearly indicated to me that the President would wish carefully to consider with his top advisors before authorizing introduction of American combat forces into battle area."

Collins then asked if the authorization just given him in accordance with JCS 292259Z would permit the initiation of movement. Prior to the time the movement would be completed, Collins said, a definite decision would be available. He asked if this would meet MacArthur's requirement for the present.

MacArthur replied: "Your authorization, while establishing basic principle that United States ground combat troops may be used in Korea does not give sufficient latitude for efficient operation in present situation. It does not satisfy the basic requirements contained in my message C56942 (300250Z). Time is of the essence and a clear-cut decision without delay is imperative."

Collins proceeded to ask a series of questions about whether MacArthur's air force had carried out any operations north of the 38th Parallel after receiving JCS 86681 (292259) and what were the results. MacArthur said some strikes had been made on North Korean airfields; results reported good but no details available yet.

Collins asked various other questions on combat operations and then said "I will proceed immediately through the Secretary of Army to request Presidential approval your proposal to move RCT into forward combat area. Will advise you as soon as possible, perhaps within half hour."

At the very end of the conference, the following exchange occurred. Collins said "Your recommendation to move one RCT to combat area is approved. You will be advised later as to further build-up."

MacArthur acknowledged this and asked if there was anything further, to which Collins said "Everyone here delighted your prompt action in personally securing first-hand view of situation. Congratulations and best wishes. We all have full confidence in you and your command. Nothing further here."

Source: White House files.

~~not~~ I don't understand this order of Capt.

- why was this given before he had received
full authorization in response to his telegram
+ Battleplan of early hrs of Th 30th?

Unless he felt authorized to do this much
by ^{the} telegram from DC's night of Thursday, 29th.

CLASSIFIED
Incoming
MESSAGE

SECRET

C
O

Department of the Army
Staff Communications Office

P
Y

SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

FROM: CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN
TO: COMINCHARMTEIGHT
INFO: GHQ ADCOM KOREA, COMCINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN,
COMNAVFE, DEPT OF ARMY WASH DC
NR: EX 56978

30 JUN 50

Move the 24th Division at once to Pusan by air and water. The 24th Division will establish a base at Pusan with a view to early offensive operations. In accordance with the mil situation it will at once advance a delaying force to the North, by all possible means, contact the enemy, now advancing south from Seoul towards Suwon, and delay his advance.

The Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces Far East will support your operations in the move to Pusan and in the protection thereof. The Far East Forces will support operations in the action against the enemy.

Direct contact with FEAF, NAVFE, and ADCOM is auth.

Upon arrival Pusan Commanding Gen 24th Division will operate under instructions from this Hq.

Note: This message has been relayed to State.

N

Note: Despatched Tokyo Time 302139.
Despatched Wash EDT 300739.

Made the 14 hr.
time difference

ACTION: 03

INFO: AF, CSA, JCS, O2, SECDEF, OSA, NAVY

CM IN 8841

(30 JUNE 50) DTG: 301139Z WK/C

30/0739 e.d.t.

SECRET

REFUGEE

EO 11652, Sec. 3(b) and (d) or (e)

Y-1-78
OSD Inter. May 6, 1972

17 NOV 1966 NAME DATE 6-20-74

(COPY)

Not Sensitive
Brevity First

MLT-617

COPY 1

C O P Y

Incoming Telegram

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Telegraph Branch
~~TOP SECRET~~

A

Action Control: 13405
FROM: Tokyo Rec'dt June 30, 1950
TO: Secretary of State 8:05 a.m.
NO: 688, June 30
INFOACT

Had brief telephone conversation with Muccio at 1730 in which he spoke of desperate and rapidly deteriorating situation. He said he had spent most of night and practically all day with top Koreans and key members National Assembly and feels he can hold them in line a little longer. Danger, however, is that they might soon panic. He strongly urged all out effort before situation out of hand.

SEBALD

MRM:KC

✓ NOTE: Mr. Bond's office notified 9:10 A.M. 6/30/50 CWD-M.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

E.O. 13526, Sec. 1(e) and (f)(1) & (g)
6/17/75
Distr. to Com. by ██████████
~~TOP SECRET JULY 7 1975~~
Re: MLT-████, MARS Date/2-5-75

DECLASSIFIED
JCS Memo, 2-9-75
~~060112Z MAR 01 1951~~

June 30, 1950 - Friday

Subject: 9:30 A.M. Meeting with the President

At 9:30 A.M. (E.D.T.) Johnson, the three Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the President at the White House (presumably, the directive to MacArthur authorizing the two division build-up was discussed and approved. Also, presumably, the text of the press release was discussed).

During this meeting, Admiral Sherman and the President approved the establishment of a Naval blockade around Korea.

(For reasons G.N.E. does not know, the appropriate directive to MacArthur was not sent until Saturday. The message had a date time group of 011520Z).

Source: JCS Secret Summary Book for Senate Committees, 30 April 1951.

Draft

At eleven o'clock on Friday, June 30, 1950, the President held a meeting in the Cabinet Room to discuss the situation in Korea. Since this was the regularly scheduled meeting of the Cabinet, the entire Cabinet was present, as were representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, and a number of members of Congress. A complete list of those attending the meeting is attached as Annex "A".

The meeting opened at 11:10 a.m., when the President entered the Cabinet Room. The President explained that he had asked those present to attend so that there could be a complete review of the Korean situation to date. The President asked General Bradley to give a summary of the military situation in Korea, which the General proceeded to do with the aid of a map.

The President then referred to the fact that he ~~had~~ had had a meeting at five o'clock on Thursday afternoon with various officials, and that he had met again with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at nine o'clock on Friday morning. As a result of those meetings, he was now prepared to issue a statement which he would read.

The President then proceeded to read a short statement which is attached as Annex "B".

After finishing the statement, the President said that he wanted all of the gentlemen present to know all of the facts as far as it was possible for him to pass them on. He wanted all of them to know that what we had done was being done under the auspices of the United Nations; and that offers of help which had come from countries like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand of sending military forces to help General MacArthur were being made for the United Nations.

The President said he was pleased that India had endorsed the United Nations Security Council resolutions, and that it looked like the action which had been taken was going to be unanimous except for Soviet Russia and perhaps some of ~~the~~ satellites.

Following the President's remarks, Senator Connally asked the first question. He said he had understood General Bradley to say that a regiment was being sent to ^{75th N} ----. He wanted to know where the regiment was coming from. General Bradley assured him it was MacArthur's command in Japan.

Senator Connally then said that he was pleased that the President was permitting American forces to operate when necessary north of the 38 degree parallel; he said that such an order was justified. General Bradley remarked that sometimes the most effective way to hit your enemy is to go after his bases.

Senator Connally concurred and asked General Bradley if we were going to have a unified command.

The President and Secretary Johnson assured the Senator that all military forces would be under General MacArthur.

Senator Connally said he wanted every other nation to understand very clearly that MacArthur was the boss.

Senator Tydings broke in to ask to what extent other nations would be giving direct military assistance to MacArthur. He said he felt quite strongly that it would be very helpful if other countries,

like Australia and Canada, could send a few ~~troops~~ ^{Allies} -- even as few as one company. -- to help in Korea. Tydings said that he was certain that some show of Allied as distinct from American forces was necessary.

There were two reasons for this, he said, the first was for the fact of the American people once the casualty lists began to appear. and the second was the attitude of the world at large. He did not want anybody to think that this was a private American war. He concluded by saying he hoped that some troops, perhaps the British at Hong Kong, could soon join us in the fighting.

The President pointed out that we had not yet committed any troops to actual combat and that our present plan was just to

Pusan
send base troops to ~~T~~ to keep communications and supply lines open.

Senator Tydings said he understood that; he was just looking to the future at such a time as we were actually in the front lines. He hoped that at that time there would be Allied ground forces in action.

Secretary Johnson commented that one nation had offered some ground troops to us, but he did not volunteer the name of the nation.

Senator Gurney said he hoped the Administration realized that we must completely support the Southern Koreans. Now that we were in this, there could be no backing down. He said he hoped the President understood.

The President said, "I certainly do understand that."

Senator Lucas said that he wished to endorse what Senator Tydings had said. He thought it very important that there be some token of forces, perhaps South American or European, fighting with us in Korea. The more nations the better, since it would indicate that what we were doing was the United Nations and not a United States action. Like Senator Tydings he thought that even one company would be valuable.

The President commented that the offers of help from other countries have been very satisfying.

Senator Lucas persisted. Ecuador, he pointed out, was a member of the United Nations Security Council. Ecuador has joined in supporting the resolutions. Couldn't we get Ecuador to give some troops?

Congressman Overton Brooks wanted to know if there was any relationship between events in Korea and the Soviet announcement that they were going to close down some power plants in Germany. The President said there was no connection he knew of.

Senator Wiley wanted to know if the State Department was working to get other countries into the fighting with us.

The President replied that ~~yes~~, the State Department was working on that. He thought he had made it clear that other countries were volunteering to help us.

Senator Wiley wanted to know if our military forces were alerted all over the world. What about Berlin? Couldn't the Russian ^{opinion} announcement about Berlin be interpreted as an ~~unfriendly~~ sign?

The President replied, "I don't interpret; I am just waiting to see what will happen."

Senator Wiley wanted to know if the Chinese Communists were going to help the North Koreans.

The President replied that we had no intelligence on that subject yet, but that there were a lot of rumors flying around that the Chinese Communists would fight. They were just rumors and we would have to wait and see.

Senator Smith asked if there were any evidences that Communist aggression was going to break out in other parts of the world.

The President said there were lots of rumors about places like Iran, but they were just rumors.

Congressman Vorys said it would be a fine thing if we could get some Asiatic peoples in the fighting to help us, not just other White people. If we got a few ^{rl} Asiatics into fighting, it wouldn't look so much like "White man's imperialism."

The President said that was a very difficult matter, because if we got some Asiatics -- like Chiang's ^{rnra} on Formosa, for example -- we would have to be awfully careful of the Chinese Communists.

Senator Sherry arose, addressed the President as though he were on the Senate Floor, and wanted to know if the President was going to advise the Congress before he sent ground troops into Korea.

The President said that some ground troops had already been ordered into Korea. If there were a real emergency, he would advise the Congress.

Senator Sherry said he thought the Congress ought to be consulted before the President made moves like this.

The President said this had been an emergency. There was no time for lots of talk. There had been a weekend crisis and ^a ~~A~~ ^{he} had to act. "I just had to act as Commander-in-Chief, and I did. I told MacArthur to go to the relief of the Koreans and to carry out the instructions of the United Nations Security Council."

Senator Sherry said "I understand ^{action} all right. But I do feel the Congress ought to be consulted before any large scale actions are taken again."

The President replied that if any large scale actions were to take place, he would tell the Congress about it.

The Vice President interrupted to ask if the ships which the British had offered for our use, and which he had been reading about in the morning newspapers, were offered for all purposes, such as fighting, or were they just to help us move refugees out of Korea. He was assured that the British offer had no strings attached to it.

Senator Wherry rose to his feet again, telling the Vice President that he would like the floor, and he continued making statements similar to those before, to the effect that he thought the President ought to consult Congress before taking drastic steps.

The President responded that as soon as he had definite information that required action by the Congress, he would inform all the members. "If there is any necessity for Congressional action," the President continued, "I will come to you. But I hope we can get those bandits in Korea suppressed without that."

There were some further questions about allied assistance to MacArthur, which General Bradley undertook to answer. He said, as a military man, he would be glad to see other countries asked for help because he thought that would have a helpful psychological effect. But as to actually seeing ~~troops~~^{soldiers} of other countries in the lines, that would be a very difficult matter. MacArthur would find it almost impossible to properly supply and control troops of a number of different countries. The troops of some of the countries that have been mentioned are not trained or organized the way ours are, and they have very different military procedures from our own. As for the suggestion that had been made that some Ecuadorian troops be sent to Korea,

General Bradley said it would take six or eight months to get them there and get them in shape to do some fighting. He said that it was ~~out~~ out of the question to contemplate anything like that. If it were only for psychological purposes, a few men might be flown in. It was useless to expect, however, that they could be of real military assistance.

Senator Tydings said he understood the difficulties Mac-Arthur was up against but he still wanted some foreign troops and "just a company, just a company or two," he kept repeating.

Senator Wherry arose again and said that he had been studying the last sentence of the President's press release. He said that he thought there was a clear inconsistency between what he had been told at this meeting about how far we were going, and the last sentence of the release. He repeated his assertions that he thought the Congress ought to be informed and that the President should ^{not} take such steps without Congressional approval.

Constitution
At this point, Dewey Short, who had been seated behind the President, arose and stepped up to the Cabinet table to say that he thought he was expressing the opinion of practically everyone in the Congress in saying that the Congress owed the President thanks for the quality of his leadership. Short said that he, personally, was very grateful to the

President for his frankness in telling them what had been going on and in having General Bradley give them a resume of the military situation.

The Vice President said he thought there was an inconsistency between the last sentence of the press release, which came right out and said that we were going to have ground troops in Korea, and what he had understood to be General Bradley's request made at the beginning of the meeting for complete secrecy on the subject of ground troops in Korea.

General Bradley arose and explained that he was sorry he had not been more precise. What he had meant to say was that he hoped all of those present would keep secret the name of the place to which our ground troops were going to be initially. He had not meant to ask those present to keep secret the fact that we were going to send ground troops in. That fact, Bradley continued, could not possibly be kept secret because there is no effective censorship in Korea. We already had a number of communications teams in Korea trying to set up Army communications and he was surprised that that fact hadn't leaked out already. The ground troops — consisting

principally of supply troops — would start moving in a few hours into Pusan. From a military point of view, Bradley concluded, he would have preferred to see no reference made at all to American troops in Korea, but since the fact was bound to leak out from a public relations point of view, he thought it was best for the President to make the announcement in this fashion before there were any leaks.

Senator Connally asked how many British troops there were in Hong Kong.

General Bradley said he was not sure but he understood the British had less than one division in Hong Kong. The only other British troops in the area are some Australian troops in Japan. Bradley understood that there were some 4500 Australians in Japan and he felt that they probably could move fairly promptly to Korea.

The Vice President said he thought the last sentence of the statement ought to be modified. He did not like it, he said; the statement ought to say that the President is in control of the forces and is issuing the orders to them.

The President pointed out that the statement had been released during the course of the present meeting by Mr. Ross and

it was too late to make changes. Furthermore, he was afraid he could not agree with the Vice President. "This is all very delicate," the President said. "I don't want it stated any place that I am telling MacArthur what to do. He is not an American General now, he is acting for the United Nations. It would spoil everything if we said he was just doing what we tell him to do." The President continued that, of course, MacArthur was obeying his orders but that we must be very careful not to let ourselves be put in the light to the rest of the world.

The Secretary of Defense said that so far as his Department was concerned, MacArthur was acting for the United Nations, and the President just couldn't say what the Vice President had suggested.

After asking if there were any further questions, the President thanked the members of Congress for having come down and he promised to keep them informed as fully as he possibly could during the next few days.

The meeting ended at 11:45 A.M.

From the White House:

11:00 am Tuesday June 30, 1950.

W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President
John R. Steelman, The Assistant to the President
Charles G. Ross, Secretary to the President
George M. Elsey, Administrative Assistant to the President

Members of the Cabinet:

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury
Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of Defense
J. Howard McGrath, Attorney General
Jesse M. Donaldson, Postmaster General
Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior
Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture
Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce
Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor

National Security Council:

James S. Lay, Executive Secretary

National Security Resources Board:

Stuart Symington, Chairman

Department of State:

John Foster Dulles, Special Advisor to the Secretary
Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations

Department of Defense:

Stephen T. Early, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army
Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy
Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force
General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations
Boyd S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force
Major General James H. Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

From the Senate:

The Vice President
Scott W. Lucas, Ill.
Elbert D. Thomas, Utah
Tom Connally, Texas
Cham Gurney, South Dakota
Millard E. Tydings, Md.
Alexander Wiley, Wisconsin
Kenneth S. Wherry, Neb.
H. Alexander Smith, N. J.

From the House:

The Speaker
John W. McCormack, Mass.
Overton Brooks, La.
John Kee, W. Va.
John M. Vorys, Ohio
Charles A. Eaton, N. J.
Mike Mansfield, Montana
Dewey Short, Mo.
Boyd Crawford, Administrative Officer
and Committee Clerk, House Committee
on Foreign Affairs

JUNE 30, 1950

At a meeting with Congressional leaders at the White House this morning, the President, together with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed with them the latest developments of the situation in Korea. The Congressional leaders were given a full review of the intensified military activities.

In keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, the President announced that

(1) he had authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets in Northern Korea wherever militarily necessary, (2) had ordered a Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.
(3) General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units.

① authorized by SC message of Thursday evening
② not actually authorized by SC message until Friday, 1 July
③ (④ Armor units + combat units in Pusan are authorized Thurs evening)
⑤ 1 RCT to combat area authorized in early Friday telecon;
⑥ 2 RCTs to Japan authorized by SC message of 1:12 pm est.
no time.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS Memo. ~~June 30, 1951~~ ~~17-1951-1-14~~
~~By [unclear]~~ JARS. Date ~~6-21-78~~

June 30, 1950 - Friday

Subject: Meeting at 8:30 A.M. in Secretary of Defense Johnson's office.

At 8:30 Friday morning (E.D.T.) the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with Secretary Johnson and the three service Secretaries to discuss MacArthur's request to build up the regimental team in the combat zone to two divisions. Johnson announced that he had authority to send two divisions to Korea. [Pace told Smith that Johnson said the President had given him that authority over the phone earlier in the morning. It should be noted that the President's own memorandum to George M. Elsey, of the same day, merely says that the President had told Johnson and Pace to "consider" giving MacArthur the two divisions.]

A draft directive to MacArthur was drawn up at this meeting and then taken to the White House.

This directive was sent out at 1:22 in the afternoon (E.D.T.).

Source: JCS Secret Summary Book for Senate Committees, 30 April 1951; G.M.E. notes; Beverly Smith conversation.

June 30, 1950 - Friday

At 1:22 in the afternoon a directive was dispatched from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur informing him that he
was authorized to proceed along the lines proposed in his teleconference
subject only to the requirements for the safety of Japan, which in the
present situation was a matter for his judgment.

Source: Secretary Acheson's Briefing Book,
borrowed by G.M.E. from Averell Harriman.

G.M.E. put out
Why this delay?

DECLASSIFIED
JCS Memo, 9-17-50
By ~~ELT/MC~~ NARS Date ~~2-16-24~~

June 30, 1950 - Friday

Subject: British Offer.

On June 30 the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the British offer of a Naval Task Force to operate in support of South Korea.

Source: JCS Secret Summary Book for Senate Committees, 30 April 1951.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

S/5

000055

Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

DATE June 30, 1950

E.O. 13526 Sec. 1(d) and 1(e) - 20

Distr. of State Letter 2-21-50

CLASSIFIED OUT 7/1/54
EX-REF ID: A4474

Conf

SUBJECT: Korean Crisis

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne, Ambassador of Norway
Caspar D. Green, BNA

COPIES TO:

S/S
EUR
BNA - Mr. Labouisse
EUR/RA
PE
UNA
American Embassy, Oslo

Ambassador Morgenstierne came in this afternoon at his own request. He began by saying that he brought greetings from Mr. Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister. He said he wished to offer congratulations on the great stand taken by President Truman and the American Government. He added that the US action had met with universal approval in Norway in all official groups and among the people. He said he remembered no event which had stirred such unanimous acclaim. The dangers involved in the present course were fully recognized in Norway, but it was believed that the danger of failure to act would have been immeasurably greater. The smaller nations of Europe were much heartened, he said, feeling that if the US is capable of meeting a situation in Korea so firmly, it will certainly not falter in its commitments in the NAT area. The Ambassador said he personally, of course, had never doubted this, but that there have been skeptics in Europe. This action will sweep away the skepticism.

I said it had seemed to us that the dangers of inaction were much greater than the dangers of facing the problem in Korea and that this had, of course, weighed heavily in our decision. I said we faced a difficult situation in Korea and it was hard to foresee how it would develop. He remarked that he was sure we would carry through successfully and that he did not believe the US would accept failure at the hands of the

North Koreans or in Korea. He said he supposed it is possible that Manchurian and Chinese troops might be sent in by the Russians. I agreed that we might have to face such a situation.

The Ambassador referred to the Soviet attitude and action as being, of course, crucial. I commented that their pose, so far, was one of "non-intervention" in the domestic affairs of Korea.

Ambassador Morgenstierne said there was some apprehension in Norway that the communist thrust in Korea might be a feint and that there would be another attack somewhere else, perhaps even in Europe. I said that we had thought it might be, perhaps, not precisely a feint, but one of a planned series, designed to get us committed at one point, then to cause trouble elsewhere. The Ambassador asked if there were any evidence that this might be the case. I replied that we were trying to keep a close watch, and that although there were some movements around at various points, they did not seem especially significant.

The Ambassador said the Norwegian Government was more apprehensive of a Soviet movement against Norway from the south than about the possibility of a Soviet attack in the north; they were more concerned about southern Norway than about the Norwegian-Soviet border in the north.

He referred to recent signs of Soviet interest in the Baltic, the shooting down of the US Privateer plane, the assertion of jurisdiction over wider territorial waters, the incidents of unscrupulous arrests and molestation of Swedish and Danish trawlers, and the recent Russian article concerning the Baltic as a closed sea. He wondered if we had any information on this special and aggressive Russian interest in the Baltic now. I replied that we had nothing beyond the items he had mentioned, but that I would request the Joint Chiefs again to give special attention to this subject, to be sure that we are not overlooking anything.

Ambassador Morgenstierne said that if the communists had been allowed to get away with their Korean aggression other areas would certainly have followed--Formosa, Indo-China and others. He remarked that there did not seem to be any serious question in the US as to the correctness of the action with regard to Korea and Formosa. I

confirmed

confirmed this, stating that this situation has pulled us together. I observed that the present situation is completely different from the previous situation in which it had been urged that we intervene in Formosa. I said that the communist intention to take Formosa and Indo-China had been evident; that if they had been allowed to take Formosa, following this thrust in Korea, the effect on the Philippines would have been drastic; there would have been panic in the Philippines since Formosa is the traditional jumping-off place for attack on the Philippines. Ambassador Morgenstierne repeated that if Korea had been allowed to pass, then other areas would have followed. I agreed emphatically, stating that I thought Asia would have fallen apart.

Ambassador Morgenstierne said it was a great moment in history. I said I thought it was a turning-point in world history.

The Ambassador commented that this situation would make settlement of the question of the Chinese UN representation much more difficult. I said I thought it would be quite impossible. I could not see how it would be possible to accept in the UN representatives of a Government which was engaged in active defiance of the UN authority. I read to him the body of Chou en Lai's statement of yesterday. Ambassador Morgenstierne signified complete agreement with my attitude. I said our thought had been to get the problem into the General Assembly, which would have to lay down policy. I did not think that a corporal's guard could now be found to vote for the Chinese communists. Ambassador Morgenstierne said he had thought that the question was rightly one of a new membership that a country could not fulfill the Charter provisions once and for all; that the specific Government had to do that; and that this was an entirely new and different Government. I said some of our people had advanced this view, but that we had concluded that if each new Government were treated as a new applicant for membership, subject to a Soviet veto, we would soon reduce the organization to a few members. Ambassador Morgenstierne commented that the change involved in China goes far beyond the usual change of government by "revolution" in Latin America.

Dean Acheson
Secretary of State

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~
EMERGENCY

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Col John H Ives USAF

~~REF ID: A65185
SECRET~~

TO: CINCFE
INFO: CINCAL, CINCARIB, CINCEUR, COMCENUSPA(REAR),
CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCPACLM, COMCENSAC
NR: JCS 84718 30 / 1722 Z 30 JUN 50
From JCS.

Restrictions on use of Army Forces imposed by
JCS 84681 are hereby removed and authority granted to
utilize Army Forces available to you as proposed your
C 56942 subject only to requirements for safety of Japan
in the present situation which is a matter for your
judgment.

Note: C 56942 is CM IN 8776 (30 Jun 50)

ORIGIN: JCS
DISTR: NAVAIRDE, AF, SECDEF, C2(STATE, NATL SECURITY
COUNCIL), CSA, NAVY, PRAD, SDIO,
CM OUT 84718 (JUN 50) DTG: 301722Z nad

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
JCS Memo, 15 JUL 2003
B-452-26 MAR 2003

COPY NO. *Mj0*

June 30, 1950

Dear Clark:

Thanks a lot for your good letter of the twenty-ninth. I can't tell you how very much I appreciated it.

England, Australia and Holland have come in on the defense of Korea. The statement you suggest, I think, is a little premature at this time but it may be necessary to make it later.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER S. WINSTON

Honorable Clark M. Clifford
1523 1/2 Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

note in longhand -
Glad to hear from you

CLARK M. CLIFFORD

WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 29, 1950

Dear Boss:

Your action of Tuesday with reference to Korea was magnificent. Apparently the public was ready for this high type of leadership because approval of your action is surprisingly universal.

I know that you have thought of all the different ramifications of the problem that exists but I would like to emphasize two phases of it which I deem to be of outstanding importance.

1. I believe that the defense of South Korea should be as broad as possible among the members of the United Nations. In the past years, the effort was always made to have Russia aligned not against the United States but against all the democratic nations of the world. I think every effort should be made to avoid the appearance that this is a contest between two nations but it should be made to appear what it is, i.e., a contest between one aggressor nation and the rest of the peace-loving world.

2. I am concerned about the present order which limits our aid to that area south of the 38th parallel. I understand the reason for such order but I am distressed

CLARK M. CLIFFORD

WASHINGTON, D. C.

-2-

that, in bombing towns and cities in South Korea, we are bombing friendly people and friendly areas.

I would like to suggest that the President issue a statement informing the world that he is going to ask the United Nations to issue an order giving the North Korean forces forty-eight hours to withdraw from South Korea. And, if the North Korean forces refuse to do so, that military forces of member nations of the United Nations will bomb military objectives in North Korea.

I believe that such a pronouncement would receive the overwhelming support of the people in this country and in the free nations, and it would greatly improve the chances of the free nations to prevent the Communists from overrunning South Korea.

Please forgive my trespass upon your time but the old fire horse got a whiff of smoke.

Affectionately yours,

Clarke -

The President
The White House

NET-624
JUL 10 1950
1417

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

Joint Chiefs of Staff 5503

TO: CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN

NR: JCS 84737 30 / 1950 2 30 JUN 50

From JCS.

Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the decision whether to accept or reject the proffer of military aid by foreign governments should properly be made at highest levels in Washington. The Secretary of State has been advised that any proffer of troops made by Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek should be declined at present. In the event any such proffer is made by the Generalissimo to you, he should be advised to refer it to Dept of State.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ORIGIN: JCS

DISTR: AF, NAVY, CSA, NAVAIDE, G2(STATE, NAT SECURITY COUNCIL), SECDEF

CM OUT 84737

(JUN 50) DTG: 301950Z med

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

JCS Memo, Jun. 17, 1973

BUREAU OF THE NAVY, DATE 1-2-75

COPY NO. M-5

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PRIORITY
ROCK MESSAGE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED 2nd

CINPO-PI Dept. of Army WASH
DC Mr John F. Kans 16680

TO: COMGENARMYONE NY NY, COMGENARMYTWO FT GEORGE S MEADE MD,
COMGENARMYTHREE FT McHENRY GA, COMGENARMYFOUR FT SAM
HOUSTON TEX, COMGENARMYFIVE CHI ILL, COMGENARMYIX SF
CALIF, CHIEF AFF FT MONROE VA, COMGENNEW WASH DC,
CINCEUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY, COMGENUSARAL FT RICHARDSON
ALASKA, COMGENUSARCARTIP FT ANADOL CZ, COMGENUSPA (REAR)
SALZBURG AUSTRIA, CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN, CHIEF JUSMAG
PHILLIPINES MANILA PI, COMGENMARBO GUAM, COMGENRYCOM
OKINAWA RI, GHQ ADCOM KOREA, COMGENTRUST TRIESTE, CHIEF
JUSMAC (GREECE) ATHENS GREECE, CHIEF ARKISH TEHRAN
IRAN, CHIEF TUSAQ ANKARA TURKEY, COMGENUSARPAC FT
DAULTER TH, COMGENNYP BROOKLYN NY, COMGENSPPE FT MASON
CALIF, COMGENSPT SEATTLE WASH, COMINT NO LA

INFO: WAR 84768

30 JUN 50

JUSMAC (GREECE) for Army COMGENUSPA (REAR) for FORWARD
from CINPO agd farke

1. Following material for information and guidance of all PIO's in dealing with Korean situation will be called "PIO Guidance Number Two". Our WCL 30408, 29 June 50, containing similar material, is "Number One."

2. In dealing with queries, or in other public information work it is suggested that PIO's generally confine themselves to facts and procedures presented in these guidelines.

3. Following material is official news digest for guidance:

A. On 30th June the President announced that in keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, he has authorized General MacArthur to use certain supporting ground units in Korea; the United States Air

BN OUT 84768

(Jun 50)

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E.O. 12005, Sec. 3-02
DOD Directive 5100.30, Jun 18, 1979

By NLT HC MSG Date 11-5-80

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COPY No.

166

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

NR: WAR 84768

DATE: 4

TYPE OR CONDUIT INFORMATION ON SPECIFIC MILITARY OPERATION IN NORTHERN KOREA WHETHER MILITARILY RESEMBLES, AND HAS ORDERED A MARITIME BLOCKADE OF THE ENTIRE KOREAN COAST.

B. At his press conference 29 June, President Truman said, "We are not at war," and declared full confidence in program of aid will maintain independent Democratic Republic of Korea. He also said United States is aiding United Nations in coming to relief of Korea after it was "unlawfully attacked by bandit neighbors in North Korea." He termed the United States steps to enforce a United Nations resolution as "police action" to suppress invading "bandits."

C. The President also announced appointment of an Economic Survey Mission to Philippines; Daniel H. Bissell, Washington Bank President, named Chief of Mission.

D. Secretary of Army Pace, addressing 24th Reserve Officers Association Convention, Washington, D.C. June, emphasized we are committed, through United Nations "with the other free nations in the cause of common defense." The objective of the United States, he said "is to support the United Nations in its efforts to restore and keep the peace."

E. Similar tone adopted by Under Secretary of Army Alexander in talk to graduating class of Command Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 30 June.

F. Copies of these speeches being sent to each Army Headquarters and major overseas command.

G. Following paragraphs are for your information only, and not for release or public discussion:

A. Announcements concerning Army casualties are being handled in the following manner: Casualty reports from the field are made to the Casualty Section, AGO, Department of Army. That office notifies the next of kin by wire, and a copy of the notification is sent to

WAR-84768

(Jun 50)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY NO.

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5-22H-1

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NR: MAR 84768

PAGE 3

the Public Information Division, Office Chief of Information. When the Public Information Division is informed by the AGO that the message has been delivered to the next of kin, the PID hands the report to Office of Public Information, Defense Department, for release. Any questions concerning casualties should be referred to the Office, Chief of Information, Department of Army.

B. Department of Army issuing very few formal releases on Korean situation. Daily briefings for the press being held twice a day at the Pentagon. The Army is the executive agency, with top level people speaking for each service. Full cooperation G-2, and other offices of the General Staff being supplied. Information on current situation given by spokesmen for each service, monitored by Chief of Information. Press asks questions freely, receives candid answers when unclassified releasable information is at hand. System has been working satisfactorily. Army CINCPAC putting background data in hands of press for general guidance and feature articles.

S. Generally, conditions set forth our WCL 30408 will apply for over-all guidance until further notice.

ORIGIN: C1

DISTR AND/OR AFPR ACTION: ABMC, AEC, AF, AFJE, AFP LN, AFSA, AFSPA, CH, CI, CML, COMPT, CPP, CSA, DC ENO COMM, ENO, FAOA, FIN, FOUSA, FT MCNAIR, G1, O2(CIA, STATE), O3, O4, HIS, IADB, IG, JAO, JPUSDC, JCS, JIOA, JMCDC, JWB, LLO, MBPC, MDW, MED, MUN, NAVAIDE, HQRES POLICY, NOR, NWC, OAEU, OAPE, OAFL, OARO, OAS, OASGM, OOA, ORD, OSA, OUSA, PJBQ, QMC, RES, SECDEF, SEL SVC, SIG(PAC), SPEC WP, PRAD, MLC, SDLO, PMG, TC, USCC, TAG

CM-OUT-84768

(Jun 50) DTG: 302305Z ab

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

Joint Chiefs of Staff
John H Ives Colonel USA
72700

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO: CINCPF

INFO: CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSEVENTHFLT

MR : JCS 84808

1 JUL 50

From JCS.

01/1528Z

1. In keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the Northern Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea the President announced that he had ordered a Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.

2. To implement this order you are authorized to use such means and forces as are available to you to deny unauthorized ingress to and egress from the Korean coast. The primary purpose is to suppress seaborne traffic to and from North Korea and to prevent movement by sea of forces and supplies for use in operations against South Korea. Care should be taken to keep well clear of the coastal waters of Manchuria and USSR.

3. Appropriate governmental notifications and notice to Mariners will be issued from Washington. Advise date measures will be effective.

ORIGIN: JCS

DISTR : AF, CSA, NAVY, NAVAIDE, SEC DEF, G2 (STATE NAT SEC COUNCIL)

CM OUT 84808

(Jul 50)

DTG: 011528Z

rkh

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~JCS MSG. 645-724
1945-1955
HANS, DOD 3-20-25

COPY NO. M-2

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July 3, 1950

171

573

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 2
OF 2 COPIES

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

At a meeting in the Secretary's office on Saturday, July 1st, the Secretary gave Mr. Pace a copy of the attached memorandum of questions which were under consideration. He made it clear that this was not a formal communication but merely to keep him advised.

At a similar meeting in the Secretary's office Sunday afternoon, July 2nd, attended by Mr. Pace, Mr. Finletter and General Burns as well as by Mr. Harriman and General Dean, further consideration was given to these two questions.

On the question of a possible Joint Resolution and a Presidential message to Congress, there was a brief discussion of the Defense Department's redraft of the Joint Resolution. There was general agreement on substance and it was decided that the exact drafting could be referred to the officials concerned. On the question of the message, the Secretary read aloud the draft and gave copies to Mr. Pace, Mr. Finletter and General Burns. All three of these expressed the view that it was an excellent draft.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the President could be advised on Monday just what the recommendation was from the two Departments or if necessary what the divergence of views between the two Departments precisely is.

At either the Saturday or Sunday meeting the Secretary expressed his concern about the maintenance of sufficient forces around Formosa to prevent any possible Chinese communist attack. He stated explicitly that he was not attempting to interfere in the military question of disposition of forces but that information on this point would be of value to him in connection with the political decisions which need to be made by him.

DAW/ASST/ED
C. O. (442), Sec. 3(1) and 3(2) et seq.
D. P. A. Staff Serial 10-21-3
PROPERTY ACT 77-34
BY M.L. HARRIS DAW/ASST/ED 77-477

Attachment

By Mr. Rusk's document:
"Check List #1" 6/20

Ccs: Mr. Battle, Mr. Matthews

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526. See ME and ~~TOP SECRET~~

Check List #1

~~Proposed by [unclear]~~
~~Memorandum for [unclear]~~
~~Subject: [unclear]~~

Cy # Y of 3 cys

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 30, 1950

1. Should the President send a message to Congress asking for a joint resolution supporting action taken or to be taken regarding Korea? If so, by what steps do we set it up?
2. In the current world situation, where can we expect further Soviet moves?
3. On basis of what general framework of policy are we to determine the extent of our involvement in Korean situation?
4. On what basis should the Department of State reply to the offers of forces made by other governments and how should we act to obtain such contributions from Members of the United Nations?
5. What further United Nations action is necessary to clarify General MacArthur's position in command of international forces acting in support of UN?
6. What should be said to Chinese Nationalist Government regarding
 - a. the use of Chinese troops in Korea
 - b. the status of the minor islands along the China coast still in Nationalist hands
 - c. the liaison arrangements between U.S. Military Commanders and Chinese authorities on Formosa regarding the defense of Formosa.
7. What should be our attitude toward volunteers from the United States and elsewhere who wish to serve in Korea?

DRusk

(cy eva)

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum of Conversation

COPY NO. 1
OF 9 COPIESSUBJECT: Meeting at Blair HouseDATE: July 3, 1950
4:00 PM

The President

PARTICIPANTS:

Secretary Acheson
 Secretary Johnson
 Secretary Snyder
 Secretary Brannan
 Postmaster General Donaldson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Senator Lucas	General Bradley
	Mr. Harriman
Secretary Pace	Mr. Jessup and Mr. Rusk
Secretary Matthews	accompanied the Secretary
Secretary Finletter	of State

THE PRESIDENT asked Mr. Acheson to lead off.

MR. ACHESON said the purpose of the meeting was to lay before the President and his advisers a recommendation by the Department of State that the President go before Congress some time in the near future to make a full report to a Joint Session of the Congress on the Korean situation. It was proposed that this report to the Congress would be followed by the introduction of a Joint Resolution expressing approval of the action taken in Korea. It was not proposed that the President should ask for such a resolution but that the initiative for this should come from the members of Congress. He said that Mr. McFall and others had talked to various Senators and Congressmen and that his exploration revealed a general desire for a Presidential message of this kind. This was partly due to the fact that they felt that so far only the leaders had been told what was going on. The Secretary then distributed copies of the draft resolution and read it aloud. He explained that in drafting it he had tried to avoid anything which would give rise to debate by concentrating on points on which there seemed to be general agreement. For example, the resolution proposes that the

~~SECRET~~
 E.O. 13526 7-26-04
 Dept. of State 1950, Aug. 1, 1950
 FOIA Log # 17-27-
 File # 17-27-17

Congress

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~~TOP SECRET~~

OKLAHOMA

E. O. 13526, sec. 2(b) and 2(d), 1-23-63

Date of Recd. 1/26/63

By R.R. LL, MARS Date 1/26/63

- 2 -

Congress command the action by the United States rather than the action by the President.

THE PRESIDENT said that is right.

MR. ACHESON said they had also eliminated from the draft resolution any reference to Formosa or Indochina. There the action was preliminary; no American boys were getting shot and the action was clearly within the Presidential powers. The Secretary then distributed copies of the draft message and read it aloud.

THE PRESIDENT asked Senator Lucas what was his reaction to this suggestion. He indicated that Congress would not re-assemble until a week from today but that he wanted to consider whether he should deliver such a message when Congress reassembled.

SENATOR LUCAS said it was hard for him to give an opinion without consulting his colleagues.

THE PRESIDENT said that all he was asking for was his personal opinion.

SENATOR LUCAS said that he frankly questioned the desirability of this. He said that things were now going along well and he questioned especially the paragraph on the top of page 14 which suggests that the President may come up with further recommendations. He said that one could draw whatever conclusions he pleased as to what such Presidential recommendations might contain. He said that the President had very properly done what he had to without consulting the Congress. He said the resolution itself was satisfactory and that it could pass. He suggested as an alternative that the President might deliver this message as a fireside chat with the people of the country.

THE PRESIDENT said he had reached no decision on this point. He had merely discussed it with Secretary Johnson, ^{and} Secretary Acheson and wanted this round-table discussion on it.

SENATOR LUCAS said that most of the members of Congress were sick of the attitude taken by Senators Taft and Wherry.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought Wherry had been a little better after the consultation the other day.

not

SENATOR LUCAS said that he thought this was /the case in view of the statements which Wherry later made.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRETARY

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, 2010-01-01 00:00:00 (EDT)

Date: 01 Jan 2010, 00:00:00 (EDT) 3/2/77

Ref ID: A62512; NAME: J-L-J-77

- 3 -

SECRETARY JOHNSON thought that Senator Wherry's statement was not so bad.

SENATOR LUCAS said that to go up and give such a message to Congress might sound as if the President were asking for a declaration of war.

THE PRESIDENT said this was exactly the point. He said that he had not been acting as President but as Commander-in-Chief of our forces in the Far East.

SENATOR LUCAS reported that the President would be practically asking for a declaration of war if he came up to the Congress like this. On the other hand a fireside chat with the people would be good. He said the document itself was wonderful. He would merely leave out the paragraph on the top of page 14.

THE PRESIDENT then asked Secretary Snyder for his opinion pointing out this was a suggestion from the Department of State and that the Secretary of Defense agreed with Senator Lucas.

SECRETARY SNYDER said that it would be a fine thing for the people to know what was in this message and to hear this statement from the President himself. He said Senator Lucas had made a good point but that the substance of the message was excellent. He agreed it was debatable whether this should take the form of a message to the Congress or a fireside chat. His first reaction was in favor of having the President make this statement in some form.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was necessary to be very careful that he would not appear to be trying to get around Congress and use extra-Constitutional powers.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said there were some difficulties in the text that he would question; he had noted that Senator Lucas marked up his copy where it referred to Communist China, for example. He thought this was not the time for a message to the Congress but that this was a political decision.

THE PRESIDENT said he didn't want to call Congress back for this purpose.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said things were going very well and there was nothing in the message that was not already in the press. He suggested that the President wait until there were things which the public does not know and which could then be told to them.

SECRETARY

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Dec. 23 1950 11:22

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- 4 -

SECRETARY BRANNAN said he thought the President could not go to the people without going to the Congress. He said that perhaps the talks with the leaders had filled the need for reporting to Congress but the real question was whether the President should now send a message to the full Congress. Such a message of course went to the people also. He questioned including in the last few pages the discussion of the diplomatic exchange with the USSR. This seemed to him to be at variance with the policy of not putting the Soviets on the spot. The less said about their machinations the better. He thought we should stick to the North Koreans and action under the UN.

THE POSTMASTER GENERAL said that he had carefully listened to Senator Wherry's remarks at the recent meeting. Wherry felt there should be a report to Congress and had raised the question of the President's authority. If the President made a report like this he might be called back again and again in further explanations to the Congress. He felt the President should not go unless he had some new information or wished to make a request for some legislative action.

SENATOR LUCAS stated that Senator Wherry was complaining because the President didn't go to Congress before he acted. Regarding the resolution he said he was just thinking out loud but it occurred to him that if the President should call the same group together we might get their reaction and then would have no trouble in getting it through. He thought they would be unanimous.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was up to Congress whether such a resolution should be introduced, that he would not suggest it. He said it was not necessary to make the decision today and that he too was just thinking out loud.

SECRETARY PAGE said the legislative branch has a strong desire for participation at some time.

SECRETARY SNYDER said that we were going along a new road and making a historical record. He thought the President should make this record clear. On this point he disagreed with Secretary Brannan. He thought the President could not wait too long for a summation. He thought the public support should be kept steady as it is today.

SECRETARY MATTHEWS thought it was essential to say something to the people and not to by-pass the Congress. He was not sure as to the timing.

SENATOR

100-10000-110-11

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100-185-1471
E.O. 13526 - 2025a (b)
Date of Recd. 3/14/71
Rec'd by [unclear] 3/14/71

- 5 -

SENATOR LUCAS said that he felt he knew the reactions of Congress. He thought that only Senator Wherry had voiced the view that Congress should be consulted. Many members of Congress had suggested to him that the President should keep away from Congress and avoid debate. He thought a debate on the resolution might last at least a week.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said that everybody in Congress wanted to pose as an expert on Constitutional law.

SECRETARY FINLETTER agreed with Secretary Snyder that we were treading new ground. If such a message were sent by the President people would feel a sense of participation. The report should stress that his one cardinal purpose is to maintain peace.

MR. HARRIMAN commented on the European reaction and stressed the need for close relation between the President and Congress under Presidential leadership. While things are going well now there may be trouble ahead. Regarding the paragraph on the top of page 14 which had been considered he thought people were wondering about this and that some statement should be made. He did not know that Congress would not reassemble until next Monday.

THE PRESIDENT said we should not call them back before they planned to return.

SECRETARY ACHESON said no one thought of doing that.

MR. RUSK said that clear Congressional support would help abroad. Comments by Senators Taft and Wherry are reported abroad and may raise a question of our solidarity.

MR. JESSUP stressed the importance particularly for opinion abroad having the President reiterate the facts in the situation. The statement by the President would in itself be news.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that he thought some report at some time was a very good idea but he wished to avoid a long debate in Congress on matters which now seemed to be taken for granted.

THE PRESIDENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
E.O. 14176
Date 2/20/77
SAC-DOJ, LEX - 7:58:17

- 6 -

THE PRESIDENT said he certainly must make a report some time but he did not want to call Congress back now. He said it was always difficult to keep 541 men informed even about legislative business. Even though he did explain matters to the leaders there were many in Congress who did not know and eventually he must report. He said his judgement was to hold up his decision for the rest of this week. He would have further consultations with the Big Four next Monday. He said he was still just thinking out loud and if there were any better suggestion he would be glad to listen to it.

SENATOR LUCAS commented that Senator Taft was merely following his same old line. Senator Jenner's statement in Indiana was unbelievable. Senator Lucas said if there should be a row in Congress that would not help abroad. He did not think that Congress was going to stir things up.

THE PRESIDENT said this depends on events in Korea. He said that if this view met with the approval of those present he would wait until he had his talks with the leaders next Monday.

This was agreed.

[Signature]
34:PCJessup:mtb

~~TOP SECRET~~


July 3, 1950

Following is the revised text of the possible resolution of Congress proposed by the Department of Defense (Pace):

~~RESOLVED . . . That the Congress of the United States hereby expresses its commendation of the forthright actions taken by the United States and the other Members of the United Nations, both in condemning the acts of aggression of the invading forces from North Korea, and in employing armed forces to assist the Republic of Korea.~~

It is the sense of the Congress that the United States continue to take all appropriate action to restore and maintain international peace and security in the Pacific area in support of the Charter of the United Nations and of the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations.



SECRET
[ARMED VERSION]

July 3, 1950

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress of the United States hereby expresses its commendation of the forthright actions taken by the United States and other Members of the United Nations, both in condemning the acts of aggression of the invading forces from North Korea, and in employing armed forces to assist the Republic of Korea.

It is the sense of the Congress that the United States continue to take all appropriate action with reference to the Korean situation to restore and maintain international peace and security in support of the Charter of the United Nations and of the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations.

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 3, 1950

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Participants: Secretary of Defense Johnson
Secretary Acheson

The Secretary telephoned Secretary Johnson to find out whether his Department had any comments on the draft of the suggested Presidential Message to Congress and the Joint Resolution on the Korean statement. Secretary Acheson pointed out that he thought it would be possible to get a resolution through if it were confined solely to Korea, without mention of Formosa or Indochina. He felt that such a resolution would be helpful during the time ahead. Secretary Johnson said that the question was in Secretary Acheson's field and he would follow whatever course Secretary Acheson wished.

Secretary Acheson suggested that, if Secretary Johnson agreed, a recommendation from the two Departments should be gotten up by late afternoon, and that the President might be requested to meet this afternoon with State and Defense people, and any other advisers he wished, in order to decide what he wanted to do about the statement and resolution.

The Secretary suggested that he send over a copy of the latest draft so that General Burns and Secretary Finletter and others might go over it. Secretary Johnson indicated that he would be glad to have such a draft sent over, but that it should go from Mr. Matthews to General Burns. Secretary Acheson said he would so send it, and Secretary Johnson said he would see that General Burns received a memorandum on the subject from the Service Secretaries to Secretary Johnson.

RECORDED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950 7-17

RECORDED ON 7-17-50

1950 7-17-50

S:DEvans:mjm

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~PRIORITY~~ PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Col Ives USAF/72700

TO: CINCPFE 2145 ✓
INFO: CINCPAC, COMUSTHFIL, COMNAVFE
NR: JCS 84385 3 JUL 50
From JCS.

The following broadcast to all shipping this date:

"The President of the United States, in keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the Northern Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, has ordered a Naval blockade of the Korean coast."

CINCPFE CX 57097 refers.

Note: CX 57097 is CM IN 9415 (2 Jul 50)

ORIGIN: JCS

DISTR: NAVAIDE, AF, CSA, NAVY

CM OUT 84385

(Jul 50) DTG: 032145Z milf

~~REF ID: A62140~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12063, Sec. 3-402

DDO Directive 5100.33, June 18, 1979

By NLT Han NARS, Date 4-5-80

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

471 B
R. A.
Col A

AMES

Box 523, Hampton, N. J.

July 4, 1950

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to urge you to reconsider the actions taken by you and other executives and departments in the government in relation to the crisis in Korea. It seems to me that we are now repeating there the mistakes that were made in China.

The primary errors in such a policy seem to be these two: first, as in China, we support an admittedly corrupt and undemocratic regime more or less against the will of the people; second that we promote and invite major world military conflict by armed intervention.

As a veteran and as a father, I am fundamentally opposed to sudden and arbitrary and violent action in world politics when a great deal yet remains to be done in exploring paths to peace through discussion, negotiation, and compromise. All recent history demonstrates without question that catastrophe in human affairs can be avoided only if the major powers make all major decisions together. The "strong" or "tough" approach in world politics simply has not been working. It is time that we try another approach--non-intervention, free trade with all nations, agreement on the outlawing of atomic and biological weapons. No country today, including the U.S., is big enough or strong enough to control the course of history singlehanded, nor to police the world.

It seems sure that American prestige in the Far East, and among all colonial and colored peoples, will suffer a tremendous blow if our troops are not quickly withdrawn from Korea. To Asia U.S. troops fighting in Korea will necessarily spell foreign invasion and imperialism, no matter what other motives we attach to the action. Whether Russia has given more or less aid to her partisans in Korea than the U.S. has to hers, the fact will remain that the Red Army has gone out and the U.S. Army has gone in. It is ironic that on the Fourth of July we find the soldiers of the first democratic Republic in world history entering a small and weak foreign country to decide the political fate of that country from the outside. This is hardly the spirit of '76.

Yours sincerely,

Russell Abbot Ames
Russell Abbot Ames

~~TOP SECRET~~



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(SECDEF HAS SEEN)

6 July 1950

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Blockade of Korea

Pursuant to the President's statement, a warning has been broadcast to all ships of the blockade of the Korean coast. State is notifying the other governments.

Actually because: (a) We do not have sufficient forces available and (b) We wish to stay well clear of Russian and Manchurian waters; our forces are operating south of 41° north along the east coast and south of 39° 30' north along the west coast.

This leaves us with a "paper blockade" of the northern part of the Korean coast. This is, of course, our own closely-held operational information and would have to be proved by any country seeking to question the legality of our blockade.

JMB
J. M. Burns

0000000000
S. O. MATL. Sec. 801 -
D. S. of Secy. 1950. H-1-34
SECRET NOV 11 1950
REF ID: A5-NY

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

the President
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 1

July 6, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Suggested Action by the NSC for Consideration of the President in the Light of the Korean Situation

REFERENCE: NSC Action No. 315

The enclosed copy of a statement by the Chairman, National Security Resources Board, on the subject, read and discussed at the 60th Meeting of the National Security Council, is circulated herewith for the information of the Council members pursuant to NSC Action No. 315.

James S. Lay, Jr.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

DECLASSIFIED

A.O. 11652, Sec. 3(C) and 3(D) - 20
KPL *7-7-73*
PROJECT NATY 77-73
W.M.T.-A.C. *2025 Dec 2014*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

C O P Y

July 6, 1950

NSC Actic

MEMORANDUM for NSC

No. 315

Suggested Action by the NSC for Consideration of
the President in the Light of the Korean Situation

The invasion of South Korea came as a surprise and shock, not only to the people of the United States and the world, but also to the people around this table, whose job it is to keep the President correctly advised.

As we see it, there are further shocks which must be absorbed, the possible consequences of which it is our duty to present to the President.

First is the now unmasked great and growing combined military strength of Soviet Russia, and such of its willing and ambitious satellites as China and North Korea; a strength so great that it will be impossible for the United States to settle this dispute in this little country of Korea for some months; and if additional "outbreaks" of communist satellite countries force us into further attrition of our own forces, the ramifications of this incident might not be settled for many years.

Second is the serious current inadequacy of our own military forces, to the point where, even in order to settle this Korean incident, and without considering the millions of trained Chinese and Russian regulars which might be used against us in the Far East, we are already being forced to seriously weaken the defenses of the United States.

(As example, if the Russians reimpose the Berlin blockade there are not enough airplanes available to handle simultaneously another Berlin airlift, the Korean campaign, and the absolute minimum airlift necessary for the military defense of the United States. This is still true even if we commandeered the planes of all our airlines, which action would of course seriously cripple the domestic economy.)

Third is the fact, also presented by the Munitions Board less than two months ago, that there is no long-range strategic defense plan. Without such a plan neither the Munitions Board, the Resources Board, or the State Department can operate with efficiency.

DECLASSIFIED

L.O. 1950, 20 JUN 1950 - 14

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

140007Z JUL 50 - 1 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

In other words, on any really accelerated basis, nobody knows what to make, or how much to make, or when, or why.

If a general war starts tomorrow, therefore, everybody will want everything yesterday; and the operating chaos resulting from such an approach to joint military-civilian planning would be further complicated by the knowledge that any time, from here out, this planning might have to also include recognition of the problems of major sabotage and devastating atomic attacks.

This situation is a far cry from the number of years we have always been favored with in the past when it became necessary to handle, with relative leisure, military and civilian mobilization.

Prior to now also there has been no requirement for any true civilian defense.

* * * * *

Those are the facts. As we see it, the important point now is to first recognize these facts and then present to the President the actions we believe necessary to reduce this critical danger to a minimum as quickly as possible.

How the situation developed is now secondary. What is primary is that we are in it; and what would now seem most important is our best considered advice to the President as to how to get out of it.

With this in mind, the Resources Board advises the National Security Council to recommend to the President action based on the two following premises:

(1) When they believe they are ready, the Soviet Union plans to attack the United States, because it is their often reiterated intention to rule the world.

(2) In the interim, the Soviet Union can be expected to harass the United States through such satellites as North Korea, communist China, and eastern Germany.

In the light of these two premises, we should start now to spend more money instead of less money for our national security; we should embark promptly on whatever program is necessary to support the position which, with our advice, the President has taken before the American people, and the world.

In order to properly support this proposed change in security planning, it is necessary that all agencies of the Government operate from the same long-range strategic defense plan.

We do not now have such a plan. It is essential as the foundation for military-civilian planning, and also for that information required by the State Department to conduct foreign affairs.

In 1945 the President directed that such a plan be formulated. Now, five years later, he has not yet received it.

The need for this plan is no theoretical matter. Answering the President's five-year-old directive may now be essential to our survival.

* * * * *

In summary, Russian tanks and soldiers are now reported in South Korea, part of the 116,000 troops estimated as now fighting against us in that theater. In addition, close to the Korean border there are reports of a minimum estimated 100,000 Chinese communist regulars, plus another 60,000 Russian communist regulars; or a total force striking or ready to strike of at least 276,000.

In addition, we know that the military posture of the communist nations all over the world is steadily strengthening.

Against this number, and that posture, similar forces of the United States in that area now total 52,000 combat troops, plus 73,000 housekeeping personnel.

Of these combat troops, around 10,000 United States soldiers and some 25,000 regrouped South Koreans are now engaged with the enemy.

No airpower on either side is included.

The British refused to face up squarely to the menace of Nazism until the invasion of Poland. Some might feel as late as the invasion of Norway.

The President carefully avoided that mistake when he electrified the country and the world by bombing, with the support of the United Nations, the Republic of South Korea.

In order to carry out what is essential to maintain the President's position, should we not now recommend erring if anywhere on the "too much" side instead of on the side of "too little"?

Our national survival is now paramount over all other considerations. Is it not possible that if we are to have any chance of maintaining the freedoms we cherish above all else, any delay in taking the action necessary to implement the President's policy may result in our being too late?

July 9, 1950

S/B:

Secretary Johnson called Mr. Acheson this afternoon and said that an announcement was being put out (either by the White House or the Defense Establishment) to the effect that the Army, Navy and Air Force had been authorized to exceed their budget limitations to fill the gap created by services to Korea. The use of selective service and employment of voluntary enlistments was also to be permitted.

Secretary Johnson said that he thought our people in New York should be told about this. He said he was mainly interested in getting information to the military people there (Military Attachés, etc.) so that they would know of this action. He suggested that we notify our Delegation at the United Nations who could in turn tell the military people there who would be instructed to call the Joint Chiefs of Staff if they desired any further information.

The Secretary suggested that the Department get a copy of the press statement (which I have since learned is being made by the White House) and notify the US Delegation along the lines of the foregoing.

L. D. B.

S:LDB:mdm

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 7, 1950

On the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, the President, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has determined that the Army, Navy and Air Force shall exceed current over-all ceilings of military personnel to the extent indicated below. He has authorized the suspension of restrictions which are now imposed as to grade structure, officer and enlisted ratios and pilot to non-pilot ratios in order to obtain the personnel possessing the required skills.

This constitutes a first step to build up to full operating strength the units of the Army, Navy and Air Force presently engaged in the Korean operation and to provide further maintenance and support. Strength increases presently authorized are as follows:

ARMY

Officers	5,000
Enlisted Men	<u>45,000</u>
Total	50,000

NAVY

Officers	3,000
Enlisted Men	<u>30,000</u>
Total	33,000

AIR FORCE

Officers	4,500
Enlisted Men	<u>21,000</u>

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402

Total

25,500

OOO Directive 5100.30, June 18, 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Because of the current situation, many of our citizens have indicated they desire to volunteer in the Armed Services of the United States. It is hoped that the response on the part of volunteers will obviate the necessity of invoking the draft.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
Washington 25, D. C.

NO. 821-50

July 7, 1950

FOR THE PRESS:

To meet the situation in Korea, upon recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in by the Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air, and with the approval of the President, the Army, Navy and Air Force have been authorized to exceed the over-all budget ceilings for military personnel.

This action constitutes a first step to build up to full operating strength the units of the Army, Navy and Air Force to be used in the Korean operation, to provide further maintenance and support therefor, and to replace units to be moved to Korea.

The use of Selective Service has been authorized. Voluntary enlistments also will be accepted.

END

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Immediate Release
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 8, 1950.

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The Security Council of the United Nations in its resolution of July 7, 1950, has recommended that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27, make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States.

The Security Council resolution also requests that the United States designate the commander of such forces, and authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.

July 8, 1950

I am responding to the recommendation of the Security Council and have designated *Gen. MacArthur* as the Commanding General of the military forces which the Members of the United Nations place under the unified command of the United States pursuant to the United Nations' effort to assist the Republic of Korea to repel the armed attack against it and to restore international peace and security in the area.

I am directing General *MacArthur*, pursuant to the Security Council resolution, to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.



~~CLASSIFIED~~

C.G. USA, Sec. 3(B) and 3(D) - 1

H.S.T.

Dept. of State letter

PROTECT ACT 77-76

by D.C.L. 12/1/2014

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

Joint Chiefs of Staff
M M Stephens Capt US Navy
Executive Secretary JCS
55234

TO: CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN

INFO: CINCAL FT RICHARDSON ALASKA, CINCARIB QUARRY HEIGHTS
CZ, CINCEUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY, COMGENUSFA (REAR)
SALISBURG AUSTRIA, CINCPAC PEARL HARBOR HI, CINCLANT
NORFOLK VA, CINCNEIM LONDON ENGLAND, COMGENSAC OFFUTT
AFB OMAHA NEBR, COMCENTRUST TRIESTE.

MR: JCS 85370

10 JUL 50

From JCS.

You have been designated by the President of the United States as commander of military forces assisting the Republic of Korea which are placed under the unified command of the United States by members of the United Nations in response to the resolution of 7 July of the Security Council of the United Nations. You are authorized to use at your discretion the United Nations flag concurrently with the flags of other nations participating in operations against North Korean forces. The United Nations flag will be used only in operations against North Korean forces and will therefore not be used in connection with your mission with respect to Formosa.

The terms of this directive authorizing the use of the United Nations flag at your discretion have been approved by the President of the United States and supersede the implications in his press release, Washington, 8 July, (Info note: Text of Security Council resolution of 7 July will be transmitted to you).

ORIGIN: JCS

DISTR : NAVAIDE, CSAF, CNO, CSA

CM OUT 85370 (Jul 50) DTG: 101714Z rkh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12805, Sec. 3-402

000 Directive 5100.30, June 19, 1979

By MLT-~~44~~ NARS, Date 11-5-80

COPY NO. 1-2

471-B
July 13, 1950

FILED BY
MISS CONWAY
JUL 17 1950

Dear Congressman Gary:

I read your letter of the tenth with a great deal of interest.

I have been holding conferences constantly with members of the Congress and the Cabinet as the situation develops in the Far East. As soon as I have a definite program on the situation I'll certainly tell the Congress about it.

Conditions are such at the present time that I can't very well make a firm commitment on the subject as regards the Budget or the Military situation. Just as soon as that can be done the Congress will be informed.

Sincerely yours,

John S. Dulles
** New*
x P.A. 71

Honorable J. Vaughan Gary
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 10, 1950.

THE WHITE HOUSE

JUL 11 8 01 AM '50

RECEIVED

The President,

The White House


Dear Mr. President:

A question is arising in the minds of our citizens as to what action they should take in view of the Korean situation. Prices are beginning to rise in some quarters, and some people are commencing to hoard. In fact, some salesmen and dealers are advising customers to purchase beyond their current needs. Such actions will necessarily encourage inflation which would be rather serious at this time.

I suggest that you consider a national broadcast as President of the United States urging the people not to resort to hysterical and unpatriotic measures and thereby add to the seriousness of the situation. *X/36-A*

I assure you of my wholehearted approval of and cooperation in your efforts to check this threat to world peace.

Very respectfully,



Monday July 11, 1950
Military instructions
to Sherman

Notes on What Secretary said about message and fireside chat
after Cabinet meeting, July 14, 1950

11:30

186-6 am.

Message

The Military people will inform us what should be said about President's action on forces. (Secretary should probably talk with someone today or tomorrow.)

Defense will give us what President should say about funds.

The Munitions Board will supply what should be said about power of allocation and limitation.

State is to work up what he should say about assisting our allies. Secretary had a paper signed by various people in Defense, which he did not think was useable in its present form, and he asked that Matthews, Perkins, Nitze look this over and talk with him later. The Secretary said that about all that it seemed to him now could be said on this point was that we are going to speed up our assistance to our allies. We understand that they are taking measures of their own.

Fireside

There are certain negative things that can be said; such as, not boarding; ~~REPLACES THE PREVIOUS ONE~~ if there were some positive things that could be said, that would be helpful, such as, to work harder and stop conversation.

There is a great deal of uncertainty in everybody's mind as to what domestic situation will be; this comes to Government mainly through businessmen. The message and the fireside chat should give people a pretty good idea of what is ahead.

The Government views the situation with great seriousness, and is taking steps which it may expand; which may mean giving up a great many things, which people would like to have.

KJL
7/19/50

471-B

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1950

MEMORANDUM

To: White House - Mr. Eben Ayers
From: Department of State (NA) - Mr. Niles W. Bond *th*
Subject: Message from Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs.

x
At Lincoln White's suggestion I am sending to you herewith a copy of the text of the message from the Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs which he discussed with you earlier today by phone. It is my understanding that this text is to be released by the Department tomorrow (Saturday) morning.

Enclosure:

Taejon's telegram No. 7,
dated July 14, 1950

x 20

x 471

A Korean emergency

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

PLAIN

A

9
Action
PE

Info
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SAM
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DCR

Control: 5763

Revd: July 14, 1950
7:48 a.m.

FROM: Taejon OFFICE OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

TO: Secretary of State JUL 14 1950

RE: 7, July 14 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SENT DEPARTMENT 7; REPEATED TOKYO UNNUMBERED.

Following letter dated Taejon, Korea, 14 July for Secretary:

"Dear Mr. Acheson: X"

"In this hour of extreme trial for the Korean nation, I want you to know how deeply grateful we are for the magnificent fight America is waging to save Korea as well as democracy, and for your own great personal service in it. Korea is very proud to be the front-line ally of the United States and the United Nations and most emphatically pledges all in her power to win a lasting victory for cherished common cause.

The Government and people of Korea feel sure, and I know you do, that now is the time and Korea is the place to demonstrate to the world once and for all that democracy is the only way of peaceful life, and that despotic Communism must be decisively defeated. The morale and stamina of our forces are very high. The fighting ability and the material power of the American and Allied Forces are unsurpassed. I know that our over-all victory is only a question of time. We are all very confident here.

Korea will never forget what the government and people of America are doing for her; it will go down in Korean history for many centuries as a great turning point in her national life. I shall highly appreciate it if you will kindly convey this sentiment to President Truman. The Armed Forces and the people of the United States.

✓726

With highest esteem,

Sincerely yours,

Ben C. Limb

X

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea."

X
MAM:KJ

DRUMRIGHT

PLAIN

REPRODUCTION OF THIS
MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, July 14,
Conf. 1950
2-2 (from meeting)

Secretary said after discussing Defense paper, that he did not see how it could be incorporated into message in its present form. Secretary thought that what could be said were the following four points:

1. What we do about forces.
2. How much money
3. Production is going to be started in a big way.
4. We are stepping up our assistance to the allies, as they are stepping up their efforts (if that is true). That we are going to do our part.

There followed a great deal of discussion of what should be said on fourth point - whether there should be a decidedly encouraging note struck; whether they should be told that the show is partly theirs, that we are not bearing entire brunt; to what extent the message should spell out the effect on MDAP of material now going to Korea.

Secretary summed up what he thought should go in as follows:

In our concern to perform our full part in meeting the crisis which has arisen out of the Korean aggression, we have not lost sight for a moment of the necessity of doing our full part to strengthen the defenses of the free world in other areas.

The matter of the defenses of the North Atlantic Treaty area was considered as a matter of great urgency by the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. Recent

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

events make it even more urgent than it was at that time to build and maintain these defenses. We are fully convinced that our associates are taking and will increasingly take steps to do their full part in this matter, and we assure them that we will do our full part in the material aid picture.

The very steps we are taking here in increasing our production and the amount of our production going into defense will play a great part in this joint effort. If it becomes necessary for me (the President) to come back to Congress to request further funds, I will not hesitate to do so.

The Secretary then elaborated on what the program of aid to allies might consist of: He said there were two parts. At present we have money for commitments to take us through present fiscal year and fiscal year ending 1951. If production could be speeded up with these funds, so that the commitments could be sent over in three months or six months, or a year, rather than dragging on for several years, that would be a splendid result, and is the first part of a possible program. (He said something along this might be mentioned in message.)

The second part of the possible program consisted in the possibility of getting further money for two different purposes:

- (a) To give the allies more stuff if this country could turn

~~TOP SECRET~~

out more stuff; (b) to help them increase their own production. What they would need is money for raw materials; and money to make up for loss of exports which would result from turning more of their production to defense.

Further questions dealt with in re message:

1. Whether to mention in message any specific or general additional amount for MDAP.

Secretary thought this would only prolong discussion of message and raise problems, which would delay the message. He thought this could be dealt with at a later date by the President's returning to Congress.

2. Whether the message should clarify aims in Korea.

Bohlen, Nitze, (with Secretary agreeing) that this could not be done at this point when no one knew what the situation would be when North Koreans were pushed back to 38th parallel.

3. What mention should be made of Formosa.

It was thought that probably something along the line that was said about Formosa in message to Bevin could be inserted.

KOREAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 17, 1950

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to convey to you, by means of this letter, the text of a cable which has been received from His Excellency, the President of Korea, and which is addressed to you.

The text of my President's cable is as follows:

"The people and the Government of the Republic of Korea welcome with tears, joy and deepest appreciation the moral and physical support of the United Nations at this time of trial and bloodshed, when the right of free men to live is being challenged by violent Communist armed aggression. For many years the Communists, through satellites, have been preparing to overthrow and to conquer for Red imperialism democratic states through subversion and internal violence. In Korea they have been checked completely by our patriotic Korean people and the alertness of our security agencies. So, suddenly, on a quiet Sunday morning, expecting that the outer free world would only piously express indignation at his naked aggression so reminiscent of Poland and Pearl Harbor, and knowing that the forces of the Republic of Korea were purely defensive, without planes, tanks, or heavy guns — all of which were possessed by the aggressive Communist forces — they attacked. With this Soviet military material and leadership, they counted on easy victory, not from superior morale but from superior weapons. The Soviets have had easy victories so long they have deceived even themselves. Almost all the civilized world has rallied to support the Republic of Korea, knowing if the Communists should conquer here there was no place where they would not try to conquer. All free governments with military forces within

/reaching distance

reaching distance of Korea have actually come to our aid militarily, or have offered to do so. Most of the rest of the civilized world has urgently supported them, and us, in this action.

"The Communists won the first battle. We lost heavily in men and material to their planes and tanks and long-range guns. Our army was forced to abandon our ancient capital, Seoul, and to fall back across the Han River where, with rifles against heavy tanks and artillery they valiantly held their positions and repelled the vicious thrusts of the enemy. Meanwhile, American and Australian air power filled the skies and are blasting the enemy concentrations, air fields, supply areas and advancing tank columns. United States troops are pouring into Korea. Their spearheads have advanced long distances towards Seoul and within a few days it is certain they will meet the enemy in force, destroying and driving back to and through Seoul every Communist soldier in Korea.

"The morale and devotion of the Korean people is magnificent despite Communist terrorist activities within the Republic of Korea; since the beginning of the war no single act of sabotage has occurred. Schools are running, factories are operating, farmers are working in the fields, peace and order are being maintained in a remarkable manner everywhere outside the combat areas. The heroism and devotion of the Korean soldiers are outstanding. Even numerous refugees on the road south of Seoul show no panic.

"On behalf of the Government of Korea and all Korean people everywhere they may live, even in the north, where the vast majority awaits liberation from Communist slavery just as eagerly as do our suffering people in Seoul, who today are feeling the maniacal vengeance of Communists, I wish to express to Your Excellency, to Your Excellency's Government, and to all the people of your country the deep prayerful and enduring gratitude and friendship for your moral support and your magnificent military support in this time of bitter trial."

SYNMAN RHEE


Please accept, Your Excellency, my own personal gratitude, and the renewed assurance of my highest regard.

His Excellency

Harry Truman

President of the United States

Washington


John M. Chang

X

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Conf 231
189

Memorandum of Conversation

July 17, 1950

(DATE)

SUBJECT: Recent Korean Developments as they affect the International Situation

PARTICIPANTS: The French Ambassador
The Secretary

S/C EUR FS

COPIES TO:

Ambassador Bonnet called today at his request. He said that Mr. Schuman had asked him to touch base with me regarding Korea and its effect on the situation in general. I gave him a brief resume of the most recent military developments and indicated to him the line some sixty miles south of Seoul which we had been endeavoring to hold and the one where we would next make our stand. I stressed to him our conviction that as soon as we got reinforcements into south Korea the military situation would become stabilized and a successful counter-offensive could be set in motion. I added that President Truman would shortly announce the steps which he proposed to take to strengthen the country militarily.

Mr. Bonnet said that the new French cabinet was anxious to know what effect our military operations in Korea would have on European rearmament. I assured him that the Korean situation had made it even all the more important for us to proceed energetically and rapidly to the rearmament of the Atlantic Pact nations and that this was one of the questions to which the permanent group of Deputies in London would address itself.

The Ambassador asked what information I could give him on the "negotiations" between the British and the Russians on the subject of Korea. I told him that Ambassador Kelly had seen Gromyko and had expressed to him the British view that Russia intercede to put a stop to the North Korean aggression, that Mr. Gromyko had countered by asking him if the British Government had any suggestions to offer and that the British Ambassador had said that his government's suggestion was the one made above.

RECORDED
L. O. 1700 - 1950 - 7-17-50
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17 JULY 1950

Mr. Bonnet

Mr. Bonnet then referred to the exchange of notes between Nehru and Stalin and asked whether we intended to make a reply to the note. I said that we were preparing a reply but that, of course, we wished to see the Korean case decided on its merits in the United Nations or the Security Council rather than be tied in with extraneous issues such as the admission of the Chinese Communists to the Security Council. I added that we were firmly convinced that the Korean affair should be handled by the United Nations and that the issue should be kept localized.

I asked Mr. Bonnet what progress was being made on the Schuman Plan negotiations. He replied that they were proceeding satisfactorily and smoothly with the Germans and Italians and that only the Benelux countries had raised some questions which now seemed by way of being ironed out. The participants were now studying a method to establish organic cooperation between the High Authority and the governments.

We briefly discussed the formation of the new French Government. Mr. Bonnet pointed out that the key Ministry of National Defense was in the very able hands of Mr. Jules Moch and that otherwise the government bore a striking resemblance to its predecessors. He also expressed satisfaction that the Socialists were in it. He was rather vague as to its possible duration.

SUR:ME:BO'Shaughnessy

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By M.L.T. MARS Date 6-11-76

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: GENERAL OF THE ARMY MACARTHUR

I am forwarding for your personal and advance information a summary of the message I am sending to the Congress later today. I want you to know that all of us are determined to see that you have everything you need to bring the action to a successful conclusion.

Summary begins.

Message to Congress consists of three major parts. First part of message is a recital of the events in Korea and the Far East, including the course of military operations up to the present time, our action with respect to Formosa, Indo-China, and the Philippines, the refusal of the Soviet Union to support the action of the United Nations, and your designation as Commander of the forces of the members of the United Nations in Korea. Second part of message is a discussion of the increase in our military strength and in the strength of other free nations which the world situation requires, both to provide additional support in Korea and to strengthen our position world-wide. Authorizes the use of as many National Guard and reserve units as may be required and recommends a supplemental appropriation of ten billion dollars for U. S. armed forces. Second part of message also states that further appropriation requests for supplemental funds for Mutual Defense Assistance Program will be submitted to Congress later. Third part of message consists of economic measures we will have to take in support of the military measures outlined. Specifically recommend legislation authorizing priorities and allocations. Also recommend control over consumer credit and real estate credit.

State that additional tax revenues will be required and outline basis on which a new program for increased taxes will be submitted to Congress shortly. States that price control and rationing are not recommended at this time but may be needed later if we fail to conduct ourselves wisely by refraining from hoarding and the like. Message concludes by expressing appreciation to Congress for the strong bi-partisan support which our decisions have received.

Summary ends.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

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July 19, 1950

Illegible signature

CONFIDENTIAL: To be held in **STRICT CONFIDENCE** and no portion, synopsis or intimation to be given out or published until the READING of the President's Message has begun in either the Senate or House of Representatives. Extreme care must therefore be exercised to avoid premature publication.

CHARLES D. ROSS
Secretary to the President

- - - - -
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am reporting to the Congress on the situation which has been created in Korea, and on the actions which this Nation has taken, as a member of the United Nations, to meet this situation. I am also laying before the Congress my views concerning the significance of these events for this Nation and the world, and certain recommendations for legislative action which I believe should be taken at this time.

At four o'clock in the morning, Sunday, June 25th, Korean time, armed forces from north of the thirty-eighth parallel invaded the Republic of Korea.

The Republic of Korea was established as an independent nation in August, 1948, after a free election held under the auspices of the United Nations. This election, which was originally intended to cover all of Korea, was held only in the part of the Korean peninsula south of the thirty-eighth parallel, because the Soviet Government, which occupied the peninsula north of that parallel, refused to allow the election to be held in the area under its control.

The United States, and a majority of the other members of the United Nations, have recognized the Republic of Korea. The admission of Korea to the United Nations has been blocked by the Soviet veto.

In December, 1948, the Soviet Government stated that it had withdrawn its occupation troops from northern Korea, and that a local regime had been established there. The authorities in northern Korea continued to refuse to permit United Nations observers to pass the thirty-eighth parallel to supervise or observe a free election, or to verify the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Nevertheless, the United Nations continued its efforts to obtain a freely-elected government for all of Korea, and at the time of the attack, a United Nations Commission, made up of representatives of seven nations — Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Turkey — was in the Republic of Korea.

Just one day before the attack of June 25th, field observers attached to the United Nations Commission on Korea had completed a routine tour, lasting two weeks, of the military positions of the Republic of Korea south of the thirty-eighth parallel. The report of these international observers stated that the Army of the Republic of Korea was organized entirely for defense. The observers found the parallel guarded on the south side by small bodies of troops in scattered outposts, with roving patrols. They found no concentration of troops and no preparation to attack. The observers concluded that the absence of armor, air support, heavy artillery, and military supplies precluded any offensive action by the forces of the Republic of Korea.

On June 25th, within a few hours after the invasion was launched from the north, the Commission reported to the United Nations that the attack had come without warning and without provocation.

The reports from the Commission make it unmistakably clear that the attack was naked, deliberate, unprovoked aggression, without a shadow of justification.

This outright breach of the peace, in violation of the United Nations Charter, created a real and present danger to the security of every nation. This attack was, in addition, a demonstration of contempt for the United Nations, since it was an attempt to settle, by military aggression, a question which the United Nations had been working to settle by peaceful means.

The attack on the Republic of Korea, therefore, was a clear challenge to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and to the specific actions taken by the United Nations in Korea. If this challenge had not been met squarely, the effectiveness of the United Nations would have been all but ended, and the hope of mankind that the United Nations would develop into an institution of world order would have been shattered.

Prompt action was imperative. The Security Council of the United Nations met, at the request of the United States, in New York at two o'clock in the afternoon, Sunday, June 25th, eastern daylight time. Since there is a 1½-hour difference in time between Korea and New York, this meant that the Council convened just 2½ hours after the attack began.

At this meeting, the Security Council passed a resolution which called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of the invading troops to the thirty-eighth parallel, and which requested the members of the United Nations to refrain from giving aid to the northern aggressors in: to assist in the execution of this resolution. The representative of the Soviet Union to the Security Council stayed away from the meeting, and the Soviet Government has refused to support the Council's resolution.

The attack launched on June 25th moved ahead rapidly. The tactical surprise gained by the aggressors, and their superiority in planes, tanks and artillery, forced the lightly-armed defenders to retreat. The speed, the scale, and the coordination of the attack left no doubt that it had been plotted long in advance.

When the attack came, our Ambassador to Korea, John J. Muccio, began the immediate evacuation of American women and children from the danger zone. To protect this evacuation, air cover and sea cover were provided by the Commander in Chief of United States Forces in the Far East, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. In response to urgent appeals from the Government of Korea, General MacArthur was immediately authorized to send supplies of ammunition to the Korean defenders. These supplies were sent by air transport, with fighter protection. The United States Seventh Fleet was ordered north from the Philippines, so that it might be available in the area in case of need.

Throughout Monday, June 26th, the invaders continued their attack with no heed to the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations. Accordingly, in order to support the resolution, and on the unanimous advice of our civil and military authorities, I ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

On Tuesday, June 27th, when the United Nations Commission in Korea had reported that the northern troops had neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn to the thirty-eighth parallel, the United Nations Security Council met again and passed a second resolution

recommending that members of the United Nations furnish to the Republic of Korea such aid as might be necessary to repel the attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. The representative of the Soviet Union to the Security Council stayed away from this meeting also, and the Soviet Government has refused to support the Council's resolution.

The vigorous and unhesitating actions of the United Nations and the United States in the face of this aggression met with an immediate and overwhelming response throughout the free world. The first blow of aggression had brought dismay and anxiety to the hearts of men the world over. The fateful events of the 1930's, when aggression unopposed bred more aggression and eventually war, were fresh in our memory.

But the free nations had learned the lesson of history. Their determined and united actions uplifted the spirit of free men everywhere. As a result, where there had been dismay there is hope; where there had been anxiety there is firm determination.

Fifty-two of the fifty-nine member nations have supported the United Nations action to restore peace in Korea.

A number of member nations have offered military support or other types of assistance for the United Nations action to repel the aggressors in Korea. In a third resolution, passed on July 7th, the Security Council requested the United States to designate a commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized these forces to fly the United Nations flag. In response to this resolution, General MacArthur has been designated as commander of these forces. These are important steps forward in the development of a United Nations system of collective security. Already, aircraft of two nations -- Australia and Great Britain -- and naval vessels of five nations -- Australia, Canada, Great Britain, the Netherlands and New Zealand -- have been made available for operations in the Korean area, along with forces of Korea and the United States, under General MacArthur's command. The other offers of assistance that have been and will continue to be made will be coordinated by the United Nations and by the unified command, in order to support the effort in Korea to maximum advantage.

All the members of the United Nations who have indorsed the action of the Security Council realize the significance of the step that has been taken. This united and resolute action to put down lawless aggression is a milestone toward the establishment of a rule of law among nations.

Only a few countries have failed to support the common action to restore the peace. The most important of these is the Soviet Union.

Since the Soviet representative had refused to participate in the meetings of the Security Council which took action regarding Korea, the United States brought the matter directly to the attention of the Soviet Government in Moscow. On June 27th, we requested the Soviet Government, in view of its known close relations with the north Korean regime, to use its influence to have the invaders withdraw at once.

The Soviet Government, in its reply on June 29th and in subsequent statements, has taken the position that the attack launched by the north Korean forces was provoked by the Republic of Korea, and that the actions of the United Nations Security Council were illegal.

These Soviet claims are flatly disproved by the facts.

The attitude of the Soviet Government toward the aggression against the Republic of Korea, is in direct contradiction to its often expressed intention to work with other nations to achieve peace in the world.

For our part, we shall continue to support the United Nations action to restore peace in the Korean area.

As the situation has developed, I have authorized a number of measures to be taken. Within the first week of the fighting, General MacArthur reported, after a visit to the front, that the forces from north Korea were continuing to drive south, and further support to the Republic of Korea was needed. Accordingly, General MacArthur was authorized to use United States Army troops in Korea, and to use United States aircraft of the Air Force and the Navy to conduct missions against specific military targets in Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel, where necessary to carry out the United Nations resolution. General MacArthur was also directed to blockade the Korean coast.

The attacking forces from the north have continued to move forward, although their advance has been slowed down. The troops of the Republic of Korea, though initially overwhelmed by the tanks and artillery of the surprise attack by the invaders, have been reorganized and are fighting bravely.

United States forces, as they have arrived in the area, have fought with great valor. The Army troops have been conducting a very difficult delaying operation with skill and determination, outnumbered many times over by attacking troops, spearheaded by tanks. Despite the bad weather of the rainy season, our troops have been valiantly supported by the air and naval forces of both the United States and other members of the United Nations.

In this connection, I think it is important that the nature of our military action in Korea be understood. It should be made perfectly clear that the action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle. The United States was going to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force. Consequently, we were not deterred by the relative immediate superiority of the attacking forces, by the fact that our base of supplies was 5,000 miles away, or by the further fact that we would have to supply our forces through port facilities that are far from satisfactory.

We are moving as rapidly as possible to bring to bear on the fighting front larger forces and heavier equipment, and to increase our naval and air superiority. But it will take time, men and material to slow down the forces of aggression, bring those forces to a halt, and throw them back.

Nevertheless, our assistance to the Republic of Korea has prevented the invaders from crushing that nation in a few days - as they had evidently expected to do. We are determined to support the United Nations in its effort to restore peace and security to Korea, and its effort to assure the people of Korea an opportunity to choose their own form of government free from coercion, as expressed in the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, and December 12, 1948.

In addition to the direct military effort we and other members of the United Nations are making in Korea, the outbreak of aggression there requires us to consider its implications for peace throughout the world. The attack upon the Republic of Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that the international communist movement is prepared to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations. We must therefore recognize the possibility that armed aggression may take place in other areas.

In view of this, I have already directed that United States forces in support of the Philippines be strengthened, and that military assistance be speeded up to the Philippine Government and to the Associated States of Indo-China and to the forces of France in Indo-China. I have also ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack upon Formosa, and I have requested the Chinese

Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. These steps were at once reported to the United Nations Security Council.

Our action in regard to Formosa was a matter of elementary security. The peace and stability of the Pacific area had been violently disturbed by the attack on Korea. Attacks elsewhere in the Pacific area would have enlarged the Korean crisis, thereby rendering much more difficult the carrying out of our obligations to the United Nations in Korea.

In order that there may be no doubt in any quarter about our intentions regarding Formosa, I wish to state that the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa. The present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to political questions affecting that island. Our desire is that Formosa not become embroiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific and that all questions affecting Formosa be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. With peace re-established, even the most complex political questions are susceptible of solution. In the presence of brutal and unprovoked aggression, however, some of these questions may have to be held in abeyance in the interest of the essential security of all.

The outbreak of aggression in the Far East does not, of course, lessen, but instead increases, the importance of the common strength of the free nations in other parts of the world. The attack on the Republic of Korea gives added urgency to the efforts of the free nations to increase and to unify their common strength, in order to deter a potential aggressor.

To be able to accomplish this objective, the free nations must maintain a sufficient defensive military strength in being, and, even more important, a solid basis of economic strength, capable of rapid mobilization in the event of emergency.

The strong cooperative efforts that have been made by the United States and other free nations, since the end of World War II, to restore economic vitality to Europe and other parts of the world, and the cooperative efforts we have begun in order to increase the productive capacity of underdeveloped areas, are extremely important contributions to the growing economic strength of all the free nations, and will be of even greater importance in the future.

We have been increasing our common defensive strength under the treaty of Rio de Janeiro and the North Atlantic Treaty, which are collective security arrangements within the framework of the United Nations Charter. We have also taken action to bolster the military defenses of individual free nations, such as Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

The defenses of the North Atlantic Treaty area were considered a matter of great urgency by the North Atlantic Council in London this spring. Recent events make it even more urgent than it was at that time to build and maintain these defenses.

Under all the circumstances, it is apparent that the United States is required to increase its military strength and preparedness not only to deal with the aggression in Korea but also to increase our common defense, with other free nations, against further aggression.

The increased strength which is needed falls into three categories:

In the first place, to meet the situation in Korea, we shall need to send additional men, equipment and supplies to General MacArthur's command as rapidly as possible.

In the second place, the world situation requires that we increase substantially the size and materiel support of our armed forces, over and above the increases which are needed in Korea.

In the third place, we must assist the free nations associated with us in common defense to augment their military strength.

Of the three categories I have just enumerated, the first two involve increases in our own military manpower, and in the material support that our men must have.

To meet the increased requirements for military manpower, I have authorized the Secretary of Defense to exceed the budgeted strength of military personnel for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and to use the Selective Service system to such extent as may be required in order to obtain the increased strength which we must have. I have also authorized the Secretary of Defense to meet the need for military manpower by calling into active Federal service as many National Guard units and as many units and individuals of the Reserve forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces as may be required.

I have directed the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep our military manpower needs under constant study, in order that further increases may be made as required. There are now statutory limits on the sizes of the armed forces, and since we may need to exceed these limits, I recommend that they be removed.

To increase the level of our military strength will also require additional supplies and equipment. Procurement of many items has already been accelerated, in some cases for use in Korea, in others to replace reserve stocks which are now being sent to Korea, and in still others to add to our general level of preparedness. Further increases in procurement, resulting in a higher rate of production of military equipment and supplies, will be necessary.

The increases in the size of the armed forces, and the additional supplies and equipment which will be needed, will require additional appropriations. Within the next few days, I will transmit to the Congress specific requests for appropriations in the amount of approximately ten billion dollars.

These requests for appropriations will be addressed to the needs of our own military forces. Earlier, I referred to the fact that we must also assist other free nations in the strengthening of our common defenses. The action we must take to accomplish this is just as important as the measures required to strengthen our own forces.

The authorization bill for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for 1951, now before the House of Representatives, is an important immediate step toward the strengthening of our collective security. It should be enacted without delay.

But it is now clear that the free nations of the world must step up their common security program. The other nations associated with us in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, like ourselves, will need to divert additional economic resources to defense purposes. In order to enable the nations associated with us to make their maximum contribution to our common defense, further assistance on our part will be required. Additional assistance may also be needed to increase the strength of certain other free nations whose security is vital to our own.

In the case of the North Atlantic area these requirements will reflect the consultations now going on with the other nations associated with us in the North Atlantic Treaty. As soon as it is possible to determine what each nation will need to do, I shall lay before the Congress a request for such funds as are shown to be necessary to the attainment and maintenance of our common strength at an adequate level.

The steps which we must take to support the United Nations action in Korea, and to increase our own strength and the common

defense of the free world, will necessarily have repercussions upon our domestic economy.

Many of our young men are in battle now, or soon will be. Others must be trained. The equipment and supplies they need, and those required for adequate emergency reserves, must be produced. They must be made available promptly, at reasonable cost, and without disrupting the efficient functioning of the economy.

We must continue to recognize that our strength is not to be measured in military terms alone. Our power to join in a common defense of peace rests fundamentally on the productive capacity and energies of our people. In all that we do, therefore, we must make sure that the economic strength which is at the base of our security is not impaired, but continues to grow.

Our economy has tremendous productive power. Our total output of goods and services is now running at an annual rate of nearly 270 billion dollars -- over 100 billion dollars higher than in 1939. The rate is now about 13 billion dollars higher than a year ago, and about 8 billion dollars higher than the previous record rate reached in 1948. All the foregoing figures have been adjusted for price changes, and are therefore a measure of actual output. The index of industrial production, now at 197, is 12 per cent higher than the average for last year, and 81 per cent higher than in 1939.

We now have 61½ million people in civilian employment. There are 16 million more people in productive jobs than there were in 1939. We are now producing 11 million more tons of steel a year than in the peak war year 1944. Electric power output has risen from 128 billion kilowatt hours in 1939, to 228 billion hours in 1948, to 317 billion hours now. Food production is about a third higher than it ever was before the war, and is practically as high as it was during the war years, when we were sending far more food abroad than we are now.

The potential productive power of our economy is even greater. We can achieve some immediate increase in production by employing men and facilities not now fully utilized. And we can continue to increase our total annual output each year, by putting to use the increasing skills of our growing population and the higher productive capacity which results from plant expansion, new inventions, and more efficient methods of production.

With this enormous economic strength, the new and necessary programs I am now recommending can be undertaken with confidence in the ability of our economy to bear the strains involved. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the demands for military purposes that are now foreseeable, in an economy which is already operating at a very high level, will require substantial redirection of economic resources.

Under the program for increasing military strength which I have outlined above, military and related procurement will need to be expanded at a more rapid rate than total production can be expanded. Some materials were in short supply even before the Korean situation developed. The steel industry, for example, was operating at capacity levels, and even so was not able to satisfy all market demands. Some other construction materials, and certain other products, were also under pressure and their prices were rising -- even before the outbreak in Korea.

The substantial speed-up of military procurement will intensify these shortages. Action must be taken to insure that these shortages do not interfere with or delay the materials and the supplies needed for the national defense.

Further, the dollars spent now for military purposes will have a magnified effect upon the economy as a whole, since they will be added to the high level of current civilian demand. These increased pressures, if neglected, could drive us into a general inflationary

situation. The best evidence of this is the recent price advances in many raw materials and in the cost of living, even upon the mere expectancy of increased military outlays.

In these circumstances, we must take action to insure that the increased national defense needs will be met, and that in the process we do not bring on an inflation, with its resulting hardship for every family.

At the same time, we must recognize that it will be necessary for a number of years to support continuing defense expenditures, including assistance to other nations, at a higher level than we had previously planned. Therefore, the economic measures we take now must be planned and used in such a manner as to develop and maintain our economic strength for the long run as well as the short run.

I am recommending certain legislative measures to help achieve these objectives. I believe that each of them should be promptly enacted. We must be sure to take the steps that are necessary now, or we shall surely be required to take much more drastic steps later on.

First, we should adopt such direct measures as are now necessary to assure prompt and adequate supplies of goods for military and essential civilian use. I therefore recommend that the Congress now enact legislation authorizing the Government to establish priorities and allocate materials as necessary to promote the national security; to limit the use of materials for non-essential purposes; to prevent inventory hoarding; and to requisition supplies and materials needed for the national defense, particularly excessive and unnecessary inventories.

Second, we must promptly adopt some general measures to compensate for the growth of demand caused by the expansion of military programs in a period of high civilian incomes. I am directing all executive agencies to conduct a detailed review of Government programs, for the purpose of modifying them wherever practicable to lessen the demand upon services, commodities, raw materials, manpower, and facilities which are in competition with those needed for national defense. The Government, as well as the public, must exercise great restraint in the use of those goods and services which are needed for our increased defense efforts.

Nevertheless, the increased appropriations for the Department of Defense, plus the defense - related appropriations which I have recently submitted for power development and atomic energy, and others which will be necessary for such purposes as stockpiling, will mean sharply increased Federal expenditures. For this reason, we should increase Federal revenues more sharply than I have previously recommended, in order to reduce the inflationary effect of the Government deficit.

There are two fundamental principles which must guide us in framing measures to obtain these additional revenues:

(A) We must make every effort to finance the greatest possible amount of needed expenditures by taxation. The increase of taxes is our basic weapon in offsetting the inflationary pressures exerted by enlarged government expenditures. Heavier taxes will make general controls less necessary.

(B) We must provide for a balanced system of taxation which makes a fair distribution of the tax burden among the different groups of individuals and business concerns in the Nation. A balanced tax program should also have as a major aim the elimination of profiteering.

At an appropriate time, as soon as the necessary studies are completed, I shall present to the Congress a program based on these principles to assure the financing of our needs in a manner which will be fair to all our citizens, which will help prevent inflation, and which will maintain the fiscal position of the Nation in the soundest possible condition.

As a further important safeguard against inflation, we shall need to restrain credit expansion. I recommend that the Congress now authorize the control of consumer credit and credit used for commodity speculation. In the housing field, where Government credit is an important factor, I have directed that certain available credit restraints be applied, and I recommend that further controls be authorized, particularly to restrain expansion of privately-financed real estate credit. These actions will not only reduce the upward pressure on prices, but will also reduce the demand for certain critical materials which are required for the production of military equipment.

Third, we must take steps to accelerate and increase the production of essential materials, products, and services. I recommend, therefore, that the Congress authorize, for national defense purposes, production loan guarantees and loans to increase production. I also recommend that the Congress authorize the making of long-term contracts and other means to encourage the production of certain materials in short supply.

In the forthcoming Midyear Economic Report, I shall discuss in greater detail the current economic situation, and the economic measures which I have recommended. If these measures are made available promptly, and firmly administered, I believe we will be able to meet military needs without serious disruption of the economy.

If we are to be successful, there must be sensible and restrained action by businessmen, labor, farmers and consumers. The people of this country know the seriousness of inflation, and will, I am sure, do everything they can to see that it does not come upon us. However, if a sharp rise in prices should make it necessary, I shall not hesitate to recommend the more drastic measures of price control and rationing.

The hard facts of the present situation require relentless determination and firm action. The course of the fighting thus far in Korea shows that we can expect no easy solution to the conflict there. We are confronted in Korea with well-supplied, well-led forces which have been long trained for aggressive action. We and the other members of the United Nations who have joined in the effort to restore peace in Korea must expect a hard and costly military operation.

We must also prepare ourselves better to fulfill our responsibilities toward the preservation of international peace and security against possible further aggression. In this effort, we will not flinch in the face of danger or difficulty.

The free world has made it clear, through the United Nations, that lawless aggression will be met with force. This is the significance of Korea -- and it is a significance whose importance cannot be over-estimated.

I shall not attempt to predict the course of events. But I am sure that those who have it in their power to unleash or withhold acts of armed aggression must realize that new recourse to aggression in the world today might well strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 19, 1950.

SUBJECT: Ground Forces for Korea.

193

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Carl Beresford, New Zealand Ambassador
The Secretary
Livingston Satterthwaite, BMA

COPIES TO: American Embassy, Wellington
American Embassy, Canberra
American Embassy, London
PC

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PC 1950 4-2-4

DIST. HC 1950 4-11-4

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The New Zealand Ambassador called at his request to say that he had been instructed by his Government to find out from the Secretary what best New Zealand could do to help the United Nations effort in Korea, specifically whether New Zealand ground forces would be needed. Sir Carl pointed out that New Zealand had practically no ground forces at the moment and that the use of non-American or American equipped troops would complicate the supply problems greatly.

The Secretary expressed his appreciation for the naval help New Zealand had so far rendered and said that ground troops from New Zealand would be most welcome both because the UN aspects of the action would be emphasised by additional countries having ground forces actually in operation in Korea and because we badly and urgently needed ground forces to help with the fighting. The Secretary said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had just come to the conclusion that regardless of supply problems, which could be overcome, they were most anxious to have New Zealand ground forces participating. It was true that non-English speaking troops would present difficulties, but this, of course, did not apply to New Zealand.

MUR: BMA: LSatterthwaite: sm

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402

ODD Directive 5100.30, June 13, 1979

By NLT HC MARS, Date 11-5-40

SIGNAL CENTER
The White House

19 July 1950

FROM: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Tokyo

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NR : C58248

DTG : 191805Z

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Reference your WH 498, 19 July 1950.

The following is my current estimate of the Korean situation:

"With the deployment in Korea of major elements of the 8th Army now accomplished the first phase of the campaign has ended and with it the chance for victory by the North Korean Forces. The enemy's plan and great opportunity depended upon the speed with which he could overrun South Korea once he had breached the Han River line and with overwhelming numbers and superior weapons temporarily shattered South Korean resistance. This chance he has now lost through the extraordinary speed with which the 8th Army has been deployed from Japan to stem his rush. When he crashed the Han Line the way seemed entirely open and victory was within his grasp. The desperate decision to throw in piecemeal American elements as they arrived by every available means of transport from Japan was the only hope to save the situation. The skill and valor thereafter displayed in successive holding actions by the ground forces in accordance with this concept, brilliantly supported in complete coordination by air and naval elements,

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MacArthur C58248

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19 July 1950

forced the enemy into continued deployments, costly frontal attacks and confused logistics which so slowed his advance and blunted his drive that we have bought the precious time necessary to build a secure base.

I do not believe that history records a comparable operation which excelled the speed and precision with which the 8th Army, the Far East Air Force and the Seventh Fleet have been deployed to a distant land for immediate commitment to major operations. It merits highest commendation for the commanders, staffs and units concerned and attests to their superior training and high state of readiness to meet any eventuality. This finds added emphasis in the fact that the Far East Command, until the President's great pronouncement to support the epochal action of the United Nations, had no slightest responsibility for the defense of the Free Republic of Korea. With the President's decision it assumed a completely new and added mission.

It is, of course, impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy future incidents of a military campaign. Over a broad front involving continuous local struggles, there are bound to be ups and downs, losses as well as successes. Our final stabilization line will unquestionably be rectified and tactical improvement will involve planned withdrawals as well as local advances. But the issue of battle is now fully joined and will proceed along lines of action in which we will not be without choice. Our hold upon the Southern part of Korea represents a secure base. Our casualties despite overwhelming odds have been relatively light. Our strength

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MacArthur C54248

- 3 -

19 July 1950

will continually increase while that of the enemy will relatively decrease. His supply line is insecure. He has had his great chance but failed to exploit it. We are now in Korea in force, and with God's help we are there to stay until the constitutional authority of the Republic is fully restored."

Signed: MacArthur

Read: 191904Z JUL

~~SECRET~~

HOLD FOR RELEASE

HOLD FOR RELEASE

HOLD FOR RELEASE

JULY 19, 1950

CONFIDENTIAL: The following address of the President, to be delivered by radio from the White House tonight, IS FOR RELEASE at 10:30 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time, WEDNESDAY, July 19, 1950.

The same release applies to all newspapers, radio commentators and news broadcasters.

PLEASE GUARD AGAINST PREMATURE PUBLICATION OR
RADIO ANNOUNCEMENT.

CHARLES G. ROSS
Secretary to the President

- - - - -

At noon today, I sent a message to the Congress about the situation in Korea. I want to talk to you tonight about that situation, and about what it means to the security of the United States, and to our hopes for world peace.

Korea is a small country, thousands of miles away, but what is happening there is important to every American.

On Sunday, June 25th, communist forces attacked the Republic of Korea.

This attack has made it clear, beyond all doubt, that the international communist movement is willing to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations. An act of aggression such as this creates a very real danger to the security of all free nations.

The attack upon Korea was an outright breach of the peace and a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. By their actions in Korea, communist leaders have demonstrated their contempt for the basic moral principles on which the United Nations is founded. This is a direct challenge to the efforts of the free nations to build the kind of world in which men can live in freedom and peace.

This challenge has been presented squarely. We must meet it squarely.

It is important for all of us to understand the essential facts as to how the situation in Korea came about.

Before and during World War II, Korea was subject to Japanese rule. When the fighting stopped, it was agreed that troops of the Soviet Union would accept the surrender of the Japanese soldiers in the northern part of Korea, and that American forces would accept the surrender of the Japanese in the southern part. For this purpose, the 38th parallel was used as the dividing line.

Later, the United Nations sought to establish Korea as a free and independent nation. A Commission was sent out to supervise a free election in the whole of Korea. However, this election was held only in the southern part of the country, because the Soviet Union refused to permit an election for this purpose to be held in the northern part. Indeed, Soviet authorities even refused to permit the United Nations Commission to visit northern Korea.

Nevertheless, the United Nations decided to go ahead where it could. In August, 1948, the Republic of Korea was

established as a free and independent nation in that part of Korea south of the 38th parallel.

// In December, 1948, the Soviet Union stated that it had withdrawn its troops from northern Korea and that a local government had been established there. However, the communist authorities never have permitted United Nations observers to visit northern Korea to see what was going on behind that part of the iron curtain.

It was from that area, where the communist authorities have been unwilling to let the outside world see what was going on, that the attack was launched against the Republic of Korea on June 25th. // That attack came without provocation and without warning. It was an act of raw aggression, without a shadow of justification.

I repeat -- it was an act of raw aggression.

The communist invasion was launched in great force, with planes, tanks, and artillery. The size of the attack, and the speed with which it was followed up, make it perfectly plain that it had been plotted long in advance.

As soon as word of the attack was received, Secretary of State Acheson called me at Independence, Missouri, and informed me that, with my approval, he would ask for an immediate meeting of the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council met just twenty-four hours after the communist invasion began.

One of the main reasons the Security Council was set up was to act in such cases as this -- to stop outbreaks of aggression in a hurry before they develop into general conflicts. In this case, the Council passed a resolution which called for the invaders of Korea to stop fighting, and to withdraw. The Council called on all members to help carry out this resolution. The communist invaders ignored the action of the Security Council and kept right on with their attack.

The Security Council then met again. It recommended that members of the United Nations help the Republic of Korea repel the attack, and help restore peace and security in the area.

Fifty-two of the fifty-nine countries which are members of the United Nations have given their support to the action taken by the Security Council to restore peace in Korea.

These actions by the United Nations and its members are of great importance. The free nations have now made it clear that lawless aggression will be met with force. The free nations have learned the fatal lesson of the 1930's. That lesson is that aggression must be met firmly. Appeasement leads only to further aggression and ultimately to war.

The principal effort to help the Koreans preserve their independence, and to help the United Nations restore peace, has been made by the United States. We have sent land, naval, and air forces to assist in these operations. We have done this because we know that what is at stake here is nothing less than our own national security and the peace of the world.

So far, two other nations -- Australia and Great Britain -- have sent planes to Korea; and six other nations -- Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, The Netherlands, and New Zealand -- have made naval forces available.

Under the flag of the United Nations, a unified command has been established for all forces of the members of the United Nations fighting in Korea. General Douglas MacArthur is the commander of this combined force.

The prompt action of the United Nations to put down lawless aggression, and the prompt response to this action by free peoples all over the world, will stand as a landmark in mankind's long search for a rule of law among nations.

Only a few countries have failed to endorse the efforts of the United Nations to stop the fighting in Korea. The most important of these is the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has boycotted the meetings of the United Nations Security Council, and it has refused to support the actions of the United Nations with respect to Korea.

The United States requested the Soviet Government, two days after the fighting started, to use its influence with the North Koreans to have them withdraw. The Soviet Government refused.

The Soviet Government has said many times that it wants peace in the world, but its attitude toward this act of aggression against the Republic of Korea is in direct contradiction of its statements.

For our part, we shall continue to support the United Nations action to restore peace.

We know that it will take a hard, tough fight to halt the invasion, and to drive the communists back. The invaders have been provided with enough equipment and supplies for a long campaign. They overwhelmed the lightly armed defense forces of the Korean Republic in the first few days and drove southward.

Now, however, the Korean defenders have reorganized, and an increasing number of American troops have joined them. Our forces have fought a skillful, rear-guard delaying action, pending the arrival of reinforcements. Some of these reinforcements are now arriving; others are on the way from the United States.

I should like to read you part of a report I have received from General Collins, Chief of Staff of the United States Army. General Collins and General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, have just returned from an inspection trip to Korea and Japan.

This is what General Collins has to say:

"United States armed forces in Korea are giving a splendid account of themselves.

"Our Far Eastern forces were organized and equipped primarily to perform peaceful occupation duties in Japan. However, under General MacArthur's magnificent leadership, they have quickly adapted themselves to meet the deliberately planned attack of the North Korean communist forces, which are well-equipped, well-led, and battle-trained, and which have at times outnumbered our troops by as much as twenty to one.

"Our Army troops, ably supported by tactical aircraft of the United States Air Force and Navy and our Australian friends, flying under most adverse conditions of weather, have already distinguished themselves in the most difficult of military operations -- a delaying action. The fact that they are preventing the communists from overrunning Korea -- which this calculated attack had been designed to accomplish -- is a splendid tribute to the ability of our armed forces to convert quickly from the peaceful duties of occupation to the grim duties of war.

"The task that confronts us is not an easy one, but I am confident of the outcome."

I should also like to read to you part of a report that I received from General MacArthur a few hours ago:

General MacArthur says:

"It is, of course, impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy future incidents of a military campaign. Over a broad front involving continuous local struggles, there are bound to be ups and downs, losses as well as successes.... But the issue of battle is now fully joined and will proceed along lines of action in which we will not be without choice. Our hold upon the southern part of Korea represents a secure base. Our casualties, despite overwhelming odds, have been relatively light. Our strength will continually increase while that of the enemy will relatively decrease. His supply line is insecure. He has had his great chance but failed to exploit it. We are now in Korea in force, and with God's help we are there to stay until the constitutional authority of the Republic is fully restored."

These and other reports I have received, show that our armed forces are acting with close teamwork and efficiency to meet the problems facing us in Korea.

These reports are reassuring, but they also show that the job ahead of us in Korea is long and difficult.

Furthermore, the fact that communist forces have invaded Korea is a warning that there may be similar acts of aggression in other parts of the world. The free nations must be on their guard, more than ever before, against this kind of sneak attack.

It is obvious that we must increase our military strength and preparedness immediately. There are three things we need to do.

First, we need to send more men, equipment, and supplies to General MacArthur.

Second, in view of the world situation, we need to build up our own Army, Navy, and Air Force over and above what is needed in Korea.

Third, we need to speed up our work with other countries in strengthening our common defenses.

To help meet these needs, I have already authorized increases in the size of our armed forces. These increases will come in part from volunteers, in part from Selective Service, and in part from the National Guard and the Reserves.

I have also ordered that military supplies and equipment be obtained at a faster rate.

The necessary increases in the size of our armed forces, and the additional equipment they must have, will cost about ten billion dollars, and I am asking the Congress to appropriate the amount required.

These funds will be used to train men and equip them with tanks, planes, guns, and ships, in order to build the strength we need to help assure peace in the world.

When we have worked out with other free countries an increased program for our common defense, I shall recommend to the Congress that additional funds be provided for this purpose. This is of great importance. The free nations face a world-wide threat. It must be met with a world-wide defense. The United States and the other free nations can multiply their strength by joining with one another.

in a common effort to provide this defense. This is our best hope for peace.

The things we need to do to build up our military defense will require considerable adjustment in our domestic economy. We have a tremendously rich and productive economy, and it is expanding every year.

Our job now is to divert to defense purposes more of that tremendous productive capacity — more steel, more aluminum, more of a good many things.

Some of the additional production for military purposes can come from making fuller use of plants which are not operating at capacity. But many of our industries are already going full tilt, and until we can add new capacity, some of the resources we need for the national defense will have to be taken from civilian uses.

This requires us to take certain steps to make sure that we obtain the things we need for the national defense, and at the same time guard against inflationary price rises.

The steps that are needed now must be taken promptly.

In the message which I sent to the Congress today, I described the economic measures which are required at this time.

First, we need laws which will insure prompt and adequate supplies for military and essential civilian use. I have therefore recommended that the Congress give the Government power to guide the flow of materials into essential uses, to restrict their use for non-essential purposes, and to prevent the accumulation of unnecessary inventories.

Second, we must adopt measures to prevent inflation and to keep our Government in a sound financial condition. One of the major causes of inflation is the excessive use of credit. I have recommended that the Congress authorize the Government to set limits on installment buying and to curb speculation in agricultural commodities. In the housing field, where Government credit is an important factor, I have already directed that credit restraints be applied, and I have recommended that the Congress authorize further controls.

As an additional safeguard against inflation, and to help finance our defense needs, it will be necessary to make substantial increases in taxes. This is a contribution to our national security that every one of us should stand ready to make. As soon as a balanced and fair tax program can be worked out, I shall lay it before the Congress. This tax program will have as a major aim the elimination of profiteering.

Third, we should increase the production of goods needed for national defense. We must plan to enlarge our defense production, not just for the immediate future, but for the next several years. This will be primarily a task for our businessmen and workers. However, to help obtain the necessary increases, the Government should be authorized to provide certain types of financial assistance to private industry to increase defense production.

Our military needs are large, and to meet them will require hard work and steady effort, but I know that we can produce what we need if each of us does his part — each man, each woman, each soldier, each civilian. This is a time for all of us to pitch in and work together.

I have been sorry to hear that some people have fallen victim to rumors in the last week or two, and have been buying up various things they have heard would be scarce. This is

foolish -- and it is selfish, because hoarding results in entirely unnecessary local shortages.

Hoarding food is especially foolish. There is plenty of food in this country. I have read that there have been runs on sugar in some cities. This is ridiculous. We now have more sugar available than ever before. There are ample supplies of our other basic foods also.

I sincerely hope that every American housewife will keep this in mind when she does her daily shopping.

If I had thought that we were actually threatened by shortages of essential consumer goods, I should have recommended that price control and rationing be immediately instituted. But there is no such threat. We have to fear only those shortages which we ourselves artificially create.

Every businessman who is trying to profit from time of national danger -- every person who is selfishly trying to get more than his neighbor -- is doing just exactly the thing that any enemy of this country would want him to do.

If prices should rise unduly because of excessive buying or speculation, I know our people will want the Government to take action, and I will not hesitate to recommend rationing and price control.

We have the resources to meet our needs. Far more important, the American people are united in their belief in democratic freedom. We are united in detesting communist slavery.

We know that the cost of freedom is high. But we are determined to preserve our freedom -- no matter what the cost.

I know that our people are willing to do their part to support our soldiers and sailors and airmen who are fighting in Korea. I know that our fighting men can count on each and every one of you.

Our country stands before the world as an example of how free men, under God, can build a community of neighbors, working together for the good of all.

That is the goal we seek not only for ourselves, but for all people. We believe that freedom and peace are essential if men are to live as our Creator intended us to live. It is this faith that has guided us in the past, and it is this faith that will fortify us in the stern days ahead.

7/20/50

MR. MURPHY —

When George Elsey phoned for his papers this morning, he asked that this message be taken out and given to you.

1d

W. J. H.

7/20/50

In case you haven't seen this - & are interested, I'm sending it to the F. B. I. C. S. via you -

471-B

UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

16 July 1950

FILED BY
MR. HOPKINS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

JUL 21 1950

Following is the additional information you have requested in amplification of my oral report to you on Saturday. I should like to emphasize again that I was greatly impressed with the speed and effectiveness with which General MacArthur's forces reacted to meet X584 the situation in fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with the brave Korean Government forces in the defense of their country.

United States Armed Forces in Korea are giving a splendid account of themselves. Our Far Eastern Forces were organized and equipped primarily to perform peaceful occupation duties in Japan. X197 However, under General MacArthur's magnificent leadership, they have quickly adapted themselves to meet the deliberately-planned attack of the North Korean communist forces, which are well-equipped, well-led, and battle-trained and which have at times out-numbered our troops by as much as twenty to one. Our Army troops, ably supported by tactical aircraft of the U. S. Air Force and Navy and our Australian friends flying under most adverse conditions of weather, X1285-1 have already distinguished themselves in the most difficult of military X1285-2 operations, a delaying action. The fact that they are preventing the communists from over-running Korea which this calculated attack has X1285-3 been designed to accomplish is a splendid tribute to the ability of our Armed Forces to convert quickly from the peaceful duties of occupation to the grim duties of war. The support that our Navy and Air Force are giving to our Army is of the highest order. The task that confronts us is not an easy one, but I am confident of the outcome. X48-D

Even greater effort will be demanded in the period ahead, but since our cause is the cause of free peoples everywhere, we are determined to do our utmost in aiding the United Nations to drive X85-H back this evil invasion of the free world.

J. Lester Collier

X1285-A

Chief of Staff

DAILY OPINION SUMMARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 1416

July 20, 1950

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

Plan,

The President's message to Congress meets with strong, unified support in initial reaction.

1. With few dissenting notes, Eastern newspapers and commentators agree that the President's program represents a realistic response to the Korean situation and other international problems.

2. According to the press, Congressional reaction also shows powerful, bi-partisan backing for the President's program. Some Republicans, however, said they want to give the program close scrutiny; and a few continued to complain about past foreign policy "failures".

3. Some commentators express surprise at the size of the President's mobilization program, but there is general agreement with the view of the N.Y. Journal of Commerce: "Any less extensive and ambitious program than that which the President outlined... might have been taken by the enemy as a sign of weakening, and done the cause of free peoples more harm than good".

4. At the same time, several spokesman question whether the President's program is enough:

Governor Dewey: The program "is a strong step in the right direction and I wholeheartedly support the program", but "it is belated and will not wholly meet the Communist world-wide threat".

Senator Johnson (D., Tex.): "I think we must go much farther, much faster".

5. Special emphasis is placed on the significance of the President's message as a statement of U.S. world policy respecting Communist aggression:

N.Y. Herald Tribune: The message "stands as an unanswerable Indictment against those who planned the unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea".

Philadelphia Inquirer: "It is in effect a stern warning to Soviet Russia that Communist aggression outside Korea would be a threat to world peace and would be met by force".

Washington Post: "President Truman has put aggressive communism on notice that it must reckon with American might no less than American principle".

KOREA

"Post-war" policy for Korea is discussed by several commentators, who recommend a unified Korea. Meanwhile, the US rejection of Soviet "peace terms" continues to be applauded.

Walter Lippmann strongly urges a UN settlement for Korea once the invaders have been repulsed. Denying that the division of Korea can continue in the future, Lippmann says: "The only way out of this dilemma is to rely upon the UN to work out an arrangement for selecting or electing an all-Korean govt." Lippmann also suggests that a UN Korean settlement can lead to "a UN intervention in the Formosan question".

A united Korea after victory is also urged by the Denver Post and by Rep. McCarthy (D., Minn.), according to a St. Paul Pioneer Press report. Robert Oliver (New Leader) declares: "Only by moving determinedly to root out the sources of contagion in North Korea itself will we show the Kremlin that any resort to force must inevitably run up against a solid front of democratic power."

America's refusal to accept mediation on the reported Soviet terms (seating Communist China on the Security Council) is warmly supported by the C. S. Monitor, Des Moines Register, Milwaukee Journal and Louisville Courier-Journal. "It will not do to reward aggression or submit to international blackmail", says the Monitor.

The absence of troops from other UN members in Korea disturbs Frank Edwards (MBS) and Felix Morley (NBC). In Arthur Krook's opinion, if other UN nations cannot give the "assurances" in Korea that Americans expect, "the American Govt. should promptly make clear to the people the reasons therefor."

William Henry Chamberlin (Wall St. Journal) warns that the Soviet Union may be planning to "bleed" Western strength indefinitely. Harry Kern (Newsweek) suggests that the US "walked into one of history's best-laid traps" in Korea. In Kern's opinion, Moscow may have lured American troops into the conflict deliberately. "The ultimate Russian purpose is to control and direct against the West the forces of Asiatic nationalism", Kern says.

NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY

In light of the present situation in Korea, the Des Moines Register calls attention to the immediate need to put Europe's defenses in readiness. The Register states: "We must keep up our building of industrial and military strength in Europe even though the Korean war is burdensome. If the eastern shores of Asia are important...the land mass and the peoples of Western Europe are absolutely vital."

RESTRICTED

7/21/50

471-B

July 20, 1950

Dear Mr. Putnam:

The pledge in your telegram of July nineteenth, made in the name of the National Association of Manufacturers, gives one renewed strength and courage in this time of crisis and in the grave days that lie ahead.

We are indeed the arsenal of democracy, *xpp7420* and I believe with every conviction of mind and soul that there is no challenge to free institutions which cannot be met by the united effort of free American men and women.

Your splendid message is a witness to that national unity which is our greatest source *xpp7318* of strength in this hour of peril.

Very sincerely yours,

Sgd: HARRY S. TRUMAN

xpp7325

1/72

Mr. Claude A. Putnam,
President,
National Association of Manufacturers,
11 West 49 Street,
New York, N.Y.

#294
xpp72210

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n. 4*
The White House
Washington

WB081 PD

1950 JUL 19 PM 5 00

FAX NEWYORK NY JUL 19 326P

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRODUCTIVE MIGHT OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY IS PLEDGED TO
SUPPLY THE FULL NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATIONS
ALLIED WITH HER IN THE EFFORT TO PRESERVE FREEDOM.

IF THE PRESENT COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN KOREA
SHOULD LEAD TO A GENERAL WAR, AND WE HOPE AND PRAY THAT IT
WILL NOT, AMERICAN INDUSTRY IS READY.

IN THE FIVE YEARS OF THE POSTWAR PERIOD,
AMERICA'S PRODUCTIVE PLANT AND FACILITIES HAVE BEEN
IMPROVED AND EXPANDED FAR BEYOND THE CAPACITY WE HAD IN
THE BEGINNINGS OF WORLD WAR II, AND WHICH MADE US THE ARSENAL
OF DEMOCRACY. AMERICA'S FREE MEN AND WOMEN, HER INDUSTRIAL
RESOURCES, AND HER PRODUCTIVE KNOW HOW AND ABILITY, WILL
MEET THE CHALLENGE WHICH YOU HAVE OUTLINED

CLAUDE A PUTNAM PRESIDENT NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF MANUFACTURERS..